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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the topic of intrahousehold resource
allocation models. The first chapter tests the unitary and general collective models of
intrahousehold resource allocation for various household compositions. I find that, for the quasiquadratic Engel curve specification, the overall results support the previous findings in the
literature that the unitary model fails to explain how resources are allocated for all household
types. However, when using the QUAIDS specification, the results can reject the unitary model
only for smaller-sized households. The general collective model, on the other hand, cannot be
rejected in either quasi-quadratic or QUAIDS and not in any of the household compositions.
Overall, the results support the general collective model of household behavior rather than the
unitary model.
The second chapter derives and tests restrictions imposed by the collective model for
households with more than two decision-makers in the absence of price variation. It extends the
two-decision-maker model in chapter one to derive the testable restrictions for households with
multiple decision makers using unconditional demand systems. Moreover, for comparison, a
particular type of demand system that is conditional on distribution factors is also estimated as an
alternative way to test the collective model. The results show that neither unconditional nor
conditional demand systems can reject Pareto efficiency. Therefore, both approaches provide
consistent outcomes supporting the hypothesis that the multiple-decision-maker households in
Thailand behave in the Pareto efficient manner predicted by the collective model.
Finally, my third chapter attempts to examine how one can exploit household-level
consumption data to recover information about individual household members for situations with
iii

no price variation. By combining consumption data from single and couple households, I am able
to estimate the resource shares and indifference scales (a variation of the standard equivalence
scales in the collective settings) for each household member via a system of Engel curves. The
results show that, in Thailand, wives are likely to have higher resource shares than husbands in
the married-couple households, while wives with higher education have the ability to extract
more household resources. However, resource shares for wives are smaller for older-married
compared to younger-married couples. Moreover, if a female were to live alone, she would need
approximately three-quarters of the couple‟s income to reach the same indifference curve, and
hence the same standard of living, that she would attain as a wife in the married-couple
household.
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INTRODUCTION
Conventional economic analysis of consumption and welfare treats members of
households as if they behaved as a single individual. This unitary perspective has been
challenged by the collective approach, which emphasizes how the consumption and welfare of
individuals partly depends on economic and social interactions within households. The unitary
and collective models have different implications for the welfare effects of public policy and for
the assessment of inequality in society, and for this reason many researchers have tested these
models. A body of evidence has accumulated that rejects key implications of the unitary model,
and a smaller body of evidence exists supporting predictions of the collective model.
Previous tests of the unitary and collective models, however, suffer from at least four
shortcomings. First, in most prior work, models are tested only for one particular type of
household composition, usually a married couple with no children. But household composition,
as measured by the number, ages, and genders of household members, is known to influence
consumption decisions. The presence of children has a particularly strong influence on
household behavior. It is not clear whether test results obtained for one type of household apply
more broadly to other types. Second, prior tests of unitary and collective models without price
variation have relied almost exclusively on one functional form for describing household
consumption behavior, the quasi-quadratic Engel curve. This functional form is not consistent
with preference maximization and is not typically employed in analysis of household
expenditures using the unitary model. It is not clear whether rejection of the unitary model in this
setting, or support for the collective model, is an artifact of the peculiar choice of functional
form. Third, the testable implications of the collective model have not been derived for all
1

applications. Specifically, testable restrictions for households with more than two decisionmakers have not been derived for situations with no price variation. Many households may
include more than two persons with a voice in decisions, and cross-sectional analyses of
consumption almost always must be conducted in the absence of price variation. Fourth, prior
studies have given relatively little attention to whether a statistically significant difference
between unitary and collective models translates into a substantive difference in conclusions
about economic welfare.
This dissertation addresses these four issues using cross-sectional consumption data from
Thailand. The dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter tests the unitary and general
collective models of intrahousehold resource allocation for various household compositions,
using both the quasi-quadratic functional form and the utility-theoretic Quadratic Almost Ideal
Demand System (QUAIDS) commonly employed in the analysis of household budgets in the
unitary framework. The second chapter derives and tests restrictions imposed by the collective
model for households with more than two decision-makers in the absence of price variation. It
extends the two-decision-maker model in chapter one to derive the testable restrictions for
households with multiple decision makers using unconditional demand systems. Finally, since
measuring consumption inequality is a major application of the analysis of household
expenditures, the third chapter attempts to estimate measures of consumption inequality that are
based on the collective model.

2

CHAPTER ONE: TESTING THE UNITARY VS. COLLECTIVE MODELS
OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR USING THAI CONSUMPTION DATA
1.1. Introduction
Economic policy analyses often focus on individual welfare based on such outcomes as
level of income, consumption, literacy, employment, or health condition. However, it is widely
recognized that the welfare of an individual is based not only on own decisions, but also on the
economic and social interactions within the household. These interactions can be affected by the
process of allocating resources among household members, and the outcomes of this process can
be referred to as intrahousehold resource allocation. Several models of intrahousehold resource
allocation exist in the literature to examine household behavior: unitary model (Samuelson 1956;
Becker 1981), general collective model (Chiappori 1988, 1992), cooperative bargaining model
with cooperative outcome (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981), and
cooperative bargaining model with noncooperative outcome (Lundberg and Pollak 1993).
If we assume that households make consumption decisions as if they maximize a single
utility function given a budget constraint, then we must predict that only total household income
should matter in their consumption decisions and the various sources of income should be
irrelevant. However, the unitary model has been challenged by a number of empirical studies that
have rejected this income pooling hypothesis using different data sets from different countries
(Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas and Chen 1994; Lundberg et al.
1997; Ward-Batts 2008). Thus, collective models of household behavior which do not predict
income pooling have attracted increasing attention from economists during recent years. This
chapter will attempt to test these two models of intrahousehold resource allocations using
3

consumption expenditure data from Thailand: the unitary model which assumes that each
household maximizes a single utility function subject to its pooled budget constraint; and the
general collective model which assumes that each household member has separate utility
functions, and that the household reaches a Pareto efficient outcome.
However, neither the unitary nor the collective models have taken into consideration the
possibilities that different household types may have different allocation methods. By different
household types, I refer to households with a different number of people living in the same
house. Different regions and countries are likely to have different household compositions.
According to Bongaarts (2001), average household size in the developing world during 1990 to
1998 ranges from 4.8 in Latin America to 5.6 in the Near East/North Africa; with 5.1 in Asia and
5.2 in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the average household size in the developed
countries during late 1990s is much lower ranging from 2.1 in Sweden to 3.1 in Ireland; with 2.6
in United States and Canada, 2.5 in France, and 2.4 in United Kingdom (Economic Commission
for Europe Statistical Division, 2001).
Moreover, households consisting of spouses only are likely to behave differently from
households consisting of spouses with children on how to allocate resources among household
members. As noted by Browning (1992), every aspect of household economic behavior is
significantly correlated with the presence of children in the household. For example, young
children are correlated with lower labor supply by the mothers while older children are correlated
with higher consumption by the household as a whole. Even when comparing among nuclear
families, smaller-size and bigger-size families may behave differently when some decisions need
to be made within the family.
4

Apart from children, it is fairly common in many developing countries to have other
types of dependents living in the same house. This may partly contribute to the fact that most
developing countries have larger average household size than that of developed countries. This is
also common in Thai society where the average household size is 4.4 in year 1990 and 4.0 in
year 2000 (National Statistical Office Thailand, 2000). These dependents may include household
head‟s and spouse‟s grandchildren, parents, grandparents, cousins and other blood relatives who
have no income. Consequently, their consumption allocations depend only on incomes of
household head, spouse, or other income earners of the family. All of these differences in
household types imply that, in some cases, when we reject the income pooling hypothesis on one
particular household type in one particular region, it does not necessarily mean that we will have
to reject the same hypothesis when considering other household types in other regions. This is
also true in the case of other alternative models.
There are two concerns that should be mentioned when we try to analyze the models of
intrahousehold resource allocations. First, it is difficult to determine how resources are actually
allocated within households since in most household surveys, consumption and expenditure data
are collected at the household rather than individual level so individual consumption is not
directly observed. Without individual level data, it is difficult to determine which individuals are
consumers of goods purchased by the household. For example, housing expenditures have a
public good component within the household. Expenditures on specific goods may be assignable
such as expenditures on men‟s, women‟s, and children‟s clothing. Even for such assignable
goods, however, there may be externalities within the household; for example, an individual
within the household may care whether other household members are well dressed. Another
5

example is that, in most parts of the world, women are more responsible for purchasing food than
men. This information, however, does not tell us how the food will be distributed among
household members (Doss 1996).
Second, endogeneity of the distribution of income within the household may create
problems when testing these models. An example is earned income since its distribution and
magnitude depend on hours worked by each member, which may be determined jointly with
household expenditures. As noted by Browning and Meghir (1991), if hours of work affect
preferences between individual goods then demand systems that take no account of this
dependence may give biased estimates. However, testing these models based on unearned
income instead of earned income may mitigate but does not completely avoid this problem. For
example, as pointed out by Lundberg et al. (1997) and Ward-Batts (2008), income from assets
may be correlated with past and current labor supplies, while public and private transfers may be
responsive to household distress due to unemployment or bad health, and may be related to
expenditures through the events that prompted them. Other sources of unexpected unearned
income that are not subject to these concerns tend to be irregular, so they are not appropriate
sources of income to test these models.
In order to test these two models in a consistent framework, I follow the strategies
adopted by Bourguignon et al. (1993) and Thomas and Chen (1994) who apply a theoretical
model of collective decision making which nests both the income pooling and the Pareto
efficient hypotheses within a general specification of consumption behavior. In this framework,
the assumption of Pareto efficient allocation within the household generates testable restrictions
on the parameters of the model. This may be done by observing only aggregate household
6

consumption of goods rather than individual consumption levels, so we need not to assume that
goods are assignable. Moreover, instead of treating household income as endogenous, I will treat
household income exogenously by using the data of couples in which both partners are full-time
employees in the paid labor market as suggested by Bourguignon et al. (1993). Using exogenous
income in testing these two models may reduce the endogeneity problem of income distribution
by making household consumption decisions independent from household leisure choices.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 gives a brief review of the existing
theoretical literature on models of household behavior. Section 1.3 provides details of the unitary
and the general collective models together with their testable restrictions. Section 1.4 describes
sample data. Section 1.5 outlines the empirical model of household expenditures estimated in
this chapter and presents results. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section 1.6.

1.2. Models of household resource allocations
The early models of household behavior, not unexpectedly, were extensions of existing
models of individual behavior and hence are termed unitary models. For example, Samuelson
(1956) proposes modeling household as if they are maximizing a single household utility
function reached by consensus among individual household members so that the household can
be considered as an elementary decision unit. An alternative justification for this traditional
model is that there is one household member (a dictator) who determines all allocations from the
point of view of an altruist who cares about other household members (Becker 1981). The
unitary approach has the advantages of simplicity and convenience because the results derived
for individual can be directly extended to the household situation.
7

One implication of the unitary model is that only total household income, and not the
separate incomes of individual members, will affect household demands. Which household
member receives income is irrelevant to the allocation of household resources. Rejection of the
pooling hypothesis, and hence unitary model, has important implications for the effectiveness of
policies aimed at improving welfare of particular household members. The unitary model implies
that transfer policies that attempt to redistribute income to particular household members will be
neutralized by reallocations of household resources. The welfare of the targeted member may be
improved, but no more or less than if the transfer had been given to another household member.
In other words, a dollar of the transfer income has the same effect on household demands
whether the transfer is made to the husband or to the wife.
While treating the household as a single homogeneous unit has the advantages of
simplicity and convenience, aggregating a group of individuals into a household in this way
involves invoking assumptions that are not theoretically attractive. i.e., all household resources
are pooled. The unitary model also has been challenged by a number of empirical studies that
have rejected the income pooling hypothesis (Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Bourguignon et al.
1993; Thomas and Chen 1994; Lundberg et al. 1997; Ward-Batts 2008). On the other hand, a
variety of collective models of household behavior have been developed to allow for the
possibility that each household member has distinct preferences. These models do not impose the
income pooling hypothesis. They include general collective model (Chiappori 1988, 1992),
cooperative bargaining model with cooperative outcome (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and
Horney 1981), and cooperative bargaining model with noncooperative outcome (Lundberg and
Pollak 1993).
8

The general collective model proposed by Chiappori (1988; 1992) allows the husband
and wife to have separate utility functions. This model assumes only that husband and wife
somehow choose an allocation of resources which is Pareto efficient such that neither could be
made better off by a redistribution of consumption goods without making the other worse off.
This model does not specify the process used by the household to reach Pareto efficiency, so it is
not a bargaining model. This is equivalent to the assumption that couples first share non-labor
income; then, given individual shares, each spouse chooses labor supply and consumption to
maximize his or her well-being. Sources of income can matter from this perspective if
contributions to total income influence the share one is allocated. This framework was designed
to let the data describe intrahousehold resource allocations and to use a minimum number of
assumptions to gain as much information from the data as possible.
The cooperative bargaining model of household behavior was initially developed by
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). They propose a bargaining
framework in which household decisions are made through a cooperative Nash-bargaining game.
In McElroy and Horney‟s model, it is again assumed that husband and wife have separate utility
functions, and each spouse receives utility from a pure public good. In addition, each spouse
values leisure and consumption of private goods. They solve a Nash-bargaining problem in
which each individual‟s threat point depends on options outside of the marriage; it is the utility
that each spouse would obtain if divorced. In addition to Pareto efficiency, the Nash bargaining
solution assumes three more axioms: symmetry, independence of utility origins and units, and
contraction independence (see Vermeulen 2002). To the extent that current income is a predictor
of income options in the event of divorce, each spouse‟s individual income will affect relative
9

bargaining power and hence the allocation of resources. In addition to income, the cooperative
bargaining model suggests that factors such as divorce laws, child support laws, tax laws and
transfer programs will affect relative bargaining power. McElroy (1990) refers to such factors as
“extrahousehold environmental parameters.” Browning et al. (1994) refer to them as
“distribution factors.”
Since it may be too extreme to suppose that spouses threaten divorce over every marital
disagreement, alternative threat points should be considered. Lundberg and Pollak (1993)
propose what they call “the separate spheres bargaining model” in which threat points are
noncooperative outcomes within the marriage which reflect traditional gender roles. If an
agreement cannot be reached through negotiation, gender roles determine each individual‟s
contribution to household public goods within their respective spheres of influence; for example,
men may be responsible for expenditures on housing, while women are responsible for
expenditures on child care. The implication of this model is that it generates corner solutions in
the provision of public goods. Because public goods are provided voluntarily, they may be
underprovided within the household, as is typical in models with voluntarily provided public
goods. So, both Pareto efficient and non-Pareto efficient outcomes are consistent with this
model.

1.3. Testing unitary versus collective models
Each model described in previous section has a different set of assumptions and makes
different predictions about how resources will be allocated within households. To examine a
model, it is important to test the validity of the predictions against the data to see whether
10

outcomes are consistent with the model. In this chapter, I will focus on testing the unitary model
and the general collective model of Chiappori (1988, 1992) using consumption expenditure data
from Thailand. The unitary model can be tested based on the income pooling hypothesis that
only total household income affects household demands for consumption of goods, while the
general collective model can be tested based on implications of the Pareto efficiency hypothesis.
I have chosen to focus on testing these two models for two main reasons. First, testing the
unitary model seems to be a sensible first step to study the household behavior. If we cannot
reject the income pooling hypothesis, then modeling the household as an individual may be
advantageous because the approach is simple and convenient. Second, testing the general
collective model does not require the estimation of threat points as required by the bargaining
models. This is important for an empirical purpose because estimating threat points requires a
cardinal representation of preferences.
During the past two decades, several empirical studies have rejected the unitary model
focusing on either labor supply or on consumption demand. Schultz (1990) tests for the
determination of husband and wife labor supply and fertility using unearned income based on the
1981 Socioeconomic Survey of Thailand. He rejects the prediction of the unitary model that
variables measuring the unearned income of the husband and the wife have equal coefficients in
the wife‟s labor supply equation. He finds that women prefer to consume more leisure time when
their unearned income increases but the effect for men‟s labor supply is not statistically
significant. Moreover, unearned income owned by the wife is significantly related to higher
fertility, and this effect is not evident for husband‟s unearned income.
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Thomas (1990) uses survey data on family health and nutrition in Brazil for 1974-1975 to
reject the unitary model prediction of the equality of parental income effects. He shows that
unearned income received by a mother has a much larger positive effect on the health of family
members than does unearned income received by a father. Moreover, the unitary model is also
rejected for gender preference when considering household resource allocations on child
anthropometric indicators. He finds that mothers prefer to devote resources to improve the
heights and weights of their daughters, while fathers prefer to do the same for their sons.
Bourguignon et al. (1993) use French household survey data in 1984-1985 to study
models of intrahousehold allocation focusing on household consumption expenditures. Initially,
they plan to analyze the behavior of couples without children because children and expenditure
on them may be considered as public goods by both parents, while the model analyzed in their
paper only allows for private goods. However, it turns out that considering only childless couples
leads to too small of a sample size. For this reason, they also include couples with one child in
the sample which still provides only 843 households. Complying with the fixed labor supply
model by analyzing the effects of exogenous incomes on consumption expenditures, they are
able to reject the unitary model that individual incomes have no effect on how household
resources are allocated. Conversely, they are unable to reject the collective model which suggests
that actual behavior may prove not to be inconsistent with the cooperative hypothesis.
Thomas and Chen (1994) use individual and household incomes from household budget
survey data in Taiwan in year 1980 to test the unitary and collective models focusing on ten
expenditure groups. They examine three samples separately; the first sample contains a full
sample of all 14,697 households; the second sub-sample includes only those households with
12

both male and female head present; and the third sub-sample restricts the sample to include only
those who live in urban areas. They also examine a series of empirical Engel curves; each
includes only non-labor income which is treated as exogenous, or total income (labor and nonlabor) which is treated as endogenous. Overall, the evidence indicates that the unitary model is
not consistent with Taiwanese data while the collective model performs very well with the data
for each pair of goods. However, these results rely critically on the assumption that total income
is not exogenous. When total income is not instrumented, the collective model is rejected for 19
of 45 pairs of goods. The difference in results illustrates that the assumptions used when
specifying and estimating Engel curves can influence inferences about intrahousehold resource
allocation.
Lundberg et al. (1997) use U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data for the period of
1973-90 to test the income pooling hypothesis based on a policy change in the U.K. that
transferred a substantial child allowance from husbands to wives in the late 1970s. They consider
expenditure patterns for families consisting of one child; two children; and three children.
Childless couples are excluded because the wide age range of families (which include the
elderly) is likely to result in expenditure patterns incomparable to those of households containing
children. They use clothing expenditure as a prime category to examine the effect of a policy
change because clothing expenditures are assignable to individual household members. The
results clearly reject the income pooling hypothesis since there are significant changes in
clothing expenditure patterns. For families with two or three children, there is a substantial
increase in spending on women‟s and children‟s clothing relative to men‟s clothing following the
transfer of resources from men to women. There is no significant change in the one-child
13

families, while for families with two and three children the differences are significant. The
difference in results illustrates that conclusions about intrahousehold resource allocation may
depend on household composition.
Ward-Batts (2008) uses micro level data to analyze how budget shares change before and
after the same child benefit reform in the UK for the two-parent families with and without
children as an extension of Lundberg et al. (1997). Her overall results support the findings by
Lundberg et al. (1997) which reject income pooling. In addition, she finds one interesting result
that the estimates of budget shares among married-couple households with no children do not
show a similar pattern of change to that in households with children. The sample without
children shows no change in broad goods expenditures, or in narrowly defined goods with the
exception of tobacco categories. Other tobacco is the only good for which similar changes are
found in households with and without children.
Unlike previous studies that often test unitary or collective models using only one or a
few household types, I will test both models using a broader range of household types, including
non-nuclear families. This emphasis on household composition fits particularly well with the
traditional Thai society in which not only children but also other blood relatives live together in
the same household. One important assumption imposed for the models estimated in this chapter
is that each family must have only two income earners who are spouses while the remaining
family members are dependents with no income. This restriction allows us to compare the results
from this chapter with the results from previous studies that consider only the two-earner
households, with the emphasis on the differences in results that may have been affected by
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household composition. This restriction will be relaxed in chapter two where I consider
consumption allocation of multiple-earner households.
Let us begin by considering a household consisting of an earning couple with D
dependents in which one of the spouses is a dictator who has an altruistic preference. Thus, the
dictator determines all allocations to household members as if solving the problem

Max
U ( x h , x w , x d ; a) ,
h w d

d = 1,…, D

(1.1)

x ,x ,x

subject to a budget constraint
D

ph xh  pw x w   pd xd  y0  yh  y w  y
d 1

where x j ( j  h, w, d ) denotes consumption of a vector of goods by individual j (husband, wife,
and the d th dependent), x d equals zero when the household has no dependents, a denotes a
vector of individual and household characteristics, p j denotes a vector of prices faced by
individual j, y j denotes exogenous income (full-time wage and salary in the labor market) of
individual j, and y0 represents exogenous joint household income (non-invested household
income, e.g. assistance from other persons outside the household) .
Assuming that the utility function U(.) is continuous and quasiconcave, and the second
order sufficient condition is satisfied, then by the implicit function theorem we can solve the
first-order conditions of problem (1.1) for the demand for good i by individual j, xij . In general,

xij will depend on all prices ph, pw, and p d denoted by p, and exogenous incomes y0, yh and yw as
well as individual and household characteristics a:

xij  xij ( p, y 0 , y h , y w ; a) .

(1.2)
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When only household consumption is observed, the household demand for good i can be
written as:
D

xi  xih  xiw   xid  xi ( p, y 0 , y h , y w ; a) .

(1.3)

d 1

However, in the unitary model, whether income is received by husband or wife is
irrelevant. The income pooling hypothesis predicts that household demand only depends on total
household income, y = y0 + yh + yw as well as all prices and household characteristics. Then, the
household demand for good i can also be written as:

xi  xi ( p, y; a) .

(1.4)

Equation (1.4) implies that it does not matter who controls income in the household so
that redistribution of income within the household should not affect household resource
allocations. This suggests a simple test of the income pooling hypothesis that in the household
demand function for good i, the marginal effects of husband‟s and wife‟s incomes should be
zero. If the income pooling is rejected, hence the unitary model, then we should determine what
other household model might be consistent with the data. Thus, I continue to test if the data is
consistent with the general collective model.
Continuing with the assumption that a household consists of two spouses and any number
of dependents, and assume further that each spouse has altruistic preferences in the sense that
each cares about every member‟s consumption of goods. I also assume that all dependents only
play a passive role in this model such that all consumption decisions are made by the spouses.
Thus, I will treat dependents‟ consumptions as household public goods. Let dependents‟
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consumptions and all other household public goods be represented by X, then any Pareto
efficient allocations solves the problem:

Max
U h ( x h , x w , X ; a)
h w

(1.5)

x ,x , X

subject to

U w ( x h , x w , X ; a)  u w

p h x h  p w x w  PX  y 0  y h  y w  y
where u w is some required utility level for the wife and P denotes a price vector for public
goods. Thus, the maximization problem (1.5) seeks an allocation that maximizes the husband‟s
welfare subject to a given welfare level required for the wife and to the household budget
constraint. By varying u w , all Pareto efficient allocations can be traced out. This set of Pareto
efficient allocations forms the boundary of the utility possibility set, which captures all attainable
vectors of utility levels for the household.
According to Chiappori (1992) and Vermeulen (2002), the household allocation problem
(1.5) is equivalent to the following maximization problem:
Max U h ( x h , x w , X ; a)  (1   )U w ( x h , x w , X ; a)

xh , xw , X

subject to

p h x h  p w x w  PX  y
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(1.6)

1

where 0 < µ < 1. In this social welfare context, welfare weights µ and (1- µ) are attached to both
husband and wife. In general, the weighting function µ will depend on the exogenous variables
which can be written as:

   ( p h , p w , P, y 0 , y h , y w , a) .

(1.7)

These welfare weights play an important role in this model. An interpretation of these
welfare weights is that they represent the bargaining power of the spouses in the intrahousehold
allocation process. Changes in prices, exogenous incomes or household characteristics may shift
bargaining power from one spouse to another. Solving maximization problem (1.6) yields the
demand for any private good, xi, and the demand for any public good, Xm, as a function of prices,
total household income and the household characteristics as well as the welfare weight, μ:

xi  xi ( p h , p w , P, y, a,  )

(1.8)

X m  X m ( p h , p w , P, y, a,  ) .

(1.9)

Since we have the data on each spouse‟s individual income yh and yw, then we can
differentiate the demand function (1.8) with respect to yh and yw to obtain:

1

To see this, note that the Lagrangian function of the maximization problem (1.5) equals:

U h ( x h , x w , X ; a)   [U w ( x h , x w , X ; a)  u w ]  [ y 0  y h  y w  p h x h  p w x w  PX ].
Multiplying this Lagrangian function by

1
, results in
1 

U h ( x h , x w , X ; a)  (1   )U w ( x h , x w , X ; a)   [ y 0  y h  y w  p h x h  p w x w  PX ] where
1

w

and  
and where the unimportant constant u for the maximization problem has been
1 
1 
eliminated. See Vermeulen (2002).
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xi xi y xi 


y h y y h  y h

(1.10)

xi
x y x 
 i w i w
w
y y
 y
y

(1.11)

By dividing (1.10) by (1.11) holding total household income constant, the ratio of any
two income effects can be written as

xi / y h
 / y h

xi / y w
 / y w

(1.12)

which is independent of i for private good.
Similarly, we can differentiate the demand function (1.9) with respect to yh and yw to
obtain:

X m / y h
 / y h

X m / y w
 / y w

(1.13)

which is independent of m for public good.
Thus, (1.12) and (1.13) provide a straightforward test for Pareto efficiency which is a
simple way to test the validity of the general collective model. They imply that the ratio of
husband income effects to wife income effects will be the same across all pairs of goods.

1.4. Data
The data comes from the Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted by National
Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO) on a sample of about 52,000 households in year 2006. The
SES has been carried out every two years. The objective of the survey is to collect economic and
social information about households such as income, expenditures, housing characteristics,
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ownership of selected durable goods and changes in assets and liabilities, for measuring the
variation in levels of living and disparities among households in different socioeconomic groups
and geographic areas. All sample households were divided into 12 equally representative subsamples, and each sub-sample household group was interviewed about economic and social
information for a one month period, from January to December 2006. The survey covered all
private, non-institutional households residing permanently in municipal areas and non-municipal
areas of all 76 provinces from five regions of Thailand. However, it excluded the population
living in transient hotels and rooming houses, hostels, boarding schools, or living in institutions
such as temples, military barracks, prisons, welfare institutes, hospitals and other such
institutions. It also excluded households of foreign diplomats and other temporary residents.
Dependent variables are monthly consumption expenditures for each of 12 categories.
This excludes expenditures on durable goods such as automobiles, televisions, refrigerators,
household furniture.2 For each category, the survey records the consumption data in terms of last
month expenditures on more frequently purchased goods, while recording monthly average of
expenditures during the past 12 months for less frequently purchased goods. This data recording
technique helps to avoid the problem of households recording zero consumption on some
infrequently purchased goods that are not „true‟ zeros as pointed out by Phipps and Burton
(1998).
The survey records three measurements of spouses‟ incomes depending on how the
questions are written in the survey. The first question is a direct question asking how much each
2

I choose to exclude expenditures on durable goods from monthly consumption expenditures because total
consumption expenditure may be higher in periods when households purchase durable goods so that it may not
represent the usual household‟s consumption patterns. However, the overall results are similar when including
durable goods to monthly consumption expenditures, and are available upon request from the author.
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spouse typically earns from their jobs per month. The second question asks how much they
actually received from their jobs last month. The third question asks how much they actually
received from their jobs during the past 12 months. In order to obtain an average monthly
income from the third question, I divide the income received during the past 12 months by the
actual length of the working period. The data show that the correlations among these three
measurements of monthly incomes are significantly high: 0.96 between direct and last month
questions, 0.98 between direct and average monthly questions, and 0.95 between last month and
average monthly questions. In this chapter, I choose to use incomes recorded from the direct
question because that is normally the amount people deem to possess in Thai society. Moreover,
workers in some occupations may have not yet received last month payments during the month
of the interview. Using incomes from the direct question also has an advantage of reducing a
number of workers reporting zero income compared to the case where the question of the actual
incomes received last month had been chosen.
Level of education is recorded as the highest level of official educational attainment, so I
convert each level of official education attainment into official years in school. Age is recorded
up to subject‟s last birthday. Household size accounts for everyone excluding maids and
servants, while children variables account for the number of younger children (aged less than
five years) and older children (aged between 6 to 14 years) living in the same residence.
Ownership dummies correspond to whether households own houses or vehicles. Regional
dummies indicate residence in Bangkok or other regions of Thailand, and the urban dummy
denotes residence in a municipal area.
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To be consistent with the model presented in the previous section, the sample is limited to
households consisting of a married couple with one spouse recorded as head of the household,
living with or without dependents of all ages. Both spouses are full-time employees who work
for a minimum of 35 hours per week outside their home, and no one other than these spouses is
reported to have any income. This results in a total sample size of 2933 households. Table 1
provides overall descriptive statistics for this sample.

1.5. Empirical model of household expenditures and results
Before testing the validity of the predictions of the unitary against the collective models,
let us first assume that households behave according to the unitary model. This implies that only
total household income, and not the separate incomes of individual members, will affect
household demands.
Following Bourguignon et al. (1993), without price variation, the individual Engel curves
for all 12 categories for the unitary household model are assumed to have the following quasiquadratic form:
C     t y t   tt ( y t ) 2    g a g  u

(1.14)

g

where C represents the 12 categories of consumption expenditures on private and public goods, a
includes g demographic variables including household size, number of young and older children,
ownership of houses and vehicles, age and level of education of both spouses, urban and regional
dummies, and where u is a disturbance. Notice that parameters in Equation (1.14) vary over
goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households. The
household and good subscripts are suppressed to simplify notation. Table 2 provides the
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estimates from the system of equations using the seemingly unrelated regression estimation
(SURE) for the full sample size of 2933 households.
The results in Table 2 show that consumption expenditure data from Thailand fits well
with the quasi-quadratic form by looking at the R-squared values. Ten of 12 categories have Rsquared values exceeding 0.22 and the only two categories that have low R-squared values are
health, and alcohol and tobacco. The coefficient on household size is positive and significant at
the 1% on seven categories, while it is insignificant on four, and negatively significant at 5%
only on the alcohol and tobacco category. The results are sensible because larger households are
expected to spend more on goods like housing, household operations, and food, requiring them
to cut back on some of non-essentials like alcohol and tobacco.
The presence of children has a significant impact (mostly negative) on all but one
consumption categories at the 10% level of significance or lower, after removing effects of
household size. It provides additional supports to Browning (1992)‟s argument that household
economic behavior is significantly correlated with the presence of children, especially when we
look at the effects of children on household food consumption both at home and outside of home.
Results indicate that couples without children and those with varying numbers of children differ
in how they allocate their resources. For example, the results show that couples with more
children spend more on food at home and less on food outside of home than do couples with
fewer or no children. Moreover, younger children tend to increase the expenditure on personal
and services category, possibly because mothers who work full time may require more help (day
care), while older children tend to increase the expenditures on clothing and footwear, and
cosmetic products.
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When looking at the demographic influences, higher-educated spouses tend to spend
more on almost all categories, while ages of spouses have no significant impact on their
consumption patterns. People living Bangkok clearly spend more on most categories than people
living in other regions, except for cosmetic and alcohol and tobacco products. Foods are more
expensive in the municipal than rural areas.
The coefficient on total income is significant at 1% on all categories, while the
coefficient on total income square is significant on nine categories. Using these highly significant
income coefficients, we can calculate income elasticities, EY, to determine which categories can
be considered inferior or normal goods.3 When evaluated at the mean total household income
(23,059 baht), 11 out of 12 categories can be considered normal goods, while the only inferior
good is cosmetic. When evaluated over the income distribution, only six categories can be
considered normal goods at all income levels because both  t and  tt are positive. These
categories are housing, household operation, clothing and footwear, transportation and
communication, education, and recreation and religion. Personal and services, and cosmetic are
considered inferior goods up to where household income levels reach 22,058 baht and 34,960
baht, respectively, and then become normal goods. Health, food at home, food outside, and
alcohol and tobacco are considered normal goods up to where household income levels reach

yt
. The critical income level that switch goods from
C
normal to inferior goods (when  t  0 and  tt  0 ) , or from inferior to normal goods (when  t  0 and
 t
 tt  0 ) is y t 
.
2  tt
3

The income elasticities

EY is equal to  t  2 tt y t 
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152,440 baht, 249,919 baht, 1,436,950 baht, and 140,483 baht, respectively, and then become
inferior goods.4
Next, I will estimate the unitary model using another specification of the Engel curve
developed by Banks et al. (1997) to see whether the results are similar to those obtained using
the quasi-quadratic form. They propose what they call the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
System (QUAIDS) which generalizes the Almost Ideal (AI) model of Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980) for more flexibility by having both linear and quadratic log total expenditure as the
leading terms. The reasons why I choose to consider another specification of the Engel curve is
to address three problems resulting from relying solely on the quasi-quadratic form. First, the
quasi-quadratic is not consistent with utility maximizing behavior, whereas the QUAIDS is.
Second, the quasi-quadratic form, while frequently used to test the unitary model, is rarely used
by researchers who apply the unitary model to study household expenditures. Third, income
effects often vary as income levels change, and thus inferences may differ according to the
functional form used to represent nonlinear effects of income on demand (Banks et al. 1997).
Without price variation, the QUAIDS for unitary model takes the following form of the
expenditure share equation system:
w     E ln E   EE (ln E ) 2    g a g  v

(1.15)

g

where w represents shares of consumption expenditures on each good, E represents total
household consumption expenditure, a includes g demographic variables as described earlier,
and where v is a disturbance. For simplification, notice again that parameters in Equation (1.15)
vary over goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households.
4

However, these income levels are way at the top end (0.001%) of the sample distribution.
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Since the shares of consumption expenditures from the Engel curve (1.15) sum up to one,
we have to omit one of the consumption categories in order to perform SURE. In this case, I
choose to omit the health category from the systems of equations to accommodate the adding up
restriction of the underlying model of utility maximization subject to a linear budget constraint.5
Table 3 provides the estimates from the systems of equations corresponding to the Engel curve
(1.15) for 11 consumption categories for the full sample size of 2933 households.
In general, the results in Table 3 show that Thai data do not fit as well with the Engel
curve (1.15) as with the Engel curve (1.14) specifications. Of course, the two equation systems
consider different dependent variables, so comparisons of R-squared are of limited value.
However, the coefficients on most household characteristics including children variables have
similar signs in both specifications. This is helpful for our analysis since the results do not show
a lot of variation due to the difference in model specifications. However, when looking at the
demographic influences, having higher education does not have much impact on consumption
behavior compared to results in Table 2, while ages of spouses still have little significant impact,
except for food outside of home. Another interesting finding is that people living outside
Bangkok tend to spend higher expenditure shares on food at home and on alcohol and tobacco
consumption.
The coefficients on log total expenditure and its squared term are significant in almost all
categories. When estimating total expenditure elasticities, EE, evaluated at the means of log total
household expenditure and expenditure shares for each category, all categories can be considered
5

Theoretically, the results should be invariant to which share of consumption omitted. However, Barten (1969)
proves that the results are invariant only if the model is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. Thus, I
reestimate the system of equations using the iterated SURE which converges to the maximum likelihood results and
find the coefficients from iterated SURE are very similar to those obtained from SURE.
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as normal goods (all EE are positive).6 This implies that households increase expenditure shares
on each good when total household expenditure increases, holding other expenditure shares
constant.
However, there is a reason to suspect that total consumption expenditure may be
endogenous with respect to shares of household consumption expenditure, especially for
infrequently purchased goods. Consequently, total consumption expenditure may be higher in
periods when infrequently purchased goods are purchased than in periods when they are not.
This may not be as problematic in our case because the SES does record the infrequently
purchased goods as average monthly expenditures during the past 12 months. When testing for
exogeneity of log total expenditure and its square in each category, I find that it is rejected for six
categories. Thus, I proceed to perform the 3SLS using log total income and its square to
instrument for log of total expenditure and its square. In addition to log total income and its
square, I also include all the explanatory variables, financial assets, debt dummy, and household
nonconsumption expenditure in the instrument set. The minimum eigenvalue statistic of 198.267
rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments at 5% level of significance. Moreover, we cannot
reject the overidentifying restrictions in almost all consumption categories. This should provide
us with at least some confidence that our choices of instruments are valid. Table 4 provides the
3SLS estimates corresponding to the Engel curve (1.15) for 11 consumption categories for the
full sample size of 2933 households.

6

The expenditure elasticities

E E is equal to 1 

1
 E  2 EE (ln E ). Since there are two variables, w and lnE ,
w

in the formula, then we cannot exactly determine the critical expenditure level that switch goods from normal to
inferior goods and vice versa.
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In general, the 3SLS estimates show some variations in the significance levels of the
coefficients compared to those reported in Table 3. However, there is no switch in signs between
coefficients except for only the northeast coefficient in the transportation and communication
category. Thus, there is little qualitative difference whether or not we instrument for total
consumption expenditure and its square terms.
Now, I proceed to test the validity of the predictions of the unitary against the collective
models by adding individual income terms to the Engel curves (1.14) to get
C     h y h   w y w   t y t   hh ( y h ) 2   ww ( y w ) 2   tt ( y t ) 2   hw y h y w    g a g  u (1.16)
g

where C represents the 12 categories of consumption expenditures on private and public goods, a
includes g demographic variables including household size, number of young and older children,
ownership of houses and vehicles, age and level of education of both spouses, urban and regional
dummies, and where u is a disturbance. Notice again that parameters in Equation (1.16) vary
over goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households. The
household subscript is suppressed to simplify notation.7 Table 5 provides the estimates from the
system of equations using SURE for all 12 consumption categories for the full sample size of
2933 households.
After adding more income variables to the quasi-quadratic Engel curves, the results in
Table 5 are very similar to those from Table 2, especially by looking at the R-squared values.
Moreover, most demographic coefficients have not only the same significance levels but also the
signs and magnitudes. The coefficients on household total income and its square are less
significant in Table 5, which may be caused by adding more income variables to the model.
7

Equation (1.16) has the exact same functional form estimated by Bourguignon et al. (1993).
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In equation (1.16),

C
  t  2 tt y t is estimated holding y h and y w constant and
t
y

corresponds to the effect of a one-unit (100 baht) increase in y 0 (because y t  y h  y w  y 0 ).
Also,

C
  h  2 hh y h   hw y w is estimated holding dy t  dy w  0 and corresponds to the
h
y

effect of dy h  dy 0 , that is, to a one-unit increase in the husband‟s income that is exactly offset
by a one-unit decrease in non-labor income. Similarly,

C
  w  2 ww y w   hw y h is estimated
y w

holding dy t  dy h  0 and corresponds to the effect of dy w  dy 0 . The income pooling
hypothesis states that a change in the relative income of the husband and wife has no effect on
demand if total household income is constant. For this to be true at arbitrary levels of yh and yw, it
must be true that  h   w   hh   ww   hw  0 . Imposing these five restrictions on 12
expenditure categories gives a total of 60 restrictions. Rejection of these restrictions implies that
income is not pooled and the unitary model may not be appropriate in explaining household
resource allocation behavior.
When imposing a total of 60 restrictions to the systems of Engel curves (1.16) that
husband‟s and wife‟s individual incomes are irrelevant, a chi-square value of 498.99 clearly
rejects the income pooling hypothesis at the 1% significance level. This finding supports the
results found from previous studies described in Section 1.3 which also reject income pooling.
However, the rejection of income pooling in Table 5 may be due to the fact that almost 38% of
our sample is households consisting of spouses only, which is similar to what most previous
studies have considered using data from developed countries. None of the previous studies has
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considered households with more than two generations living in the same residence which is
fairly common in Thailand. Thus, I continue to test income pooling for each household type
separately to see if the results still hold for each household type.
Before proceeding to examine the behaviors of different household types, I will also test
the validity of the predictions of the unitary against the collective models using QUAIDS
specification by adding log individual income terms to the Engel curves (1.15) to get
w     E ln E   EE (ln E ) 2   h ln y h   w ln y w    g a g  v

(1.17)

g

where w represents shares of consumption expenditures on each good, E represents total
household consumption expenditure, a includes g demographic variables as described earlier,
and where v is a disturbance. Notice again that parameters in Equation (1.17) vary over goods
whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households.
From the Engel curve (1.17), we can test the income pooling hypothesis that only total
expenditure has an effect on household consumption behavior while individual sources of
income are irrelevant. For each consumption category, this is the same as testing the restrictions
that  h   w  0 . I choose to omit the health category from the systems of equations to
accommodate the adding up restriction of the QUAIDS. Table 6 provides the estimates from the
systems of equations corresponding to the Engel curve (1.17) for 11 consumption categories for
the full sample size of 2933 households.
The estimates in Table 6 are extremely similar to the estimates found in Table 3,
including the signs, magnitudes and level of significance. When considering the coefficients on
spouses‟ incomes, the coefficients on log husband and wife incomes are significant in seven
categories under this specification, while the coefficients on log total expenditure and its squared
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term are significant in almost all categories. When imposing a total of 22 restrictions that
individual sources of income are irrelevant in the QUAIDS, i.e.,  h   w  0 for 11 categories,
a chi-square value of 157.75 clearly rejects income pooling for Thai data at 1% level of
significance.
When testing for exogeneity of log total expenditure and its square in each category, I
find that it is convincingly rejected in all categories. Thus, I proceed to perform the 3SLS using
log total income and its square to instrument for log of total expenditure and its square. In
addition to log total income and its square, I also include all the explanatory variables, financial
assets, debt dummy, and household nonconsumption expenditure in the instrument set. The
minimum eigenvalue statistic of 19.51 rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments at 5% level of
significance. Moreover, we cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions in almost all
consumption categories. This should provide us with at least some confidence that our choices of
instruments are valid. Table 7 provides the 3SLS estimates corresponding to the Engel curve
(1.17) for 11 consumption categories for the full sample size of 2933 households.
In general, the 3SLS estimates in Table 7 show some variations in the significance levels
of the coefficients compared to those reported in Table 6. There is no switch in signs between
coefficients except for only the log husband wage in food at home category, and the log total
consumption squared term in the housing category. Thus, there is little qualitative difference
whether or not we instrument for total consumption expenditure and its square terms. Moreover,
a chi-square value of 59.70 also rejects income pooling at the 1% level of significance. Thus, the
results from both Engel curve specifications (1.16) and (1.17) clearly reject the unitary model for
household consumption expenditures in the two wage-earner households in Thailand.
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Next, in order to compare the differences between the results in this chapter to those from
previous studies, I continue to estimate the Engel curves for each subsample for various
household compositions separately. Seven subsamples are estimated by equations (1.16) and
(1.17) which include households consisting of spouses with various types of dependents. Since
we rejected the exogeneity of log total expenditure and its square, I only report the testing results
using the 3SLS estimates for the QUAIDS specification. Table 8 provides the results for the test
of the income pooling hypotheses for all subsamples.8
The results in Table 8 show that the income pooling can be rejected for all seven
subsamples with the specification (1.16), but can be rejected for only four subsamples with
(1.17). This is an interesting finding because our specification (1.16) is more parallel to what has
been done by most previous studies that consider household consumption in terms of money
expenditures rather than shares of total expenditures. In such case, the results in this chapter are
consistent with results from previous studies for all types of households with or without any
dependents. These confirm that the unitary model is still not very attractive to explain household
consumption behaviors in Thailand.
On the other hand, the QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) only rejects the income pooling for
households consisting of fewer than four members. These findings clearly suggest that the
number of dependents makes the difference on how households allocate their shares of
consumption expenditures. Thus, households with different compositions should be examined
separately on how their household resources are allocated. Considering all types of households
together may lead to various results depending on the proportions of each household type in the
8

See Appendix A and Appendix B for estimates of each subsample for Engel curves (1.16) and (1.17).
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sample. When considering each household type separately, households with more dependents
seem to behave consistently with the prediction of the unitary model. A possible explanation is
that once there are dependent individuals living in the household, these dependents can be
considered as household public goods as described earlier in the model. Both spouses would be
likely to spend higher shares of their individual incomes on these dependents‟ consumptions and
have less money to spend freely for their own interests; thus, making it harder to reject the
income pooling hypothesis.
For example, the share of food consumed at home increases with the number of
dependents while the share of food consumed outside declines. Couples with no dependents can
very well behave just like two separate individuals sharing rents and utility bills. Once the
household size gets larger, the shares of household public goods also get larger because there are
only two income earners. Couples with dependents may consult each other more on how to
allocate their resources and thus pool their incomes as opposed to couples without any
dependent. Thus, it is possible that the unitary model may apply when there are many household
public goods to be considered in the households which are the number of dependents in this case.
Having rejected the unitary model for the full sample and most subsamples, I now test the
general collective model of Chiappori (1988; 1992) that husband and wife choose a Pareto
efficient allocation of resources. Testing the Pareto efficiency is the same as testing the nonlinear restrictions that the ratios of husband and wife income effects are the same across all pairs
of consumption categories.9 Table 9 provides the results of testing the Pareto efficiency using the
systems of equations regression for all subsamples.

9

See Eqs. (1.12) and (1.13).
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Table 9 shows that Pareto efficiency is not rejected at the 5% level in any subsample
using either Engel curve specification. These results suggest that all household types in Thailand
behave consistently with the Pareto efficient hypothesis as suggested by Bourguignon et al.
(1993) using French and by Thomas and Chen (1994) using Taiwanese data. Therefore, we may
conclude that the general collective model is more attractive than the unitary model in explaining
intrahousehold resource allocation behaviors regardless of the specification of the Engel curve.

1.6. Conclusions
This chapter tests the unitary and general collective models of intrahousehold resource
allocations using consumption expenditure data from Thailand. The main difference of this
chapter from previous studies is that it looks at the application of these models for various
household compositions since most studies in the literature have rejected the unitary model using
data from nuclear families.
However, most previous studies using consumption expenditure data have used data from
developed countries. Prior research indicates that household composition has a substantial effect
of consumption expenditures and suggests that the outcome of tests of the unitary model may
differ according to household composition. Household composition differs between developed
and developing countries. Households tend to be larger and non-nuclear families are more
common in developing countries. Thus, I test the unitary and collective models separately for
different types of households.
I find that, for the quasi-quadratic Engel curve specification, the overall results support
the previous findings in the literature that the unitary model fails to explain how the resources are
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allocated for all household types. However, when using the QUAIDS, the unitary model is
rejected only for smaller-sized households. These are households consisting of fewer than four
members. These findings bring up two interesting concerns from testing the unitary model. First,
different Engel curve specifications affect the results. Second, the presence of dependents in the
households, such as children, appears to affect how resources are allocated within the
households.
The general collective model, on the other hand, cannot be rejected in any subsample for
either quasi-quadratic or QUAIDS functional forms. This finding supports the perspective of the
general collective model that household members may have different preferences but allocate
their resources efficiently. The results in this chapter indicate that the general collective model of
household behavior is more attractive than the unitary model.
Finally, even though the general collective model appears to be more theoretically and
empirically attractive, all results in this chapter are restricted to only two wage-earner households
with two distribution factors which are spouses‟ individual incomes. Since the idea of extended
families is fairly common in most developing countries, there are opportunities for future
research to examine households consisting of multiple earners with more distribution factors to
see if the general collective model still performs well under such circumstances.
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CHAPTER TWO: DO THAI HOUSEHOLDS WITH MULTIPLE
DECISION MAKERS BEHAVE PARETO EFFICIENTLY?
2.1. Introduction
The standard economic model to explain how a household chooses to allocate resources
among its members is the unitary model. The unitary model generally considers the household as
a single decision-making unit in which all household members reach consensus and thus can be
represented by one common preference (Samuelson 1956). Another justification for this model is
that there is a dictator who determines all allocations from the point of view of an altruist who
cares about other household members (Becker 1981). Because of its simplicity and convenience
the unitary model had been applied in many studies both theoretically and empirically.
The unitary model has been seriously challenged during the past two decades, however,
based on its weak theoretical foundation that we can analyze households as a single decisionmaking unit. Using this assumption, we can apply Neo-classical utility theory to the household
setting and ignore the possibility that each individual in the household has unique preferences.
The unitary model also has been challenged by many empirical studies that reject restrictions on
the Slutsky matrix (Browning and Chiappori 1998) or reject the income pooling hypothesis
(Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas and Chen 1994; Lundberg et al.
1997; Phipps and Burton 1998). For example, Browning and Chiappori (1998) reject the
symmetry property of the Slutsky matrix for Canadian couples but not for single men and
women. This result suggests that the rejection of the symmetry property is due to having the
incorrect model for couples and is not attributable to the specification of the model. However,
the results from chapter one show that, without price variation, the rejection of the income
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pooling depends on the specification of the estimated Engel curves for households with two
decision makers in Thailand. These findings suggest that the rejections of the unitary model may
be due to having either the incorrect model or inadequate functional forms or both.
On the other hand, the general collective model developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992),
which is the main alternative to the unitary model, works well empirically in explaining
household decision behaviors for various model specifications using consumption survey data
from different countries. More importantly, the general collective model is very theoretically
attractive because it allows each household member to have distinct preferences and only
assumes that the final outcomes are Pareto efficient.
Up to now, only a small number of studies have used consumption expenditure data to
test the validity of the general collective model (Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas and Chen
1994). However, these previous studies only test the Pareto efficiency hypothesis for households
consisting of two decision makers. None has tested the Pareto efficiency for households with
multiple decision makers. The latter case is important because it is very common in many
developing countries that households consist of at least two or three generations of blood
relatives living together as extended families. Thus, it may be worthwhile to determine whether
the general collective model applies to households in which decisions may be more complex than
in households with only two decision makers.
This chapter generalizes tests for Pareto efficiency for application to households with
more than two decision makers, by applying the concept of distribution factors. Distribution
factors are variables that affect the household decision process but do not affect either individual
preferences or the household budget constraint. Some examples of distribution factors have been
37

suggested in prior studies (e.g. McElroy 1990; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Browning et al. 1994;
Lundberg et al. 1997; Chiappori et al. 2002; Dauphin et al. 2003; Bourguignon et al. 2009) are
individual incomes, relative incomes of household members, the regional sex ratio, personal
attractiveness, marriage and divorce laws, child support law where individual incomes are the
most common distribution factor used in the literature. According to Bourguignon et al. (2009),
these distribution factors will play a major role in the following three reasons. First, the existence
of such variables is inconsistent with the unitary model. Second, without price variation, the
influence of distribution factors provides the only testable restrictions for the collective model.
Third, distribution factors are helpful in recovering some features of the intra-household decision
process; this point will be discussed in the next chapter. This chapter extends the model used in
chapter one to derive the testable restrictions on the collective model for households with any
number of decision makers using the unconditional demand systems approach.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 develops the theoretical framework and
provides testable restrictions on the collective model for households with more than two decision
makers using the unconditional demand systems. Section 2.3 introduces the concept of
conditional demand systems and its application. Section 2.4 describes the sample. Section 2.5
outlines the empirical model of household expenditures estimated in the chapter and presents
empirical results. Finally, conclusions are provided in Section 2.6.

2.2. The theoretical framework
Let us begin by considering a household consisting of H+1 members (with H ≥ 1) with no
household production. Each member h, with h = 1, …, H+1, chooses his or her consumption of N
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market goods that can either be consumed privately or publicly. To minimize the assumptions on
individual preferences and to allow externalities within the household, assume that all H+1
members have altruistic preferences represented by U h (q1 ,..., qH1 , Q; a) , where qh denotes a
vector of private consumption by the hth member and Q denotes a vector of public consumption,
and a denotes a vector of individual and household characteristics.
H 1

consumption can be written as

q
h 1

h

The total household

 Q  q . Since there is no price variation, we can

normalize all prices to one so that the household budget constraint is given by
H 1

e(  q h  Q)  eq  x , where e is a unit vector of dimension N and x can be considered either
h 1

as total household income or, as in the standard analysis of demand, total household expenditure.
Since we allow individual preferences to be different, we need to specify how households
decide to consume q given the household budget constraint. In general, the household‟s
decisions do not depend only on individual preferences but also on each member‟s decisionmaking power. Moreover, apart from the individual and household characteristics, these
decision-making powers may also depend on distribution factors mentioned earlier. According to
Chiappori et al. (2002), Dauphin et al. (2003) and Bourguignon et al. (2009), a variable zk is a
distribution factor if it affects the choices of qh and Q directly through the weighting factors but
does not have any effect through preferences or the household budget constraint. More
importantly, the effects of distribution factors on consumption decisions provide the only testable
restrictions for the collective model of household behavior where there is no price variation.
Therefore, for all Pareto efficient allocations the household maximizes the problem:
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Max μ( x, a, z) [U1 (q1 ,..., q H1 , Q; a),...,U H (q 1 ,..., q H1 , Q; a)]   U H 1 (q 1 ,..., q H1 , Q; a) (2.1)

q1 ,...,qH 1 ,Q

subject to a budget constraint
H 1

e(  q h  Q)  x
h 1

H

where μ( x, a, z)  [1 ( x, a, z),...,  H ( x, a, z)] and   1    h ( x, a, z ) represent each household
h 1

member‟s welfare weights, and z is a K-vector of distribution factors. The distribution factors
influence the weight of each member‟s preferences in household decisions. If individual income
is a distribution factor, for example, members who have lower incomes may be more willing to
compromise than those who have higher incomes. In that event, the outcomes of household
decision process are likely to favor those with higher incomes and thus decision-making powers,
as reflected in larger values of the welfare weights.
Assuming that each the utility function Uh(.) is continuous and quasiconcave, and the
second order sufficient condition is satisfied, then by the implicit function theorem we can solve
the first-order conditions of problem (2.1) for the demand function for good j by the hth member
as a function of individual and household characteristics a as well as distribution factors z:

qhj  qhj ( x, a, 1 ( x, a, z),...,  H ( x, a, z))

, h = 1, …, H+1.

(2.2)

When only household consumption is observed, the household demand for good j can be
written as:

qj 

H 1

q
h 1

j
h

 q j ( x, a, 1 ( x, a, z),...,  H ( x, a, z)) .
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(2.3)

The expression of Eq. (2.3) is very useful for our analysis because it can be used to
represent both private and public consumption through index j.
To consider the influence of distribution factors on consumption behavior, let us
differentiate (2.3) with respect to zk to obtain
H
q j
q j  h
,

z k
h 1  h z k

(2.4)

for all k = 1, …, K.
We can rewrite (2.4) into the matrix forms to get

q zj  Mq μj

(2.5)

where q zj is a Kx1 vector of partial derivatives of qj with respect to zk; M is a KxH matrix of
partial derivatives of  h with respect to zk; and q μj is an Hx1 vector of partial derivatives of qj
with respect to  h .
Assuming that not every element of the vector q μj is identical, then in order to solve for a
solution of q μj in system (2.5), we also need to assume that rank [M] ≥ H which implies that K ≥
H. If K = H, and M has full rank such that rank [M] = H, we can obtain a unique solution for q μj
which is

q μj  M 1q zj .

(2.6)

However, this unique solution of q μj from system (2.6) imposes no testable restrictions
on the collective model because only q zj is observable, while q μj and M-1 are not. Thus, to be

41

able to derive any testable restrictions, we must have K > H or, in other words, we must have at
least as many distribution factors as the number of decision makers in the household.
When K > H, we then have an over-identified system. This over-identified system is
crucial for us because it allows us to manipulate system (2.5) so that there are CK,H which equals
to

K!
ways to solve for q μj , but all solutions must be identical. These manipulations
H !( K  H )!

imply restrictions among q zj which also involve the unobservable M matrix. Thus, to solve for
q μj , I first delete any arbitrary (K-H) rows from q zj and M in system (2.5) to form new CK,H just-

identified systems:

q zj [dim H ]  M[dim H ]q μj

(2.7)

where q zj [dim H ] is an Hx1 vector of partial derivatives of qj with respect to the remaining zk;
M[dimH] is a square matrix of dimension H of partial derivatives of  h with respect to the
remaining zk; where q μj remains the same. Let us further assume that M[dimH] has a full column
rank H, so it is invertible. Then, we can solve for q μj by
1
j
q μj  M[dim
H ] q z [dim H ] .

(2.8)

Systems (2.7) and (2.8) show how we have CK,H ways to solve for q μj . However, there
are some redundancies among these CK,H systems which allow us to eliminate some systems with
common constraints. As a result, we need to consider only (K/H) systems if (K/H) is an integer;
or otherwise, the closest integer higher than (K/H). Since the expressions for the general case are
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cumbersome in terms of notations at this point, I use an example to illustrate how systems (2.7)
and (2.8) operate so that later on we can easily extend to the case of any number of K and H.
Let us consider households consisting of three income earners living with or without
dependents. Any dependents are assumed to play only a passive role and have no decisionmaking power. Also assume that the distribution factors are the three earners‟ exogenous labor
incomes. Thus, we have H = 2 and K = 3 which is the simplest case to test the collective model
for households with more than two decision makers. In this case, there are C3,2 = 3 systems that
can solve for q μj , but all solutions must be identical. From (2.7), these three systems are
q zj [12]  M[12]q μj

(2.7.1)

q zj [13]  M[13]q μj

(2.7.2)

q zj [ 23]  M[ 23]qμj

(2.7.3)

where the superscripts in the brackets represent the remaining kth rows from the original system
(2.7).
Then, we can solve for q μj by

q μj  M [121 ]q zj [12]

(2.8.1)

q μj  M [131 ]q zj [13]

(2.8.2)

1
j
q μj  M [23
] q z [ 23] .

(2.8.3)

Since we have (K/H) = 1.5, then we need to consider only two out of the three systems
(2.8.1), (2.8.2) and (2.8.3). It can easily be shown that once the constraints of the selected two
systems are met, the constraints in the remaining system will be automatically satisfied. The
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criterion for which systems to be selected is straightforward. We need to select the smallest
number of systems such that they cover constraints for all K rows in the original M matrix. With
3 rows to be covered, we can select any of the following 3 pairs of systems; (2.8.1) and (2.8.2);
(2.8.1) and (2.8.3); or (2.8.2) and (2.8.3). The choice of pairs will not alter the final result. For
example, I select systems (2.8.1) and (2.8.2) to illustrate the main concept of this approach.
From (2.8.1) and (2.8.2), we know that

q μj  M[121 ]q zj [12]  M[131 ]q zj [13] .
Then, we can get rid of q μj to obtain

q zj [12]  {[12][13]1}q zj [13]

(2.9)

where {[12][13]1 }  M[12]M[131 ] .
It is useful to our analysis to expand system (2.9) to get

{[1112][13]1 } {[1212][13]1 } 
 qzj1 

 j    21
22
qz 2 
{[12][13]1 } {[12][13]1 } 

 qzj1 
 j
qz3 

where {[rc12][13]1 } , r = 1, 2; c = 1, 2 represents the elements corresponding to the rth row and cth in

{[12][13]1 } .
When fully calculated, system (2.9) becomes

1
0
 qzj1 


 j    21

22
 {[12][13]1 } {[12][13]1 } 
qz 2 

 qzj1 
 j
qz3 

which is equivalent to

qzj2  {[2112][13]1 }qzj1  {[2212][13]1 }qzj3 .

(2.9.1)
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Eq (2.9.1) consists of all three influences from distribution factors q zj1 , q zj2 , q zj3 and two
unknowns {[2112][13]1 } and {[2212][13]1 } which are functions of the partial derivatives of μ with respect
to z. However, having only one good j does not provide us with sufficient information to solve
for the two unknowns, so one or more additional goods is required to derive testable restrictions
in this case.
One important thing to be noticed here is that the first row of {[12][13]1 } contains only
zero and one elements which are constant across all goods. This implies that the first row of

{[12][13]1 } does not provide any restriction that can be tested. Thus, the only row that can be used
to derive the restrictions is the second row which I will call the “non-zero-and-one” row. The
concept of the “non-zero-and-one” row will be crucial in determining the total number of
restrictions when we consider more general cases later on in this section.
Next, I will show how many goods are required in order for us to impose testable
restrictions on the collective model. Consider the second good, i, that the household chooses to
consume. From (2.3), we have

qi 

H 1

q
h 1

i
h

 q i ( x, a, 1 ( x, a, z),...,  H ( x, a, z )) .

Follow the same procedure earlier to obtain

q iz [12]  {[12][13]1}q iz [13] .

(2.10)

Then,

qzi 2  {[2112][13]1 }qzi 1  {[2212][13]1 }qzi 3 .
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(2.10.1)

From (2.9.1) and (2.10.1), we now have two equations with two unknowns. Then, we can
solve for {[2112][13]1 } and {[2212][13]1 } to get

{[2112][13]
{[2212][13]

1

1

}

 f (qzj1 , qzj2 , qzj3 , qzi 1 , qzi 2 , qzi 3 ) and

}

 f (qzj1 , qzj2 , qzj3 , qzi 1 , qzi 2 , qzi 3 ) .

However, these results still cannot provide us with any testable restrictions because we
can only observe the values of (q zj1 , q zj2 , q zj3 , q zi1 , q zi 2 , q zi 3 ) and f (q zj1 , q zj2 , q zj3 , q zi1 , q zi 2 , q zi 3 ) on the
right hand sides, while the values of {[2112][13]1 } and {[2212][13]1 } on the left hand sides are still
unobservable. It means that we need to consider more goods in order to eliminate the
unobservable ω terms.
Let consider the third good, l, and follow the same procedure to get

q lz [12]  {[12][13]1}q lz [13] .

(2.11)

Then,

qzl 2  {[2112][13]1 }qzl 1  {[2212][13]1 }qzl 3 .

(2.11.1)

Eqs. (2.9.1), (2.10.1) and (2.11.1) represent a system of three equations that contain all
the required information to derive the restrictions with two unobservable ω terms. The testable
restrictions can be obtained through multiple steps as follows:
Step 1: From (2.9.1), we can solve for {[2112][13]1 } in terms of a base good, j, to obtain



21
{[12][13] 1 }

 f (q , q , q , 
j
z1

j
z2

j
z3

22
{[12][13] 1 }
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) 

qzj2  {[2212][13]1 }qzj3
qzj1

.

(2.9.1.1)

Step 2: Substitute (2.9.1.1) into (2.10.1) and (2.11.1), then solve for {[2212][13]1 } to obtain



 f (q , q , q , q , q , q ) 



 f (q , q , q , q , q , q ) 

22
{[12][ 13]1 }

22
{[12][ 13]1 }

j
z1

j
z1

j
z2

j
z2

j
z3

i
z1

j
z3

l
z1

i
z2

i
z3

l
z2

l
z3

q zj1 q zi 2  q zi 1 q zj2
q zj1 q zi 3  q zi 1 q zj3
q zj1 q zl 2  q zl1 q zj2
q zj1 q zl 3  q zl1 q zj3

,

(2.10.1.1)

.

(2.11.1.1)

Step 3: Setting (2.10.1.1) equals (2.11.1.1) to eliminate the unobservable {[2212][13]1 } to
obtain a unique testable restriction for the collective model which is

q zj1 q zi 2  q zi 1 q zj2
q zj1 q zi 3  q zi 1 q zj3



q zj1 q zl 2  q zl1 q zj2
q zj1 q zl 3  q zl1 q zj3

.

(2.12)

Thus, in the case of H = 2 and K = 3, we need at least three goods to achieve one testable
restriction. This finding gives us another requirement for testing the collective model that we
need at least as many goods as the decision makers in the household or N ≥ H+1. Another
interesting finding from these steps is that the choice of whether we first choose to solve for
either {[2112][13]1 } or {[2212][13]1 } in step 1 does not affect the number of restrictions to be obtained. It
means that after achieving restriction (2.12), we do not need to repeat steps 1, 2 and 3 again to
first solve for {[2212][13]1 } to derive another restriction that

{[2112][13]

1

}

 f (qzj1 , qzj2 , qzj3 , qzi 1 , qzi 2 , qzi 3 )  f (qzj1 , qzj2 , qzj3 , qzl 1 , qzl 2 , qzl 3 ) .

(2.13)

The reason behind this is straightforward. Even though (2.13) provides us with a
legitimate testing restriction, it does not provide any new information that has not already been
contained in (2.12). The testing expressions may look different between (2.12) and (2.13), but
only one restriction is sufficient to test the collective model. This shows that only one restriction
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is required for each “non-zero-and-one” row in {[12][13]1 } . Therefore, we only need one
restriction in this particular example.
Next, let us see how the values of N and K affect the number of restrictions for
households with H+1 members in general. If we follow the same procedure above with
additional information on extra goods (now N > 3) while H and K remain the same at two and
three, then we will obtain more than one restriction. The additional restrictions come from the
fact that now we have extra information on N which is greater than the minimum requirement of
H+1 by (N – H – 1) goods. This shows that having additional goods implies additional
restrictions. Consequently, we will have extra equations that can solve for {[2212][13]1 } ; as a result,
having extra (N – H – 1) restrictions to test the collective model. Thus, in case of N > H+1, we
have a total of (N – H) restrictions for each “non-zero-and-one” row in {[12][13]1 } .
To determine the number of the “non-zero-and-one” rows for the general case is quite
straightforward. It can be determined by the difference between the values of K and H. For
example, from (2.7), if we consider the case where K = 4 and H = 2 and follow the same
procedure we would get

q μj  M[121 ]q zj [12]  M[341 ]q zj [34] .
Thus, we can get rid of q μj to obtain

q zj [12]  {[12][ 34]1}q zj [34]

(2.14)

where {[12][ 34]1 }  M[12]M[341 ] .
Expand system (2.14) to get
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{[1112][ 34]1 } {[1212][ 34]1 } 
 qzj1 

 j    21

{[2212][ 34]1 } 
qz 2 
 {[12][ 34]1 }

qzj3 
 j
qz 4 

where {[rc12][ 34]1 } , r = 1, 2; c = 1, 2 represents the elements corresponding to the rth row and cth
column of {[12][ 34]1 } . The main difference between systems (2.14) and (2.9) is that when

{[12][ 34]1 } in (2.14) is fully calculated, it does not contain any “non-zero-and-one” row as in
{[12][13]1 } from (2.9). Thus, system (2.14) provides us with 2 constraints:
qzj1  {[1112][ 34]1 }qzj3  {[1212][ 34]1 }qzj4

(2.14.1)

qzj2  {[2112][ 34]1 }qzj3  {[2212][ 34]1 }qzj4 .

(2.14.2)

As we have seen earlier that when N = H+1, each “non-zero-and-one” row corresponds to
having one restriction. Then, with N = H+1, system (2.14) will provide two restrictions. This
additional restriction comes from the fact that as the number of K increases, each of them will
impact decision powers within the household. In the case of N = H+1, the number of “non-zeroand-one” rows can be easily determined by K – H.
Therefore, in general, the total number of restrictions will be equaled to (N – H)(K – H).
Even though this approach seems rather complicated, to my knowledge, this is the first approach
that allows us to derive the precise testable restrictions to test the collective model of household
behaviors with multiple decision makers. The only drawback from this approach is that, due to
the flexibilities of this model in general, there is no immediate formula to determine the exact
expressions of each testable restriction. The restrictions are different for each possible value of
N, K and H.
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2.3. The concept of conditional demand systems
The theoretical framework in the previous section shows that the testable restrictions
derived from unconditional demand systems can be very complicated and cumbersome,
especially when the numbers of N, H and K increase. This section, I will briefly describe an
alternative approach which has recently been used in the literature, based on conditional demand
systems.
According to Browning and Meghir (1991), conditional demand systems originally were
used in demand analysis where the demand for one set of goods (goods of interest) are
conditioned on prices of these goods, total expenditures on these goods, and the quantities of
another set of goods (conditioning goods). However, in considering the restrictions implied by
the collective model, Bourguignon et al. (1995; 2009) extend the original concept of conditional
demand systems to define what they call “z-conditional demands” in which the demand for one
good can be expressed as a function of the demand for another good, total expenditure,
preferences and distribution factors. Several studies have applied the concept of z-conditional
demand systems to examine properties of collective models; in particular, Dauphin and Fortin
(2001, hereafter DF), Dauphin et al. (2003), Donni (2006), and Donni and Moreau (2007).
In this chapter, I will consider a particular type of z-conditional demand systems used in
DF to derive different sets of testable restrictions as alternative ways to test the collective model.
To make this a self-contained chapter, I will also outline the theoretical discussion presented by
DF. Let us follow DF by first using the demand functions (2.3) obtained in the previous section,
so we can rewrite (2.3) as:

~( x, a, z)  qˆ ( x, a, μ( x, a, z))
q

(2.15)
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~( x, a, z) and qˆ ( x, a, μ( x, a, z)) are the observable and unobservable Nx1 vectors of the
where q
demands for all N goods, respectively. The key issue here is to first find a way to test whether the
demands systems can actually be written as qˆ ( x, a, μ( x, a, z)) since this form contains the
unobservable welfare weights, μ( x, a, z) .
To make it less cumbersome, let us drop x and a from all demand functions such that
(2.15) becomes

~(z)  qˆ (μ(z)) .
q

(2.16)

Next, based on a particular type of z-conditional demand systems developed by
Bourguignon et al. (1995) and generalized by DF, they are able to derive a local test for the
collective model. First, they consider partitions q  [q1 , q2 ] of the demand systems and

z  [z1 , z 2 ] of the distribution factors, with q 1 and z 1 having the same dimension k. Given such
a partition, (2.16) can be written as:
~ (z , z )  qˆ (μ(z , z )) ,
q1  q
1
1
2
1
1
2

(2.17)

~ (z , z )  qˆ (μ(z , z )) .
q2  q
2
1
2
2
1
2

(2.18)

Apply Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 from DF and adjust names of variables and equations
corresponding to the notation used in this paper, we have
Lemma 1. Let N ≥ H + 1 and K ≥ H + 1 and consider a z*   K
~
~(z) is differentiable. Next, assume that D q
at which q
z1 1 (z*) is
~ (z *, z *) . Then, conditional on q *,
non-singular and let q *  q
1

1

1

2

1

there exist a unique and continuously differentiable function
~
z1 (q1 *, z 2 ) that solves that solves (2.17) for z 1 on some
neighborhood of (q1 *, z 2 *) and such that:

~ (~
~
ˆ
q1 *  q
1 z1 (q1 *, z 2 ), z 2 )  q1 (μ( z1 (q1 *, z 2 ), z 2 )) .
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(2.19)

Proof. Use the implicit function theorem.
Under the conditions of Lemma 1, one can define the
function q 2 :  K   N k by:

q2 (q1 *, z 2 )  qˆ 2 (μ(~
z1 (q1 *, z 2 ), z 2 )) .

(2.20)

The right hand side of (2.20) yields a (local) demand subsystem for q 2 conditional on the k-vector q1 * .
Theorem 1. Let the conditions of Lemma 1 hold and suppose that,
in addition, μ(z) and qˆ (μ(z)) are differentiable at, respectively,
z * and μ(z*) . Then, for k = H the demand system for q satisfies:

Dz2 q2 (q1 *, z 2 *)  0 ,

(2.21)

where 0 is a null matrix of dimension ( N  H )  ( K  H ) .
Proof. See p. 214 in DF.
Eq. (2.21) shows that once household demands for the N – H goods, q2 (q1 *, z 2 *) , are
conditioned on as many goods as there are the welfare weights (H in this case) in the household
maximization problem (2.1), the adjustment in z 1 will compensate for any changes in z 2 as to
keep q 1 constant in a way that will leave μ(z) unchanged. Moreover, if μ(z) stays constant
when z 2 changes, then q 2 must also stay constant, and therefore Dz2 q 2 (q1 *, z 2 *)  0 .
Bourguignon et al. (2009) also gives an intuitive explanation that is, for given values of x and a,
whenever distribution factors (z1 , z 2 ) contain some information that is relevant for intrahousehold allocation, this information is fully summarized by the values of q 1 . Once we
condition on q 1 , z 2 becomes irrelevant.
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As suggested by some of the earlier studies (Dauphin and Fortin 2001; Dauphin et al.
2003; Bourguignon et al. 2009), there are both advantages and disadvantages to using the
approach of z-conditional demand systems to test collective rationality. The key advantage is
that, instead of testing for cross-equation restrictions like in the unconditional demand systems
which is rather complicated and cumbersome, this approach is likely to be more powerful
because testing on exclusion restrictions are more robust than testing restrictions on parameters
across equations. On the other hand, one drawback of using this approach is that the estimation
of the conditional sub-system may introduce an endogeneity problem since q 1 variables are
endogenous. However, we can use instrumental variable technique to solve this problem by
using the excluded exogenous variables in z 1 which has the same dimension as q 1 , and the most
common choices are individual exogenous incomes.
Another drawback from this approach as noted by DF is that when N = H + 1, one has

q2 (q1 *, z 2 *)  x  eq1 * from the adding-up restriction. Thus, (2.21) is always satisfied in this
case. This requires additional assumption that we must have N > H + 1 in order to derive any
testable restrictions for the collective model. However, this should not create any major problem
for the analysis for two possible reasons as long as we have N ≥ H + 1 and K ≥ H + 1. First,
household survey data often contain a greater number of consumption categories than the
number of household members, so N > H + 1 is usually satisfied. The second reason may be that
some household surveys may observe the data for only N o ( N ) consumption categories such
that the adding-up restriction will not always be satisfied.
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2.4. Data
As mentioned in the introduction, extended families are very common for the Thai family
system, which is somewhat different from the norm of the married couple families in most
western countries. This is because, through the hierarchical structure in Thailand, one of the key
responsibilities placed on children is to take care of their parents when they are old. Thus, for
this particular reason, many Thai households often consist of members of two or more
generations living together, while the elderly are awarded the highest status such that they can
give advice and consultation on household decisions (Limanonda 1995).
Not only can the elders give advice to household members, but children can also give
some thoughts to the elders in certain circumstances. For example, older children who earn
incomes will have decision-making powers and may have their own thoughts about how
resources should be allocated within the household. Having many income earners in the
household will make it more difficult for all members to reach an agreement. Thus, individual
incomes can be considered our distribution factors that affect the decision-making power through
the welfare weights, μ( x, a, z) .
The data comes from the same Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted by the National
Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO) in year 2006 used in chapter one, but with different types of
sample. The reader is referred to the data section in chapter one to see how the data are collected.
Initially, I planned to consider the case where households have four income earners (two couples
from two different generations) to see how this particular situation impacts household
consumption choices. It turns out, however, that considering only such households lead to
extremely small of a sample size (only six households).
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Then, for easier demonstration of the model presented in the previous section, I choose to
consider the case where there are three decision makers in the household; with two out of three
decision makers are married couples. Since we are considering households with three decision
makers, the number of female and male decision makers may be a determinant in the
intrahousehold allocation process. This is because the introduction of the third decision maker in
the household may shift the balance of the decision power between the married couple to favor
the dominant gender of the household. Thus, in addition to individual incomes, I will consider a
major gender of household decision makers as additional distribution factor to test the collective
model in the next section.
Thus, the sample is limited only to households consisting of three earners (two are
married couples); each of them is wage and salary earner who work full-time for a minimum of
35 hours per week outside their home. Moreover, the third decision maker is limited to be either
1) a child of the married couples or 2) a parent of one of the married couples. This results in a
total sample size of 443 households. Table 10 provides the main overall descriptive statistics of
the sample.

2.5. Empirical model of household expenditures and results
For implementation, I continue to estimate the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
(QUAIDS). Without price variations, the QUAIDS model takes the following form of
expenditure share equation system:
G

K

g 1

k 1

w     E ln E   EE (ln E )    g a g   k z k  v
2
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(2.22)

where w represents shares of consumption expenditure on each good, E represents total
household consumption expenditure, a represents g preference factors, z represents k distribution
factors, and where v is a residual term. Notice again that parameters in Equation (2.22) vary over
goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households.
Since the shares of consumption expenditure sum up to one, I choose to omit the health
category from the systems of equations to accommodate the adding up restriction of the
QUAIDS. Table 11 provides the SURE estimates from the system of equations corresponding to
the Engel curve (2.22) for 11 consumption categories for the full sample size of 443 households.
The results show that the data fit a little better for seven categories in the case of three
decision makers compared to the case where spouses are the only decision makers in the
household. However, there are relatively few significant coefficients in the case of households
with three decision makers. The coefficients on most household characteristics have similar signs
to those in the case of two decision makers (results from chapter one). The coefficients on the
third member‟s characteristics and income are insignificant in most categories. This implies that
having additional decision maker does not necessary alter household consumption behaviors.
However, the coefficient on major gender provides us with an interesting result. When the third
member is male, households significantly spend lower share of consumption on cosmetic, while
spend higher share on alcohol and tobacco products. This supports a common claim that
cosmetics can be considered as female, while alcohol and tobacco as male products.
Before testing whether households with three decision makers behave efficiently, let us
first test whether they behave according to the unitary model since we did not consider
households with three decision makers in chapter one. According to Bourguignon et al. (2009)
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mention earlier, the existence of distribution factors is inconsistent with the unitary model. Thus,
testing the unitary model is the same as testing that  k  0, for k  1,..., K , that is all coefficients
on individual incomes and major gender are zero. Since we estimate the system of 11
consumption categories in this case, this provides us with a total of 44 restrictions to test for the
unitary model. The chi-square value of 85.66 rejects income pooling, hence the unitary model, at
1% level of significance.
Again, there is a reason for us to suspect that total consumption expenditure may be
endogenous with respect to shares of household consumption expenditure, especially for
infrequent purchased categories. When testing for exogeneity of log total expenditure and its
square in each category, I find that it is rejected for only two categories that are transportation
and communication, and food eaten at home. Nevertheless, I also perform the 3SLS using log
total income, log total income square, monthly welfare benefits received from employers, and all
explanatory variables to instrument for log of total expenditure and its square. The minimum
eigenvalue statistic of 14.00 rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments at 5% level of
significance. Moreover, the overidentifying restriction is rejected for only alcohol and tobacco
category. This provides us with at least some confidence that the instruments are valid. Table 12
provides the 3SLS estimates corresponding to the Engel curve (2.22) for 11 consumption
categories for the full sample size of 443 households.
In general, the 3SLS estimates show some variation in the significance levels of the
overall coefficients compared to those reported in Table 11. However, the signs of most
coefficients are very similar between the two methods of estimation. Thus, in the comparative
statics perspective, there is not much of the difference whether or not we instrument for total
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consumption expenditure and its square terms. Moreover, a chi-square value of 62.84 also rejects
income pooling at the 5% level of significance. Thus, the results from both SURE and 3SLS
clearly reject the unitary model for three wage-earner households in Thailand.
Now, let us derive the testable restrictions on the collective rationality by first using the
share of housing expenditure as a base good. Following the steps described in section 2.2, testing
the Pareto efficient hypothesis for households with three decision makers, four distribution
factors and 11 consumption categories provides us with a set of ( N  H )( K  H )  9  2  18
restrictions.10 We obtain a chi-square value of 4.51 which cannot reject the Pareto efficiency at
any significant level. This implies that the three-decision-maker households in Thailand do
behave efficiently which is consistent with the collective model. In addition, since the choice of
choosing the base good should not alter the final result, I also estimate 10 more sets of
restrictions where each set uses different base goods. Table 13 provides the chi-square values for
all sets of testable restrictions using different base goods.
The results in Table 13 show that there is not a single case in which we can reject Pareto
efficiency. These findings are important because they demonstrate that the approach developed
in this chapter is not sensitive or limited to some particular choices of the base good. Thus, using
the unconditional demand systems gives us a robust way to test for the validity of the collective
model.
Next, I continue to test the collective rationality using the z-conditional demand systems
used in DF. In order to apply Theorem 1 in DF for the case of three decision makers, the demand
systems must be conditioned on two consumption goods which is equal to the number of the
I use N  11 because if all restrictions are satisfied for 11 goods, by adding up, the restriction for the 12th good
is also satisfied.
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welfare weights, μ( x, a, z) . Moreover, we also have to select 2 distribution factors such that z 1
has the same dimension as q 1 .
Since the systems of equations contain a total of 11 goods, the z-conditional demand
systems would consist of nine equations, and each equation is conditioned on two conditioning
goods. Again, the choice of the two conditioning goods is arbitrary and it should not affect the
final result. Thus, we have C11,2 = 55 different z-conditional demand systems that can test Pareto
efficiency. In addition, we also have C4,2 = 6 ways to choose the two corresponding distribution
factors in each of the 55 z-conditional demand systems. Therefore, for a particular case
considered in this chapter, we have a total of 330 possible ways to test the collective model, each
possibility contains 18 restrictions, and all possibilities should generate the same result.

~ (z*) is non-singular in every possibility, we
Under the maintained assumption that Dz1 q
1
can directly apply Theorem 1 in DF. The results show that only three out of 330 possibilities can
reject the Pareto efficiency at 5% significance while other 327 possibilities cannot.11 However,

~ (z*) ; as a result,
none of these three possibilities can pass the non-singularity test of Dz1 q
1
Theorem 1 in DF is not applicable for these three possibilities. Thus, we can say that using the
available data, there is not a single possibility that can reject the Pareto efficiency hypothesis.
Therefore, using the z-conditional demand systems provide the same conclusion that the
three-decision-maker households in Thailand do behave efficiently which is consistent with the
results obtained when using the unconditional demand systems. However, the results in this
chapter show that even though the z-conditional demand approach may be more powerful and

11

The results are available upon request from the author.
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more robust, it also generates many more testing possibilities than the unconditional demand
approach. This may be considered as another disadvantage of using the z-conditional demand
approach. Since each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, the choice of whether it is
best to use the unconditional demand or z-conditional demand systems cannot yet be resolved in
general.

2.6. Conclusions
Up to now, there are a small number of studies that have proper consumption expenditure
data to empirically test the validity of the collective model (Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas
and Chen 1994). However, these previous studies only test the Pareto efficiency hypothesis for
households consisting of only two decision makers. None of them has ever tested Pareto
efficiency in the case of households with multiple decision makers.
This chapter generalizes and tests whether larger households with more than two decision
makers behave efficiently by applying the concept of distribution factors. Distribution factors are
variables that only affect the household decision process, but not on individual preferences or the
household budget constraint. This chapter extends the model used in chapter one to derive the
testable restrictions on the collective model for households with any number of decision makers
using the unconditional demand systems approach. This approach can also apply to broader cases
where there are more distribution factors than the number of decision makers in the household.
Moreover, I also consider a particular type of z-conditional demand systems used in
Dauphin and Fortin (2001) to derive different sets of testable restrictions as alternative ways to
test the collective model. The results show that both unconditional and z-conditional demand
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systems provide similar outcomes that the three-decision-maker households in Thailand behave
efficiently, which is consistent with the collective framework.
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CHAPTER THREE: COLLECTIVE MODEL AND WITHIN-HOUSEHOLD
CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY
3.1. Introduction
A major application of demand analysis for applied welfare economics is the
measurement of consumption inequality between households using household equivalence
scales. These scales may be used to determine how much income a household with a given
composition would need to attain the same welfare level as a reference household. Equivalence
scales are based on the unitary assumption that consumption decisions are made to maximize a
single household welfare function. Results of chapters one and two, however, suggest that
consumption decisions in Thai households are not consistent with the unitary model, but are
consistent with the collective model. This chapter estimates indifference scales, alternatives to
equivalence scales that are based on the collective model and that measure consumption
inequality between individuals rather than between households. Using indifference scales, we
may be able to examine welfare effects of public policy on inequality in society, such as effects
of policies regarding poverty reduction.
In Thailand, poverty reduction has played a significant role in country‟s development
goals. These goals include improving the well-being of disadvantaged families, sharing the
benefits of growth across communities, and connecting remote regions within the country and
with the rest of the world. Over the past decades, commitment to poverty reduction by policy
makers, businesses, and civil society has coincided with a remarkable record of poverty
reduction. For example, the national poverty headcount, defined as the share of people living in
households with income below the poverty line, fell from 32.6 percent in 1988 to 11.4 percent in
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1996, then rose to 14.2 percent up to 2000 due to the consequences of the Asian crisis before it
declined with the economic recovery and dropped below 10 percent for the first time (Jitsuchon
and Richter 2006). Despite this record, there are some concerns about the effectiveness of
economic policies in supporting continued growth in household income and providing
communities with access to basic services.
In 2001, Thai government adopted a number of poverty reduction policies such as the
Village Fund, asset capitalization, and the BAHT 30 (about $1) health care system. However,
many of the policies have limited coverage or significant benefit leakage to the nonpoor because
they cover large populations. Improved targeting through better criteria for the allocation of
resources is essential if the number of the poor is to be reduced. For example, the Village Fund
was launched in 2001 as a revolving fund of BAHT 1 million that was to be distributed to about
70,000 villages nationwide over a three-year period. A key characteristic of the program is that it
covers every single village in the country, regardless of whether the village is poor or nonpoor.
In fact, the bulk of the beneficiaries of the program are nonpoor households. The poverty impact
of the Village Fund would be increased if the same resources were allocated in a more targeted
fashion toward poor villages or if loans were provided at more favorable terms to low-income
households or individuals within the households (Jitsuchon and Richter 2006).
Although the success of the collective approach to household behavior has been
recognized and there is growing interest in making inequality or welfare comparisons between
individuals rather than households, survey data are generally collected at the household level.
Welfare or inequality statements are usually measured at this level. For example, previous
studies in the consumption literature use equivalence scales to measure consumption inequality.
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Equivalence scales measure individual inequality rather than household inequality only if there is
no within-household inequality. The interpretation of standard equivalence scales as measures of
individual inequality implies a very restricted model of intrahousehold allocation by assuming
that consumption is divided equally among household members regardless of individual
preferences, sources of incomes, or decision-making powers. Findings from the previous two
chapters, however, suggest that individual preferences, sources of incomes, and decision making
powers influence consumption decisions. Then, ignoring the consumption inequality within
households may give misleading estimates of the individual inequality.
This chapter examines the use of household consumption data without price variation to
recover information about individual household members and consumption inequality. The
chapter focuses on single and married women, using collective household models developed in
Lewel and Pendakur (2008), hereafter LP. The LP model is based on the structural model
proposed by Browning et al. (2004), hereafter BCL. BCL assumed that households consumed a
vector of goods ranging from purely private to very sharable, and showed how to recover
individual resource shares and indifference scales via demand system estimation. However, the
model used in BCL is highly nonlinear in prices, expenditures and other characteristics and is
very difficult to estimate, both computationally and in terms of data requirements. On the other
hand, the model used in LP provides a way to estimate the parameters of interest and obtain
identification without price variation, so that the demand system reduces to a system of Engel
curves.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the model used to estimate the
resource shares and indifference scales. Section 3.3 outlines systems of Engel curves estimated
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in this chapter. Section 3.4 describes sample data and presents results. Finally, the conclusions
are provided in Section 3.5.

3.2. The model
Let us begin by considering the LP model of household demands where each household
member is denoted by

j  1,..., J . Let x denote log total household expenditure and

p  [ p1 ,..., p K ] denote the K-vector of log market prices. The budget share of individual j on
good k is denoted by w kj (p, x ) , that is, if individual j were living alone, he/she would spend the
fraction w kj (p, x ) of total expenditure exp(x) on good k. Assume that the household has a type of
economies of scale from sharing consumption according to Barten (1964), that is, there exists a
K-vector of constant α  [ 1 ,...,  K ] , called log Barten scales, such that the total log quantity of
good k consumed by the members of the household equals the log quantity of the good purchased
by the household minus  k . Thus,  k can be interpreted as the degree of publicness or the
economy of scale for good k within the household; a purely private good k would have  k  0 ,
while a good that is shared has  k  0 .
Let wkj (p, x, α) denote the budget share for good k of a household which is comprised of
individuals j  1,..., J , and has log Barten scale parameters, α . Individuals living alone are
assumed to have no economies of scale to consumption, and so have log Barten scale parameters
equal to zero. Thus, for each good k and individual j, w kj (p, x ) denotes the budget share demand
function for a household consisting just of individual j living alone.
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With some technical restrictions, BCL proves that if the household behaves Pareto
efficiently and shares consumption within the household according to the Barten technology
above, then the household budget share for good k is given by
w k (p, x, α)   j (p, x, α) w kj (α  p, x  ln  j (p, x, α))

(3.1)

j

where  j (p, x, α) is the resource share of individual j in the household and

 (p, x, α)  1 .
j

j

Equation (3.1) illustrates how efficiency can be obtained by having each household member
behave as if maximizing his/her own utility functions given a fraction  j of the household total
expenditure, exp(x), and facing log shadow prices α  p which reflect the economies of scale
from sharing. The two elements of household demand functions of most interest here are
resource shares and indifference curves. BCL shows that resource shares can be
nonparametrically identified by combining data on multiple person households with data on
individuals living alone. Since we have already defined resource shares, we now define
indifference scales.
Let V j (p, x ) denote the indirect utility of individual j and suppose that the household has
Barten scales α and individual j in the household has resource share  j (p, x, α) . BCL defines an
indifference scale I j (p, x, α) as the solution to

V j (α  p, ln  j (p, x, α)  x)  V j (p, ln I j (p, x, α)  x) .

(3.2)

Equation (3.2) shows that if we multiply the total household expenditure by the
indifference scale I j (p, x, α) , and give that amount of income to individual j living alone (facing
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log market price p ), then individual j would be able to purchase a bundle of goods that lies on
the same indifference curve as if he/she were to consume as a member of the household.
Indifference scales differ from the standard adult equivalence scales in that equivalence
scales equate the utility of an individual to the utility of a household, and then compare the utility
of one household to the utility of another household. Equivalence scales thus face the
fundamental problems associated with interpersonal comparisons of utility. On the other hand,
indifference scales depend only on the indifference curves of individual j in two different
situations, i.e., living alone facing market prices, versus living in a household consuming his/her
share of the household‟s resources and facing shadow prices. As a result, indifference scales can
potentially be identified just from revealed preference data. One assumption needs to be imposed
here, that is, individual j‟s indifference curves over the goods themselves remain the same
whether he/she living as a single or as a member of a household. Changes in consumption
behaviors between living alone or with other persons are attributed merely to sharing of
consumptions and resources rather than changes in preferences.
Next, let us define the Independence of Base (IB) assumption to represent the scale
economies. For each individual j living in a household, assume that there exists a scalar-valued
function D j (p, α) that satisfies the condition

V j (α  p, x)  V j (p, x  ln D j (p, α))

(3.3)

Equation (3.3) is a joint restriction on the behavior of the individual and the household,
because it involves the individual‟s utility function V j and the household‟s scale economy
parameters α . The function D j (p, α) measures the cost savings experienced by individual j
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resulting from scale economies of living in the household. These scale economies are assumed to
be independent of the base expenditure (or utility) level. This assumption is similar to the IB
restriction in the equivalence scale literature (Lewbel 1989; Blundell and Lewbel 1991; Blundell
et al. 1998).
When applying Roy‟s identity to Eq. (3.3), individual j‟s budget share functions on good
k can be written as

w kj (α  p, x)  d kj (p, α)  w kj (p, x  ln D j (p, α))

(3.4)

where

d kj (p, α) 

 ln D j (p, α)

(3.5)

p k

is the elasticity of D j with respect to the k th price. The consequence of the IB assumption in the
present context is that the demands of individual j when living alone differ from her demands
when living in a household only in that they are translated over log expenditure x by ln D j (p, α)
and over each w kj by d kj (p, α) .
Assume that resource shares  j do not depend on x, and so are given by  j (p, α)  0 . By
substituting Eq. (3.4) into (3.1), the household budget share demand functions can be written as
w k (p, x, α)   j (p, α)[d kj (p, α)  w kj (p, x  ln I j (p, α))]

(3.6)

j

where

I j (p, α) 

D j (p, α)

(3.7)

 j (p, α)
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is person j‟s indifference scale (deflator of total expenditure x) which combines the effect of cost
savings D j and resource shares  j of individual j when living in the household. Eq. (3.6) shows
that household budget share equations are a simple function of individual budget share
equations; in particular, they are weighted average of individual budget shares translated both in
budget shares (weighted by scale economy price elasticities) and log expenditure (weighted by
individual indifference scales). Eq. (3.7) shows that individual j‟s indifference scale is smaller
when she receives a larger share of household resources  j or experiences smaller cost savings
from sharing consumption.
We now suppose that data are only observed in one price regime, p  p 0 , as typically
occurred when considering cross-sectional data. Both p 0 and α are vectors of constants and can
now be taken out of Eq. (3.6). We can then rewrite Eq. (3.6) in Engel curve form as
w k ( x )   j [d kj  w kj ( x  ln I j )]

(3.8)

j

where w k (x ) and w kj (x ) are the household‟s and individual j‟s Engle curves for good k,
respectively, and where the resource shares  j and indifference scales I j are now constants for
each individual j. Moreover, in addition to the fact that



j

 1 , we also need to assume that

j

 j  0 for each household member j, so each household member j can be considered as a
decision maker in the household.
Since we have assumed that individual‟s preferences over goods are the same whether
living alone or in a household, observing the expenditure of households and of individuals on
each good k in this one price regime allows the Engel curve functions w k (x ) and w kj (x ) to be
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identified for each good k. However, we need to investigate whether the resource shares  j and
indifference scales I j can be identified from these Engel curves. Using Theorem 1 in LP, it can
be shown that  j and I j are nonparametrically identified, as long as some of the goods have
budget shares that are nonlinear and are sufficiently different across individuals. Specifically,
Theorem 1 says that in a household with J people, the resource shares and indifference scales are
identified if there are J goods having nonlinear Engel curves that differ both across people and
across goods. Also note that Theorem 1 is sufficient but not necessary for identification. One
may also obtain identification under weaker conditions by the presence of assignable goods, or
by functional form restrictions.

3.3. Empirical implementation
For implementation, I follow LP by considering the households consisting of married
couples, so J  2 . I index the members of the household by j  f for female and j  m for
male. Since resource shares  j sum to one, I define a single share function    f with

1    m . Moreover, to exploit data from a survey of many people, I also specify how
wkj ( x ), I j ,, D j and d kj vary by observable characteristics such as age and education.
Next, I introduce a vector of demographic characteristics for each individual, z j , and a
vector of distribution factors, z h . Distribution factors as described in previous two chapters are
variables that affect the decision making process but do not directly affect preferences. In the
present context, distribution factors are variables that affect resource shares but not the demand
70

functions of individual household members. Thus, z j can enter the budget share functions of the
relevant singles, w kj ( x, z j ) and the scale economies functions and elasticities of the singles
D j ( z j ) and d kj ( z j ) . Both z h and the individual characteristics z f and z m enter the resource

share function  ( z h , z f , z m ) , and since the indifference scale is equal to the scale economies
divided by the resource share, these arguments also enter the indifference scale I j ( z h , z f , z m ) .
Let z  ( z h , z f , z m ) denote the set of distribution factors and all demographic
characteristics, so we can write the resource share and indifference scale functions as  (z) and

I j (z) . Adding  error terms for each good k  1,..., K  1 , the model of estimation for single
individuals can be written as
wkf  wkf ( x, z f )   kf

(3.9)

wmk  wmk ( x, z m )   mk

(3.10)

and for couples as
w k   ( z)[ w kf [ x  ln I f ( z), z f ]  d kf ( z f )]
 [1   ( z)][ wmk [ x  ln I m ( z), z m ]  d mk ( z m )]   k

(3.11)

where wkj , j  f , m is individual j‟s actual budget share and wkj ( x, z j ), j  f , m is the Engel
curve function for these shares. Notice that the equation for the K th good in each household type
(f, m and couples) does not need to be estimated, because its parameters can be determined by
budget shares summing to one for each household.
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Although the parameters of interest,  (z) and I j (z) , can be nonparametrically identified
from Engel curve data according to Theorem 1 in LP, I will flexibly parameterize the model for
empirical tractability. For parameterization, let us continue to estimate the budget share Engel
curve models using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) which was found to
provide a good fit for Engle curves (Banks et al. 1997). Without price variation, the QUAIDS
models for single females are given by

wkf ( x, z f )  a kf 0  akf ' z f  ( x  e /f z f )bkf  ( x  e /f z f ) 2 c kf

(3.12)

and for single males by

wmk ( x, z m )  amk 0  akm' z m  ( x  e m/ z m )bmk  ( x  e m/ z m ) 2 cmk

(3.13)

for each good k  1,..., K , where z f and z m are vectors of female‟s and male‟s demographic
characteristics including ages and highest level of education. I also normalize z f and z m to zero
for a reference set of characteristics, which in this chapter are an individual aged 35 with Junior
High School as their highest level of education.
Substitute Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13) into (3.11) then gives the budget share Engel curve
models for couples as

w k   ( z )[a kf 0  a kf ' z f  ( x  ln I f ( z )  e /f z f )b kf
 ( x  ln I f ( z )  e /f z f ) 2 c kf  d kf ( z f )]
 [1   ( z )][a mk 0  a km' z m  ( x  ln I m ( z )  e m/ z m )bmk
 ( x  ln I m ( z )  e m/ z m ) 2 cmk  d mk ( z m )]   k .
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(3.14)

To estimate the models, I also need to parameterize D j ( z j ), d kj ( z j ) and  (z) . The
indifference scale is given by ln I j ( z)  ln D j ( z j )  ln  j (z) . Following LP, I parameterize
D f ( z f ) and Dm ( z m ) as

ln D f (z f )  d 0 f  d /f z f ,

(3.15)

ln Dm (z m )  d 0m  d m/ z m

(3.16)

and for each k  1,..., K , the price elasticities of the IB scales are parameterized as

d kf ( z f )   0k f  δ kf ' z f ,

(3.17)

d mk ( z m )   0km  δ km' z m .

(3.18)

Moreover, the resource share function  (z) can be parameterized by

 (z)  r / z  r0  rh/ z h  r f/ z f  rm/ z m

(3.19)

where I take the distribution factor z h to be the relative wage of the wife versus the husband as
suggested by Browning and Chiappori (1998).
Using Eqs. (3.15) to (3.19), I can write the functional forms for indifference scales I f (z)
and I m (z) as
ln I f ( z)  d 0 f  d /f z f  ln(r / z)

(3.20)

ln I m (z)  d 0m  d m/ z m  ln(1  r / z) .

(3.21)

The model I actually estimate is then obtained by substituting Eq. (3.12) into (3.9) and
Eq. (3.13) into (3.10) for singles, and substituting Eqs. (3.17) to (3.21) into Eq. (3.14) for
couples, for each k  1,..., K  1 good. We then have a system of K  1 equations for each
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household type. To estimate the functions of interest  (z) and I j (z) requires a two-step process.
First, I separately estimate each system of K  1 equations for the singles using NLSUR method
to obtain a kj 0 , a kj ' , e /j , b kj , c kj for j  f , m . Then, I substitute these single parameters into the
couple‟s budget share system (3.14) for each k  1,..., K  1 good, and estimate a system of
equations for couples by NLSUR using only just couples data. It is crucial for us to first estimate
the systems of equations for singles because, without information on singles, the parameters of
interest from the couple‟s model by itself are not all identified.
According to Theorem 1 in LP, the couple‟s model above is identified as long as the

2  K matrices consisting of rows [b kf , bmk ] and [c kf , cmk ] each have rank two and  (z) is not
equal to zero or one. However, the precision of estimation is likely to be improved by the
presence of an assignable good. A good is considered assignable if it is consumed exclusively by
only one individual in the collective household. Unfortunately, there are no records of any
assignable good in our sample data from Thailand. I try to estimate the models by assuming that
cosmetics can be considered as an assignable good for female, while alcohol and tobacco as an
assignable good for male. However, the survey data show that approximately 13% of single
males report positive expenditures on cosmetics, while 9% of single females report positive
expenditures alcohol and tobacco. Since these numbers are relatively large, I choose not include
any assignable good to the model.
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3.4. Data and results
The sample data used to estimate the model in this chapter also comes from the same
Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted by the National Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO) in
year 2006 used in chapters one and two. The reader is referred to the data section in chapter one
to see how the data are collected. The sample is only limited to three types of households (single
female, single male and married couples with no child) with each individual being a full-time
wage and salary earner. Thus, our sample consists of 810 single females, 825 single males, and
1108 childless couples. The vectors z f and z m consist of two demographic variables, age and
years of formal education. I normalize z f and z m to zero by subtracting 35 from age, and 9 from
years of formal education for a reference set of characteristics. I also define distribution factors

z h to be the demeaned female‟s share of gross household income (the mean is 0.45). In addition,
I decide to totally drop the budget share on education category out of the estimated models
because there are only 1% of single female and 2% of single male reported to have positive
expenditures on education. Thus, I estimate the system of budget shares using NLSUR for

K  11 non-durable categories, and the omitted category is healthcare. Table 14 provides the
main overall descriptive statistics of the sample.
Table 15 reports the estimated parameters for the collective household that enter the scale
economies D f and Dm , and resource shares  functions.12 For an individual aged 35 with nine
years of formal education, scale economies for female and male are given by exp( d 0, f ) and
Estimates for the hundreds of parameters of the model comprising the singles‟ budget share equations for each
model are available upon request from the author. Moreover, I also compute ranks of the 2  K matrices consisting
12

of rows

[b kj , bmk ] and [c kj , cmk ] for identification purpose using Stata. The results show that each matrix has rank

two; thus satisfying Theorem 1 in LP.
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exp( d 0,m ) , respectively. Notice that, in principle, one should expect the scale economy to lie
between 0.5 (completely sharing of consumption) and 1 (purely private consumption). I first
consider the estimated parameters from Model A. Model A estimates the couple models
developed in section 3.3. The results for Model A give scale economies of 0.88 for female and
1.86 for male of this type in the married-couple households. Even though the scale economy for
female is reasonable in magnitude, the scale economy for male clearly is not. These point
estimates imply that for a female aged 35 with 9 years of formal education, the cost of living as a
member (wife) of the household equals 88% of the costs if she should live alone (single). On the
other hand, a married male (husband) faces a much higher cost of living of 186% compared to
when he lives alone.
There may be two possible explanations that cause the scale economy for husband to lie
outside the 0.5 – 1 range. The first possibility is that it is common in Thai society for husbands to
provide housing and some personal expenses for their wives even when wives work full time. As
a result, married males would require higher income to be as well off as they were living alone.
The second possibility is that these scale economies are imprecisely estimated as we may see that
they are not statistically significant at any level. As pointed out by Bargain et al. (2010), which
uses the model similar to LP to estimate the measurement of child costs using data from Ireland,
that the estimated parameters may be sensitive to model specifications. Thus, I estimate Model B
where the resource shares  are now specified using the logistic form as  ( z) 

exp( r / z)
1  exp( r / z)

used by Bargain et al. (2010). The main difference of using the logistic form for the resource
shares is that now the resource shares are bounded between zero and one, which was not the case
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in Model A. However, the scale economies are still not statistically significant at any level in
model B.13
In addition, demographics affect the demand of single individuals, and so should also
affect their scale economies when living in married couple households. The negative and
significant coefficient on d age, f suggests that older females in married couples have smaller scale
economies (more negative ln D f ) than younger females in married couples, while none of the
remaining coefficients on the demographic variables are significant; hence, no discernible effect
on scale economies.
The resource shares  are more precisely estimated than the scale economies, and the
estimates are more stable across Models A and B. In Model A, the parameter r0 gives the
resource share  of a female (wife) aged 35 with 9 years of formal education in a marriedcouple household, while for Model B it equals exp ( r0 ) . The estimated resource shares for a wife
equal 0.649 and 0.644 for Models A and B, and they are both significant at 1% and 5%
respectively. These results are different than those found by LP and Lise and Seitz (2011) that
females have resource shares less than 0.5. However, these results are more in line with BCL and
Bargain et al. (2010) that female‟s resource shares are in the neighborhood of 0.6. Notice from
Models A and B that the precisions of the estimates of the r0 coefficient are very impressive
even though I am not able to incorporate the use of assignable goods. This ability to identify and
estimate the resource shares without the presence of assignable goods is an interesting finding
because it implies that we may be able to use household-level data to recover some of the
13

I also estimate Models A and B using different initial values for r0 and find that the estimated results are relatively
stable across the values with no evidence of multiple local minima.
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individual decision-making process parameters, which rarely occurred in the earlier literature of
collective household model.
For the effect of demographic variables on the resource share, Models A and B show that
the wife‟s share of gross household income and husband‟s education level have no significant
effects on the resource shares, while wife‟s education and ages of both spouses do. The positive
value of reduc, f implies that the wives with higher education have larger resource shares
compared to wives with only Junior High School qualification. This is somewhat expected since
we should anticipate that wives‟ ability to extract resources within the household would be larger
when they are more educated. The negative coefficients on rage, f and rage,m imply that, ceteris
paribus, older wives tend to have smaller resource shares compared to younger wives, and also
receive smaller resource shares when their husbands get older. These results are interesting
because they simply demonstrate that older wives have less bargaining power within the
household while older husbands possess more power, which is very common in Thai society.
I estimate two more models using instrumental variables for log total household
expenditure. First, I run a linear regression to predict log total expenditure for each type of
household by regressing log total expenditure on log total income and all explanatory variables,
their square and interaction terms, then substituting the predicted value of log total expenditure
into singles‟ and couples‟ household models. After that, I estimate the couple‟s model using
NLSUR. Models C and D provide the estimated parameters after controlling for the endogeneity
of total household expenditures.14

14

I have estimated more specifications than Models C and D reported here, including different instruments. In
particular, I experience that all models are very sensitive to the choice of instruments because the estimates are
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The estimated parameters from Models C and D are exceedingly different from each
other and also different than the results obtained from Models A and B. These findings are
similar to the results found by BCL which estimates the resource shares using GMM estimations
and finds that the estimated models are sensitive to the choice of instruments. Bargain et al.
(2010) also find that the share of children which is interpreted as the cost of children is relatively
stable across specifications without endogeneity correction, but unstable when the endogeneity
of total expenditure is controlled for.
Finally, indifference scales, which are used to adjust household income that puts a single
individual on the same indifferent curve they would attain when they were married, can be
obtained by dividing the scale economy with the resource share. Since the estimated parameters
from Models C and D are relatively unstable, then I only interpret the results obtained from
Models A and B. Therefore, given the estimates from Model A, a female aged 35 with 9 years of
formal education has an estimated indifference scale of (0.88/0.649) = 1.36. This implies that this
female when living alone would need approximately (1/1.36) = 74% of the couple‟s income to
reach the same indifference curve that she would attain as a wife in the married-couple
household. From Model B, the indifference scale of such female would equal to (0.85/0.644) =
1.32. This implies that when living alone she would need (1/1.32) = 76% of the couple‟s income
to attain the same indifference curve that she would attain as a wife in the married-couple
household. Therefore, the estimates are relatively stable between Models A and B regardless of
the functional form of the resource shares.

relatively unstable across all specifications. The estimated parameters from models with different instruments are
available upon request from the author.
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3.5. Conclusions
The success of the collective approach to household behavior has been recognized and
there is growing interest in using it to make inequality or welfare comparisons between
individuals. Survey data are generally collected at the household level and welfare or inequality
statements are usually measured at this level. This chapter estimates systems of Engel curves
developed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) using household consumption data to recover many
of the objects of interest, especially resource shares and indifference scales of the individuals
who together make up the household in the collective framework.
Even though the estimates of scale economies are imprecise, I find relatively stable and
more precise results for the resource shares. Using Thai consumption data, I find that wives aged
35 with Junior High School diplomas have resource shares equal to nearly 65% of marriedcouple‟s total incomes, while higher educated wives have larger resource shares. Resource shares
for wives are smaller for older-married compared to younger-married couples. Moreover, if a
female were to live alone, she would need approximately three-quarters of the couple‟s income
to reach the same indifference curve, and hence the same standard of living, that she would attain
as a wife in the married-couple household.
Finally, the readers should be cautious that the estimated model in this chapter assumes
that there is no change in preferences from being single to being married, so that differences
between the consumption behaviors of singles versus couples are due to sharing of household
goods and the allocation of household resources to husbands and wives. Therefore, there are
opportunities for us to examine the situation where we allow individual‟s preferences to change
after marriage. This may be done by acquiring additional data which include direct observations
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of the resource allocation and separate consumption of some goods by individuals within the
household. I will leave these opportunities for my future research.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for all 2933 households
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Household characteristics:
Household size
Number of young children (age 0-5)
Number of older children (age 6-14)
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Central
North
Northeastern
South
Rural

3.06
0.23
0.52
39.06
36.61
10.66
10.67
0.43
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.25

1.04
0.48
0.73
9.50
9.18
4.74
4.86
0.50
0.37
0.37
0.32
0.43

2
0
0
18
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

9
3
4
75
76
22
22
1
1
1
1
1

Monthly income (in hundred):
Husband wages
Wife wages
Total household income
Total household consumption

127.02
102.89
230.36
180.87

110.54
92.52
190.53
134.37

10
5
30
15.86

2000
1200
3000
2077.95

Share of monthly consumption expenditure (%) on:
Housing
Household operations
Clothing & Footwear
Personal & Services
Cosmetic
Health
Transportation & Communication
Education
Recreation & Religion
Food eaten at home
Food eaten outside
Alcohol & Tobacco

15.22
7.02
3.89
3.85
0.72
1.50
18.83
1.92
1.86
28.91
11.99
4.29

7.45
3.55
4.66
3.20
1.30
3.64
9.36
3.42
2.36
11.52
8.41
5.86

1.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.76
0.00
0.00

64.90
43.34
30.62
29.53
21.60
58.86
60.46
46.61
25.03
78.56
73.97
48.40
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Table 2. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (unitary model) with all household compositions
Variable

Housing

Constant

3.372138
(2.771189)
2.447597***
(0.681573)
-1.589591
(1.092827)
-3.625263***
(0.84927)
8.14947***
(0.949202)
2.540932**
(1.214085)
-0.006849
(0.090533)
0.047777
(0.094195)
0.479061***
(0.151295)
0.267743*
(0.14769)
0.043892***
(0.005817)
0.000004
(0.000003)
-9.965106***
(1.359943)
-13.95853***
(1.602706)
-17.47446***
(1.616982)
-11.78578***
(1.715201)
-0.767361
(0.991641)

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
HH total income
HH total income square
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

0.3105
2933

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

-3.544552*** -3.425716***
(1.161005)
(1.262572)
2.564208***
-0.0409
(0.285549)
(0.310529)
-1.026734**
0.134926
(0.457846)
(0.497899)
-1.17483*** 1.032571***
(0.355807)
(0.386933)
0.84844**
0.348138
(0.397674)
(0.432463)
0.677995
0.197072
(0.508648)
(0.553145)
0.010381
-0.011194
(0.037929)
(0.041247)
0.036399
-0.008162
(0.039464)
(0.042916)
0.177061*** 0.191239***
(0.063386)
(0.068931)
0.165649***
0.153866**
(0.061875)
(0.067288)
0.008802*** 0.020388***
(0.002437)
(0.00265)
0.000013***
0.000003**
(0.000001)
(0.000002)
-1.459253*** 2.396331***
(0.569756)
(0.619599)
-2.419238*** 2.785889***
(0.671463)
(0.730204)
-4.382593***
1.074179
(0.677444)
(0.736708)
-3.385955*** 2.519596***
(0.718593)
(0.781457)
-0.803638*
-0.469672
(0.415454)
(0.451798)
0.3400
2933

0.2607
2933

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

Personal&
Services
1.040187
(1.102068)
0.376319
(0.271054)
3.445435***
(0.434604)
-0.231981
(0.337745)
0.050001
(0.377486)
0.600068
(0.482827)
0.019292
(0.036004)
-0.004031
(0.03746)
0.15934***
(0.060168)
0.272587***
(0.058734)
-0.014558***
(0.002313)
0.000033***
(0.000001)
-1.720148***
(0.540833)
-2.662457***
(0.637377)
-2.603857***
(0.643054)
-2.58823***
(0.682114)
-0.278107
(0.394364)
0.3965
2933

Cosmetic

Health

-0.179794
-3.260877**
(0.419679)
(1.530563)
-0.15319
1.234883***
(0.10322)
(0.376442)
-0.096855
-0.226032
(0.165502)
(0.603582)
0.296514**
-1.3709***
(0.128617)
(0.469063)
0.266619*
0.339861
(0.143751)
(0.524256)
0.075258
-0.249856
(0.183865)
(0.670555)
0.001016
-0.033626
(0.013711)
(0.050002)
0.015171
0.060417
(0.014265)
(0.052025)
0.077989***
-0.037529
(0.022913)
(0.083562)
0.150354***
0.146969*
(0.022367)
(0.081571)
-0.011187*** 0.015244***
(0.000881)
(0.003213)
0.000016*** -0.000005***
(0.000001)
(0.000002)
-0.149259
-1.529792**
(0.205955)
(0.751114)
-0.062684
-1.47304*
(0.24272)
(0.885195)
-0.251059
-3.473658***
(0.244882)
(0.89308)
-0.290252
-1.747585*
(0.259756)
(0.947327)
-0.143367
-0.472445
(0.150178)
(0.547696)
0.4179
2933

0.0597
2933

83

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

-6.88292***
(2.558455)
3.356849***
(0.629252)
-4.39009***
(1.008934)
-1.464415*
(0.784075)
2.776233***
(0.876335)
6.221644***
(1.120884)
-0.022414
(0.083583)
-0.024021
(0.086964)
0.830384***
(0.139681)
0.534765***
(0.136352)
0.065756***
(0.00537)
0.000042***
(0.000003)
-4.549628***
(1.255545)
-12.04932***
(1.479672)
-12.57153***
(1.492852)
-9.459163***
(1.583531)
-0.26324
(0.915517)

-7.599359***
(1.134348)
3.888807***
(0.278993)
-3.673807***
(0.447333)
-1.011194***
(0.347637)
0.158661
(0.388543)
0.598133
(0.496969)
-0.068897*
(0.037058)
0.047264
(0.038557)
0.081944
(0.06193)
-0.04894
(0.060455)
0.013161***
(0.002381)
0.000008***
(0.000001)
-2.209069***
(0.556674)
-2.537374***
(0.656045)
-5.038213***
(0.661889)
-2.664688***
(0.702094)
-0.342626
(0.405915)

-1.683796**
(0.754496)
0.236848
(0.185568)
-0.481955
(0.297538)
-0.193489
(0.231226)
0.310584
(0.258434)
0.781221**
(0.330552)
-0.003161
(0.024649)
0.008486
(0.025646)
0.06427
(0.041192)
0.010332
(0.040211)
0.015308***
(0.001584)
0.00000004
(0.000001)
0.127183
(0.370264)
-0.839094*
(0.436359)
-1.628048***
(0.440246)
-1.223181***
(0.466988)
-0.467508*
(0.269988)

4.619832**
(2.161818)
4.347187***
(0.531699)
4.625384***
(0.852519)
1.182416*
(0.66252)
0.195594
(0.740477)
0.550239
(0.947114)
0.004177
(0.070625)
0.127181*
(0.073482)
0.308441***
(0.118026)
0.416592***
(0.115213)
0.039987***
(0.004538)
-0.000008***
(0.000003)
-0.20371
(1.060898)
-3.316868***
(1.250278)
-3.539661***
(1.261415)
-0.040938
(1.338036)
-1.325718*
(0.773584)

11.28793***
(1.792946)
2.897741***
(0.440975)
-4.673697***
(0.707054)
-1.389984**
(0.549474)
0.993778
(0.614129)
-0.539082
(0.785507)
-0.081277
(0.058574)
-0.082988
(0.060944)
0.039309
(0.097887)
0.366237***
(0.095555)
0.028739***
(0.003763)
-0.000001
(0.000002)
-2.86346***
(0.879876)
-8.284594***
(1.036943)
-10.18***
(1.046179)
-4.690447***
(1.109726)
-1.86976***
(0.641587)

6.730615***
(1.376926)
-0.703404**
(0.338655)
0.186806
(0.542995)
0.891497**
(0.421979)
-1.288352***
(0.471632)
1.021934*
(0.603245)
-0.05291
(0.044983)
0.017163
(0.046803)
-0.057936
(0.075174)
-0.103904
(0.073383)
0.016858***
(0.00289)
-0.000006***
(0.000002)
0.972466
(0.675717)
0.193504
(0.79634)
0.985452
(0.803433)
0.466601
(0.852235)
0.130535
(0.492719)

0.6450
2933

0.3051
2933

0.2489
2933

0.3299
2933

0.2237
2933

0.0263
2933

Mean of X

3.06
0.23
0.52
0.52
0.84
39.06
36.61
10.66
10.67
230.36
89354.57
0.43
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.25

2933

Table 3. QUAIDS Engel curve (unitary model) with all household compositions (SURE)
Variable

Housing

Constant

47.95122***
(7.568327)
-0.422973
(0.233604)
-0.189286
(0.366663)
-0.863702***
(0.2851)
3.386533***
(0.320278)
0.038214
(0.410944)
0.075287**
(0.030032)
-0.015054
(0.031297)
0.192609***
(0.049827)
0.040917
(0.048954)
-11.40674***
(3.032674)
0.871901***
(0.301982)
-2.561366***
(0.457673)
-4.093137***
(0.554452)
-4.163578***
(0.561907)
-2.247507***
(0.580158)
-0.927423***
(0.334023)

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) square
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

0.0868
2933

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

28.6071***
-11.72575**
(3.644231)
(4.680457)
0.647975*** -0.673187***
(0.112483)
(0.144467)
0.196662
0.38417*
(0.176552)
(0.226754)
-0.299925** 0.663647***
(0.137279)
(0.176314)
0.232454
-0.227118
(0.154217)
(0.198069)
-0.065912
-0.162627
(0.197874)
(0.254139)
0.015614
0.005437
(0.014461)
(0.018573)
0.025003*
-0.012177
(0.01507)
(0.019355)
0.017355
0.020657
(0.023992)
(0.030814)
0.038578
0.01635
(0.023572)
(0.030274)
-8.609631*** 3.911027**
(1.460265)
(1.875487)
0.689185***
-0.157129
(0.145408)
(0.186754)
-0.053644
1.760144***
(0.220375)
(0.283037)
-0.101006
3.044569***
(0.266975)
(0.342888)
-0.40101
2.632196***
(0.270564)
(0.347498)
-0.638355** 2.472685***
(0.279352)
(0.358785)
-0.190953
0.164484
(0.160836)
(0.206569)
0.0701
2933

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

0.1089
2933

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

14.9885***
(3.244211)
-0.271705***
(0.100136)
1.823501***
(0.157173)
0.070154
(0.12221)
-0.2422*
(0.137289)
-0.085155
(0.176154)
-0.008224
(0.012874)
-0.018767
(0.013416)
-0.006757
(0.021359)
0.040819*
(0.020984)
-4.29764***
(1.299975)
0.470327***
(0.129447)
-0.411262**
(0.196185)
-0.292014
(0.237669)
-0.021434
(0.240865)
-0.582481**
(0.248688)
-0.008971
(0.143181)

-0.279357
(1.32222)
-0.154844***
(0.040812)
-0.101049
(0.064058)
0.035162
(0.049808)
0.027776
(0.055954)
-0.008825
(0.071794)
-0.002294
(0.005247)
-0.008871
(0.005468)
0.002794
(0.008705)
0.025513***
(0.008552)
0.111265
(0.529821)
0.040062
(0.052758)
0.000633
(0.079958)
0.176343*
(0.096865)
0.243642**
(0.098168)
-0.006619
(0.101356)
-0.016366
(0.058355)

-63.56146***
(8.380295)
-0.756311***
(0.258667)
-1.846728***
(0.406001)
-0.5121
(0.315687)
-0.014805
(0.354639)
2.964907***
(0.455032)
0.060732*
(0.033254)
0.010027
(0.034655)
0.34288***
(0.055173)
0.23447***
(0.054206)
26.79339***
(3.358035)
-2.304151***
(0.33438)
-1.465686***
(0.506775)
-2.132306***
(0.613936)
-1.601606***
(0.622191)
-2.594735***
(0.6424)
1.320277***
(0.369859)

-0.661715
(3.13245)
1.4795***
(0.096686)
-1.359492***
(0.151758)
-0.110872
(0.118)
-0.08216
(0.13256)
0.159562
(0.170085)
-0.006356
(0.01243)
0.033088**
(0.012954)
0.020463
(0.020623)
-0.014003
(0.020261)
-1.925881
(1.255192)
0.297368**
(0.124987)
-0.532324***
(0.189426)
-0.037834
(0.229482)
-1.023438***
(0.232567)
-0.417596*
(0.240121)
-0.122081
(0.138249)

2.169561
(2.373891)
-0.231708***
(0.073273)
-0.163269
(0.115008)
0.003563
(0.089425)
-0.087766
(0.100459)
0.351926***
(0.128897)
0.013818
(0.00942)
0.002977
(0.009817)
0.035466**
(0.015629)
-0.001075
(0.015355)
-1.432116
(0.951232)
0.245216***
(0.09472)
0.412813***
(0.143554)
0.37397**
(0.17391)
0.127592
(0.176248)
-0.061485
(0.181973)
-0.07543
(0.10477)

122.5616***
(9.535993)
0.76068***
(0.294338)
4.251885***
(0.461991)
1.535698***
(0.359223)
-0.839084**
(0.403546)
-0.630297
(0.517784)
0.021935
(0.03784)
0.030416
(0.039434)
-0.214644***
(0.062782)
-0.20934***
(0.061681)
-29.80317***
(3.82113)
2.026401***
(0.380494)
2.00351***
(0.576662)
3.021543***
(0.698602)
3.817403***
(0.707995)
3.638793***
(0.730991)
0.212248
(0.420864)

-39.63972***
(8.305295)
0.502355**
(0.256352)
-3.332964***
(0.402367)
-0.690937**
(0.312862)
-0.835992**
(0.351465)
-2.435099***
(0.450959)
-0.121565***
(0.032957)
-0.071633**
(0.034345)
-0.157405***
(0.054679)
-0.011567
(0.053721)
24.72721***
(3.327982)
-2.346334***
(0.331388)
-0.57566
(0.502239)
-2.003164***
(0.608442)
-2.236195***
(0.616623)
-1.250661**
(0.636651)
-0.60705*
(0.366548)

-14.4352***
(5.998765)
-0.897427**
(0.185158)
0.072893
(0.290623)
0.370314
(0.225975)
-1.156135***
(0.253857)
-0.100494
(0.32572)
-0.055555**
(0.023804)
0.016777
(0.024807)
-0.193043***
(0.039494)
-0.200145***
(0.038801)
8.343684***
(2.403741)
-0.606255**
(0.239356)
1.462926***
(0.362758)
1.683812***
(0.439467)
2.597241***
(0.445375)
1.398328***
(0.459841)
0.315895
(0.264751)

0.0903
2933

0.0916
2933

0.2919
2933

0.2605
2933

0.1070
2933

0.3945
2933

0.1377
2933

0.0742
2933

84

Mean of X

3.06
0.23
0.52
0.52
0.84
39.06
36.61
10.66
10.67
4.89
24.25
0.43
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.25

2933

Table 4. QUAIDS Engel curve (unitary model) with all household compositions (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

10.72154
(12.60288)
-0.532857**
(0.246086)
-0.130749
(0.370093)
-0.852595***
(0.287764)
3.393007***
(0.327226)
-0.209365
(0.423987)
0.070877**
(0.030349)
-0.016779
(0.031792)
0.151391***
(0.055276)
-0.008237
(0.055052)
3.35555
(5.039183)
-0.509783
(0.493966)
-2.466828***
(0.474597)
-3.601858***
(0.613558)
-3.852929***
(0.626252)
-2.112054***
(0.609004)
-0.804547**
(0.338702)

28.43179***
(6.04125)
0.624349***
(0.117962)
0.207885
(0.177406)
-0.290859***
(0.137941)
0.213303
(0.156858)
-0.092296
(0.20324)
0.014561
(0.014548)
0.023464
(0.01524)
0.010044
(0.026497)
0.031064
(0.02639)
-8.604784***
(2.415557)
0.707771***
(0.236785)
-0.015069
(0.2275)
-0.022107
(0.294112)
-0.312825
(0.300197)
-0.580407**
(0.291929)
-0.178784
(0.162358)

1.473448
(7.783365)
-0.56318***
(0.151979)
0.329759
(0.228564)
0.631994***
(0.177719)
-0.170438
(0.202091)
0.002683
(0.261848)
0.010175
(0.018743)
-0.006859
(0.019635)
0.057152*
(0.034138)
0.05617*
(0.034)
-1.123895
(3.112131)
0.255578
(0.305067)
1.609393***
(0.293105)
2.634928***
(0.378925)
2.255429***
(0.386765)
2.248458***
(0.376112)
0.085283
(0.209178)

23.32235***
(5.386769)
-0.225477**
(0.105183)
1.80015***
(0.158187)
0.05923
(0.122997)
-0.225695
(0.139864)
-0.006129
(0.181222)
-0.00627
(0.012972)
-0.016947
(0.013589)
0.009132
(0.023626)
0.05864**
(0.023531)
-7.541647***
(2.153867)
0.75613***
(0.211133)
-0.468116**
(0.202854)
-0.473673*
(0.262249)
-0.172148
(0.267675)
-0.666446***
(0.260303)
-0.047326
(0.144769)

1.445582
(2.194414)
-0.174205***
(0.042849)
-0.092178
(0.064441)
0.044185
(0.050106)
0.00718
(0.056977)
-0.024038
(0.073825)
-0.003182
(0.005284)
-0.010411*
(0.005536)
-0.002827
(0.009625)
0.020084**
(0.009586)
-0.64113
(0.877423)
0.13063
(0.086009)
0.036599
(0.082637)
0.234616**
(0.106833)
0.321011***
(0.109043)
0.047747
(0.10604)
-0.009795
(0.058975)

-76.86008***
(14.48936)
-1.619468***
(0.282922)
-1.43551***
(0.425491)
-0.186742
(0.330839)
-0.696379*
(0.376208)
1.977352***
(0.487452)
0.02235
(0.034892)
-0.04517
(0.036551)
0.074408
(0.06355)
-0.042763
(0.063293)
29.761***
(5.793484)
-1.903072***
(0.567907)
-0.072439
(0.545638)
0.773703
(0.7054)
1.601284**
(0.719994)
-0.503042
(0.700163)
1.777432***
(0.389401)

2.074284
(5.193334)
1.463474***
(0.101406)
-1.352377***
(0.152506)
-0.102287
(0.118581)
-0.102641
(0.134842)
0.151455
(0.174714)
-0.007109
(0.012506)
0.031618**
(0.013101)
0.016069
(0.022778)
-0.017987
(0.022686)
-3.078201
(2.076523)
0.425077**
(0.203551)
-0.499503**
(0.19557)
0.005937
(0.252832)
-0.955821***
(0.258063)
-0.367779
(0.250955)
-0.119022
(0.139571)

1.86969
(3.934851)
-0.223764***
(0.076833)
-0.16698
(0.11555)
0.000209
(0.089845)
-0.080385
(0.102166)
0.359568***
(0.132377)
0.014176
(0.009476)
0.003548
(0.009926)
0.037854**
(0.017258)
0.001312
(0.017188)
-1.288504
(1.573326)
0.2245
(0.154225)
0.399005***
(0.148178)
0.348666*
(0.191564)
0.096959
(0.195527)
-0.082292
(0.190142)
-0.078869
(0.105749)

151.4285***
(16.02402)
1.297742***
(0.312888)
3.992437***
(0.470557)
1.350824***
(0.36588)
-0.469036
(0.416054)
0.054778
(0.539081)
0.045541
(0.038588)
0.061688
(0.040423)
-0.043519
(0.070281)
-0.028812
(0.069997)
-39.98503***
(6.407107)
2.60708***
(0.628057)
1.184621**
(0.60343)
1.143099
(0.780113)
1.880809**
(0.796252)
2.413141***
(0.774322)
-0.109677
(0.430645)

-30.57731**
(13.76865)
0.518199*
(0.268849)
-3.342047***
(0.404327)
-0.689387**
(0.314383)
-0.846619**
(0.357495)
-2.386732***
(0.463206)
-0.120979***
(0.033157)
-0.071935**
(0.034733)
-0.15073**
(0.060389)
-0.003039
(0.060145)
21.10328***
(5.505312)
-1.998167***
(0.539659)
-0.580681
(0.518498)
-2.086615***
(0.670313)
-2.270894***
(0.68418)
-1.256592*
(0.665337)
-0.631491*
(0.370032)

-14.63786
(9.980853)
-0.71634***
(0.194888)
-0.012858
(0.293095)
0.299502
(0.227895)
-1.005292***
(0.259147)
0.096429
(0.335776)
-0.047463**
(0.024035)
0.028804
(0.025178)
-0.137311***
(0.043776)
-0.14315***
(0.043599)
8.932455**
(3.990784)
-0.811055**
(0.391197)
1.163655***
(0.375857)
1.084362**
(0.485908)
1.917113***
(0.49596)
0.948483**
(0.482301)
0.225432
(0.268235)

0.0782
2933

0.0698
2933

0.1030
2933

0.0870
2933

0.0892
2933

0.2295
2933

0.2601
2933

0.1069
2933

0.3777
2933

0.1373
2933

0.0671
2933

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) square
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

85

Mean of X

3.06
0.23
0.52
0.52
0.84
39.06
36.61
10.66
10.67
4.89
24.25
0.43
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.25

2933

Table 5. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (monthly expenditures on monthly incomes) with all household compositions
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

3.963707
(2.760838)
2.235393***
(0.678869)
-1.51615
(1.085796)
-3.429768***
(0.844576)
8.074346***
(0.942782)
2.370711**
(1.205911)
-0.000098
(0.090657)
0.035708
(0.095039)
0.508616***
(0.152735)
0.275466*
(0.153842)
-1.607835***
(0.542183)
-1.61341***
(0.542377)
1.649388***
(0.542884)
0.000596
(0.000483)
0.000652
(0.000483)
-0.000581
(0.000484)
0.001112
(0.000972)
-9.84346***
(1.351739)
-14.0746***
(1.593465)
-17.39376***
(1.608406)
-11.76045***
(1.70486)
-0.63585
(0.984849)

-3.589473***
(1.16188)
2.534827***
(0.285698)
-1.013693**
(0.45695)
-1.202633***
(0.355434)
0.889971**
(0.396763)
0.636507
(0.5075)
-0.005168
(0.038153)
0.056522
(0.039996)
0.138323**
(0.064278)
0.221125***
(0.064743)
0.204737
(0.228174)
0.181121
(0.228256)
-0.186944
(0.228469)
-0.000339*
(0.000203)
-0.000329
(0.000203)
0.000339*
(0.000204)
-0.000625
(0.000409)
-1.343235**
(0.56887)
-2.328121***
(0.670599)
-4.242463***
(0.676887)
-3.25191***
(0.717479)
-0.813243**
(0.414467)

-3.157096
(1.263553)
-0.042719
(0.310698)
0.144808
(0.496937)
1.032985***
(0.386537)
0.370002
(0.431483)
0.160124
(0.551909)
-0.014023
(0.041491)
-0.008428
(0.043496)
0.181139***
(0.069902)
0.173751**
(0.070409)
-0.151878
(0.248141)
-0.168279
(0.24823)
0.17684
(0.248462)
-0.000045
(0.000221)
-0.000028
(0.000221)
0.000011
(0.000222)
0.000067
(0.000445)
2.466693***
(0.61865)
2.790796***
(0.729281)
1.073636
(0.736119)
2.559185***
(0.780263)
-0.490091
(0.450736)

1.074747
(1.080833)
0.459701*
(0.265769)
3.391352***
(0.425075)
-0.383093
(0.330641)
0.014664
(0.369087)
0.608288
(0.472099)
0.017724
(0.035491)
-0.012777
(0.037206)
0.151066**
(0.059794)
0.229168***
(0.060227)
0.55228***
(0.212258)
0.580529***
(0.212334)
-0.575369***
(0.212532)
-0.001024***
(0.000189)
-0.001086***
(0.000189)
0.00109***
(0.00019)
-0.002154***
(0.00038)
-1.456942***
(0.529189)
-2.396568***
(0.623822)
-2.185902***
(0.62967)
-2.238864***
(0.667431)
-0.287725
(0.385556)

-0.07391
(0.413369)
-0.094958
(0.101644)
-0.167245
(0.162572)
0.216187*
(0.126455)
0.239553*
(0.141159)
0.092017
(0.180556)
0.001766
(0.013574)
0.004638
(0.01423)
0.078805***
(0.022868)
0.10897***
(0.023034)
-0.152555**
(0.081179)
-0.134436*
(0.081208)
0.136864*
(0.081284)
0.000155**
(0.000072)
0.00012*
(0.000072)
-0.000126*
(0.000073)
0.000276*
(0.000146)
-0.148967
(0.20239)
-0.073682
(0.238583)
-0.230548
(0.24082)
-0.28292
(0.255262)
-0.137682
(0.147457)

-3.093508**
(1.531739)
1.232468***
(0.376643)
-0.239971
(0.60241)
-1.37688***
(0.468579)
0.287876
(0.523064)
-0.267524
(0.669051)
-0.026006
(0.050298)
0.045113
(0.052728)
-0.017102
(0.084739)
0.105204
(0.085353)
-0.256385
(0.300808)
-0.234872
(0.300916)
0.263478
(0.301197)
-0.000107
(0.000268)
-0.000125
(0.000268)
0.000126
(0.000269)
-0.000307
(0.000539)
-1.448496*
(0.749958)
-1.434989
(0.88407)
-3.346346***
(0.892359)
-1.661*
(0.945873)
-0.439161
(0.546404)

-6.756507***
(2.532665)
3.413266***
(0.622764)
-4.599473***
(0.996059)
-1.770607**
(0.774775)
2.684924***
(0.864864)
6.155476***
(1.106247)
-0.048381
(0.083165)
-0.023026
(0.087184)
0.772128***
(0.140112)
0.472965***
(0.141127)
-0.354716
(0.497374)
-0.309022
(0.497552)
0.412664
(0.498017)
-0.00042
(0.000443)
-0.000544
(0.000443)
0.000557
(0.000444)
-0.001199
(0.000891)
-4.19193***
(1.240023)
-11.80316***
(1.461772)
-11.90722***
(1.475477)
-8.989528***
(1.56396)
-0.16428
(0.903455)

-8.005282***
(1.128518)
3.804653***
(0.277494)
-3.656585***
(0.443829)
-0.998616***
(0.345228)
0.158721
(0.385371)
0.573013
(0.492927)
-0.08237**
(0.037057)
0.071377*
(0.038848)
0.056745
(0.062432)
-0.009231
(0.062884)
0.155228
(0.221622)
0.151387
(0.221702)
-0.138702
(0.221909)
-0.000175
(0.000198)
-0.000178
(0.000198)
0.000232
(0.000198)
-0.000571
(0.000397)
-2.171126***
(0.552536)
-2.467345***
(0.651344)
-4.860208***
(0.657451)
-2.574189***
(0.696877)
-0.28987
(0.402566)

-1.512694**
(0.754191)
0.275645
(0.18545)
-0.509749*
(0.296612)
-0.240296
(0.230717)
0.297086
(0.257544)
0.779263**
(0.329425)
-0.001134
(0.024765)
-0.000746
(0.025962)
0.066644
(0.041723)
-0.012693
(0.042026)
-0.034647
(0.148111)
-0.026346
(0.148164)
0.047093
(0.148302)
-0.00013
(0.000132)
-0.000146
(0.000132)
0.000125
(0.000132)
-0.000229
(0.000266)
0.19168
(0.369261)
-0.802013*
(0.435295)
-1.563723***
(0.439376)
-1.156691**
(0.465725)
-0.475797*
(0.269036)

4.863536**
(2.165687)
4.315569***
(0.532526)
4.588048***
(0.851733)
1.116322*
(0.662512)
0.211884
(0.739547)
0.466741
(0.945954)
-0.014618
(0.071115)
0.14039*
(0.074551)
0.263216**
(0.11981)
0.454687***
(0.120678)
-0.358682
(0.425305)
-0.377565
(0.425457)
0.406965
(0.425855)
-0.000033
(0.000379)
-0.000036
(0.000379)
0.000012
(0.00038)
-0.000007
(0.000762)
-0.037154
(1.060346)
-3.263758***
(1.249964)
-3.359367***
(1.261684)
0.119674
(1.337345)
-1.305195*
(0.772546)

11.16771***
(1.798459)
2.908493***
(0.442228)
-4.68427***
(0.707307)
-1.433383***
(0.550172)
1.02406*
(0.614145)
-0.537502
(0.785552)
-0.091326
(0.059056)
-0.069918
(0.06191)
0.013361
(0.099494)
0.39377***
(0.100215)
0.267628
(0.353188)
0.256557
(0.353314)
-0.233641
(0.353644)
-0.000163
(0.000315)
-0.000168
(0.000315)
0.000158
(0.000315)
-0.000303
(0.000633)
-2.83658***
(0.880547)
-8.238306***
(1.038012)
-10.13231***
(1.047744)
-4.642293***
(1.110576)
-1.886805***
(0.641548)

6.584779***
(1.37511)
-0.789491**
(0.338129)
0.164081
(0.54081)
0.859421**
(0.420664)
-1.276497***
(0.469578)
0.9499
(0.600637)
-0.076409*
(0.045154)
0.044719
(0.047337)
-0.108264
(0.076074)
-0.048833
(0.076625)
-0.249067
(0.270049)
-0.265556
(0.270146)
0.274831
(0.270398)
0.000074
(0.000241)
0.000071
(0.000241)
-0.000052
(0.000241)
0.000022
(0.000484)
1.064201
(0.67327)
0.232886
(0.793668)
1.175689
(0.80111)
0.583259
(0.849151)
0.188685
(0.490531)

0.3208
2933

0.3440
2933

0.2651
2933

0.4239
2933

0.4395
2933

0.0654
2933

0.6547
2933

0.3174
2933

0.2552
2933

0.3326
2933

0.2249
2933

0.0362
2933

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

86

Mean of X

3.06
0.23
0.52
0.52
0.84
39.06
36.61
10.66
10.67
127.01
102.89
230.36
28347.76
19143.79
89354.57
20782.16
0.43
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.25

2933

Table 6. QUAIDS Engel curve with all household compositions (SURE)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

48.68685***
(7.650512)
-0.433594*
(0.234216)
-0.196503
(0.366747)
-0.866223***
(0.285162)
3.37835***
(0.320437)
0.057498
(0.411406)
0.082011***
(0.030772)
-0.014157
(0.031915)
0.209899***
(0.052618)
0.048485
(0.053997)
-0.365298
(0.381077)
-0.032525
(0.361904)
-11.40062***
(3.037675)
0.894458***
(0.30396)
-2.611625***
(0.460537)
-4.135648***
(0.557128)
-4.193927***
(0.563042)
-2.292077***
(0.582412)
-0.928678***
(0.333966)

28.63959***
(3.68176)
0.646505***
(0.112715)
0.196854
(0.176495)
-0.303086**
(0.137232)
0.244156
(0.154208)
-0.086213
(0.197987)
0.009673
(0.014809)
0.028431*
(0.015359)
0.003606
(0.025322)
0.047217*
(0.025986)
0.357099*
(0.183391)
-0.213189
(0.174164)
-8.734673***
(1.461861)
0.690615***
(0.146279)
-0.028242
(0.221631)
-0.094135
(0.268114)
-0.393662
(0.27096)
-0.624878**
(0.280282)
-0.189643
(0.160719)

-10.6582**
(4.730097)
-0.689461***
(0.144809)
0.374136*
(0.22675)
0.657368***
(0.176307)
-0.228629
(0.198117)
-0.152815
(0.254361)
0.009836
(0.019026)
-0.007963
(0.019732)
0.03328
(0.032532)
0.034467
(0.033385)
-0.209475
(0.235609)
-0.22912
(0.223755)
3.812251**
(1.878109)
-0.124022
(0.18793)
1.710937***
(0.284737)
2.990392***
(0.344457)
2.595618***
(0.348113)
2.421274***
(0.360089)
0.163836
(0.206482)

15.33509***
(3.276996)
-0.276151***
(0.100323)
1.819816***
(0.157091)
0.070667
(0.122145)
-0.252787*
(0.137255)
-0.064266
(0.17622)
-0.001575
(0.013181)
-0.020235
(0.01367)
0.009488
(0.022538)
0.039751*
(0.023129)
-0.380373**
(0.163229)
0.102834
(0.155017)
-4.224833***
(1.301148)
0.480713***
(0.130197)
-0.450354**
(0.197265)
-0.316925
(0.238638)
-0.040581
(0.241171)
-0.612098**
(0.249469)
-0.010324
(0.14305)

-0.460065
(1.336609)
-0.152001***
(0.04092)
-0.099396
(0.064074)
0.036494
(0.04982)
0.026967
(0.055983)
-0.008619
(0.071876)
-0.002488
(0.005376)
-0.009883*
(0.005576)
0.001938
(0.009193)
0.021714**
(0.009434)
0.002509
(0.066577)
0.057478
(0.063228)
0.139048
(0.530707)
0.03442
(0.053104)
0.006524
(0.08046)
0.184741*
(0.097335)
0.249067**
(0.098368)
0.000721
(0.101752)
-0.016377
(0.058347)

-75.48891***
(8.307995)
-0.576672**
(0.254344)
-1.733499***
(0.398265)
-0.448604
(0.309668)
0.028402
(0.347976)
2.809109***
(0.446763)
-0.002027
(0.033417)
-0.029655
(0.034658)
0.17017***
(0.05714)
0.050182
(0.058638)
3.154966***
(0.413826)
2.09775***
(0.393006)
27.62351***
(3.298732)
-2.673096***
(0.330082)
-0.855629*
(0.500116)
-1.507907**
(0.605007)
-1.173964*
(0.611429)
-1.986621***
(0.632465)
1.330499***
(0.362667)

-0.643023
(3.164829)
1.478401***
(0.096889)
-1.359252***
(0.151714)
-0.113462
(0.117964)
-0.072376
(0.132557)
0.142532
(0.170189)
-0.011352
(0.01273)
0.035918***
(0.013203)
0.008882
(0.021767)
-0.006932
(0.022337)
0.299856*
(0.157642)
-0.176216
(0.149711)
-2.029519
(1.256611)
0.2983**
(0.125741)
-0.510723***
(0.190513)
-0.031668
(0.23047)
-1.017013***
(0.232917)
-0.405936*
(0.24093)
-0.120982
(0.138153)

1.973703
(2.399664)
-0.228412***
(0.073464)
-0.161587
(0.115034)
0.005662
(0.089444)
-0.091234
(0.100509)
0.356693***
(0.129042)
0.014947
(0.009652)
0.001151
(0.010011)
0.037656**
(0.016504)
-0.006977
(0.016937)
-0.077435
(0.119529)
0.107772
(0.113515)
-1.375092
(0.952799)
0.239008**
(0.09534)
0.413266***
(0.144452)
0.381194**
(0.174749)
0.131605
(0.176604)
-0.056848
(0.18268)
-0.075735
(0.104752)

128.6835***
(9.60752)
0.667609**
(0.294128)
4.194212***
(0.460561)
1.500461***
(0.358106)
-0.85079**
(0.402406)
-0.568693
(0.516644)
0.048732
(0.038644)
0.053725
(0.040079)
-0.138595**
(0.066077)
-0.107543
(0.06781)
-1.295362***
(0.478556)
-1.260507***
(0.45448)
-30.33801***
(3.814714)
2.216143***
(0.381713)
1.714366***
(0.578343)
2.708655***
(0.699642)
3.605452***
(0.707068)
3.340077***
(0.731394)
0.208186
(0.419394)

-40.73426***
(8.389993)
0.521451**
(0.256854)
-3.323906***
(0.402196)
-0.677154**
(0.312725)
-0.863503**
(0.35141)
-2.394205***
(0.451172)
-0.111047***
(0.033747)
-0.084117**
(0.035)
-0.135387**
(0.057704)
-0.050146
(0.059217)
-0.684314
(0.417911)
0.745009*
(0.396885)
25.13035***
(3.331289)
-2.381323***
(0.33334)
-0.591747
(0.505052)
-1.968692***
(0.610979)
-2.219622***
(0.617464)
-1.235157**
(0.638707)
-0.609675*
(0.366246)

-10.7644*
(6.04701)
-0.954796***
(0.185125)
0.039109
(0.289879)
0.344425
(0.225393)
-1.144321***
(0.253276)
-0.096578
(0.325178)
-0.049227**
(0.024323)
0.036045
(0.025226)
-0.170101***
(0.041589)
-0.126142***
(0.04268)
-0.194034
(0.301205)
-1.086401***
(0.286051)
7.82735***
(2.400996)
-0.491806**
(0.240252)
1.332674***
(0.364011)
1.509858***
(0.440357)
2.483716***
(0.445031)
1.243326***
(0.460342)
0.315592
(0.263969)

0.0871
2933

0.0715
2933

0.1097
2933

0.0920
2933

0.0919
2933

0.3192
2933

0.2615
2933

0.1074
2933

0.3987
2933

0.1391
2933

0.0797
2933

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) square
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

87

Mean of X

3.06
0.23
0.52
0.52
0.84
39.06
36.61
10.66
10.67
4.57
4.34
4.89
24.25
0.43
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.25

2933

Table 7. QUAIDS Engel curve with all household compositions (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

-5.904374
(14.74367)
-1.881935***
(0.387215)
0.253036
(0.428455)
-0.524118
(0.334239)
2.47672***
(0.414036)
-1.297602**
(0.529301)
0.114032***
(0.035779)
-0.038992
(0.036944)
0.052115
(0.066766)
-0.142905**
(0.07027)
-4.745477***
(0.94936)
-2.421528***
(0.637922)
12.42565**
(6.007284)
-0.118
(0.571954)
-1.54991***
(0.570377)
-0.633629
(0.909479)
-0.335596
(0.993742)
-0.291882
(0.780748)
-0.202394
(0.403761)

30.73023***
(6.199335)
0.692271***
(0.162814)
0.182524
(0.180155)
-0.313639**
(0.140539)
0.271767
(0.174092)
-0.0421
(0.222557)
0.00866
(0.015044)
0.029188*
(0.015534)
0.008694
(0.028073)
0.053505*
(0.029547)
0.495586
(0.399182)
-0.138958
(0.26823)
-9.634495***
(2.525909)
0.73725***
(0.240492)
-0.061156
(0.239829)
-0.206395
(0.382413)
-0.514921
(0.417843)
-0.687042**
(0.328284)
-0.21328
(0.169771)

4.64221
(8.155155)
-0.333993
(0.21418)
0.263156
(0.236991)
0.574743***
(0.184877)
-0.011918
(0.229016)
0.186498
(0.292772)
0.001975
(0.019791)
-0.002014
(0.020435)
0.072538**
(0.03693)
0.082693**
(0.038868)
0.865965*
(0.525119)
0.350671
(0.352853)
-2.799869
(3.322804)
0.200644
(0.316365)
1.453661***
(0.315492)
2.122562***
(0.50306)
1.652094***
(0.549668)
1.935777***
(0.431854)
-0.017993
(0.223332)

21.02358***
(5.523851)
-0.332179**
(0.145074)
1.834543***
(0.160525)
0.089389
(0.125226)
-0.306435**
(0.155122)
-0.089089
(0.198307)
-0.000345
(0.013405)
-0.021794
(0.013842)
0.005568
(0.025014)
0.037487
(0.026327)
-0.548137
(0.355687)
-0.01642
(0.239003)
-6.438017***
(2.250684)
0.753951***
(0.214288)
-0.395743*
(0.213697)
-0.215602
(0.340745)
0.122736
(0.372315)
-0.512524*
(0.292514)
0.003104
(0.151273)

0.279501
(2.312591)
-0.262738***
(0.060736)
-0.066702
(0.067205)
0.066107
(0.052426)
-0.053793
(0.064943)
-0.094842
(0.083023)
-0.000045
(0.005612)
-0.012159**
(0.005795)
-0.00875
(0.010472)
0.010318
(0.011022)
-0.331332**
(0.14891)
-0.142085
(0.10006)
-0.01394
(0.942262)
0.153796*
(0.089713)
0.096229
(0.089465)
0.430986***
(0.142655)
0.552923***
(0.155872)
0.167634
(0.122463)
0.029914
(0.063331)

-72.4363***
(14.26579)
-1.162002***
(0.374664)
-1.560395***
(0.414568)
-0.292678
(0.323405)
-0.396413
(0.400616)
2.350323***
(0.512145)
0.010886
(0.03462)
-0.041618
(0.035747)
0.113436*
(0.064602)
-0.010619
(0.067993)
1.390182
(0.918589)
1.045857*
(0.617245)
27.1591***
(5.812575)
-2.076409***
(0.553416)
-0.382956
(0.551889)
-0.202566
(0.880001)
0.430602
(0.961533)
-1.106794
(0.755442)
1.576791***
(0.390674)

4.153896
(5.334122)
1.534429***
(0.140091)
-1.377559***
(0.155011)
-0.124807
(0.120925)
-0.043958
(0.149794)
0.204453
(0.191496)
-0.012594
(0.012945)
0.036673***
(0.013366)
0.015737
(0.024155)
0.002241
(0.025423)
0.469878
(0.34347)
-0.093037
(0.230794)
-4.03034*
(2.173379)
0.445005**
(0.206928)
-0.547133***
(0.206357)
-0.178896
(0.329041)
-1.161429***
(0.359527)
-0.47567*
(0.282467)
-0.154126
(0.146077)

2.318658
(4.063312)
-0.134622
(0.106715)
-0.189608
(0.118081)
-0.018736
(0.092115)
-0.02517
(0.114107)
0.433157***
(0.145874)
0.012877
(0.009861)
0.003004
(0.010182)
0.04698**
(0.0184)
0.003315
(0.019366)
0.205525
(0.261641)
0.273452
(0.175809)
-1.635891
(1.65559)
0.176803
(0.157629)
0.338975**
(0.157194)
0.168381
(0.25065)
-0.123999
(0.273873)
-0.195453
(0.215172)
-0.116768
(0.111275)

161.6928***
(17.4495)
2.010354***
(0.458278)
3.783456***
(0.507087)
1.170915***
(0.39558)
0.027458
(0.490022)
0.625332
(0.62644)
0.019065
(0.042346)
0.0781*
(0.043725)
0.002756
(0.079019)
0.058295
(0.083166)
2.761673**
(1.123591)
1.014876
(0.754996)
-45.35316***
(7.109769)
2.449832***
(0.676922)
0.699505
(0.675055)
-0.460975
(1.076391)
-0.003302
(1.176119)
1.435621
(0.924034)
-0.432047
(0.477861)

-33.89027**
(14.12065)
0.567569
(0.370852)
-3.339962***
(0.41035)
-0.684455**
(0.320115)
-0.847079**
(0.39654)
-2.332991***
(0.506934)
-0.112072***
(0.034267)
-0.083718**
(0.035383)
-0.128933**
(0.063944)
-0.040688
(0.067301)
-0.543741
(0.909243)
0.803513
(0.610965)
22.31974***
(5.753437)
-2.1446***
(0.547785)
-0.616692
(0.546274)
-2.102556**
(0.871048)
-2.333275**
(0.95175)
-1.284317*
(0.747756)
-0.642402*
(0.3867)

-14.04128
(10.17546)
-0.955905***
(0.267239)
0.040557
(0.295702)
0.342411
(0.230678)
-1.137227***
(0.28575)
-0.109062***
(0.365301)
-0.049199**
(0.024693)
0.036274
(0.025498)
-0.171127***
(0.046079)
-0.12842***
(0.048498)
-0.198086
(0.655208)
-1.077101**
(0.440267)
9.145747**
(4.145974)
-0.622146
(0.394739)
1.327872***
(0.39365)
1.526704**
(0.627684)
2.48084***
(0.685839)
1.235652**
(0.538839)
0.322231
(0.278659)

-0.1975
2933

0.0702
2933

0.0653
2933

0.0887
2933

0.0398
2933

0.2910
2933

0.2591
2933

0.0960
2933

0.2995
2933

0.1387
2933

0.0796
2933

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) square
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Mean of X

3.06
0.23
0.52
0.52
0.84
39.06
36.61
10.66
10.67
4.57
4.34
4.89
24.25
0.43
0.16
0.17
0.12
0.25

2933

Table 8. Test of income pooling for households consisting of spouses with various
household types
Household composition

1

Engel curve (1.16) Engel curve (1.17)
(3SLS)

2

Number of
Average
households household size

1. Full sample

498.99**

59.70**

2933

3.06

2. Spouses only

338.74**

57.56**

1108

2.00

3. Spouses with kids, no others

302.01**

36.12**

1112

3.48

4. Spouses with others, no kids

116.32**

33.93**

314

3.40

5. Spouses with kids and others

395.72**

30.64

399

4.56

6. Spouses with one dependent

156.61**

57.40**

846

3.00

7. Spouses with two dependents

465.72**

27.56

728

4.00

8. Spouses with three or more dependents

261.70**

19.04

251

5.25

1

Chi-square value with 60 restrictions
Chi-square value with 22 restrictions
3
** Significant at 5%
2

89

Table 9. Test of Pareto efficiency for households consisting of spouses with various
household types
Household composition

1

2

Engel curve (1.16) Engel curve (1.17)
(3SLS)

Number of
Average
households household size

1. Full sample

8.34

9.04

2933

3.06

2. Spouses only

11.00

11.32

1108

2.00

3. Spouses with kids, no others

1.97

5.63

1112

3.48

4. Spouses with others, no kids

3.31

3.79

314

3.40

5. Spouses with kids and others

6.14

4.20

399

4.56

6. Spouses with one dependent

1.89

1.70

846

3.00

7. Spouses with two dependents

3.55

4.82

728

4.00

8. Spouses with three or more dependents

4.50

2.70

251

5.25

1

Chi-square value with 11 restrictions
Chi-square value with 10 restrictions
3
** Significant at 5%
2

90

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for all 443 households
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Household characteristics:
Household size
Number of young children (age 0-5)
Number of older children (age 6-14)
Number of adults (age 15 and up)
Husband age
Wife age
Third member's age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Third member's education (year)
Central
North
Northeastern
South
Rural

4.44
0.35
0.45
3.64
38.86
36.66
31.46
9.42
9.26
9.87
0.53
0.14
0.11
0.08
0.29

1.34
0.59
0.69
0.80
10.94
10.39
13.48
4.70
4.90
4.69
0.50
0.35
0.31
0.28
0.45

3
0
0
2
19
16
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10
3
4
8
69
67
70
18
18
18
1
1
1
1
1

Monthly income (in hundred):
Husband wages
Wife wages
Third member's wages
Total household income
Total household consumption

103.28
83.96
76.44
264.71
178.68

102.05
80.07
74.85
210.54
110.01

12.00
15.00
5.00
54.61
30.62

1200.00
684.36
670.00
1652.85
984.47

Share of monthly consumption expenditure (%) on:
Housing
Household operations
Clothing & Footwear
Personal & Services
Cosmetic
Health
Transportation & Communication
Education
Recreation & Religion
Food eaten at home
Food eaten outside
Alcohol & Tobacco

15.48
8.71
3.45
3.20
0.69
1.91
31.48
1.92
2.86
29.80
13.05
4.16

8.64
4.87
4.04
1.59
1.14
4.97
31.55
3.69
3.48
11.74
8.32
5.38

3.58
1.85
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.94
0.00
0.00

66.69
42.04
35.87
9.73
10.25
53.71
281.27
29.28
20.91
68.01
47.74
26.82
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Table 11. QUAIDS Engel curve for households with three decision makers
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

7.107318
(29.01154)
-0.993192*
(0.570376)
0.966968
(1.001336)
-0.008113
(0.843308)
1.50093
(1.075682)
-1.069316
(1.359768)
0.115839
(0.080889)
-0.059563
(0.089371)
-0.022592
(0.043288)
0.20384
(0.16246)
-0.034585
(0.167311)
-0.203308
(0.143415)
0.404268
(1.009385)
-1.498235
(1.222853)
1.685567*
(0.947134)
0.339399
(0.854671)
2.012113
(11.08602)
-0.031303
(1.07983)
-1.248773
(1.38704)
-1.927392
(1.683038)
-1.861888
(1.789635)
0.180871
(1.923171)
1.020385
(1.001345)

24.01806
(16.11496)
0.571185*
(0.316825)
-0.492015
(0.55621)
-0.308676
(0.46843)
0.637254
(0.597506)
-0.068714
(0.755307)
0.036517
(0.044931)
-0.020455
(0.049643)
-0.000656
(0.024045)
0.069916
(0.090241)
0.118611
(0.092936)
-0.164359**
(0.079662)
0.901467
(0.560681)
-0.526745
(0.679255)
0.368412
(0.526102)
-0.056368
(0.474742)
-7.613945
(6.157924)
0.628649
(0.59981)
0.293282
(0.770455)
-0.288833
(0.934873)
0.981623
(0.994084)
2.565321**
(1.068259)
-0.361457
(0.556214)

-16.44577
(12.92354)
-0.020902
(0.254081)
-0.431992
(0.446058)
-0.364575
(0.375662)
-1.067636**
(0.479176)
-0.243325
(0.605726)
0.018025
(0.036033)
0.018902
(0.039811)
0.005223
(0.019283)
0.130746*
(0.07237)
-0.002373
(0.074531)
-0.049796
(0.063886)
-0.304353
(0.449643)
0.014943
(0.544735)
0.890306**
(0.421913)
-0.757501**
(0.380723)
4.669607
(4.938404)
-0.330624
(0.481023)
1.734166***
(0.617874)
3.374145***
(0.74973)
2.803702***
(0.797215)
2.123259**
(0.8567)
0.308346
(0.446061)

-1.540109
(5.368634)
0.159764
(0.105549)
-0.292026
(0.185299)
-0.201447
(0.156056)
0.107257
(0.199057)
-0.110631
(0.251627)
0.002817
(0.014969)
0.001211
(0.016538)
0.000219
(0.008011)
-0.005172
(0.030063)
0.048192
(0.030961)
0.014456
(0.026539)
-0.031188
(0.186788)
-0.110439
(0.226291)
-0.075352
(0.175269)
-0.040251
(0.158158)
2.495177
(2.051487)
-0.302568
(0.199824)
-0.307417
(0.256674)
-0.40182
(0.311449)
-0.440466
(0.331175)
-0.819721**
(0.355886)
-0.009949
(0.185301)

-4.828334
(3.688389)
0.014943
(0.072515)
-0.197184
(0.127305)
-0.068169
(0.107214)
0.19151
(0.136757)
-0.083524
(0.172875)
0.010644
(0.010284)
-0.020123*
(0.011362)
-0.003513
(0.005503)
-0.024627
(0.020654)
0.023706
(0.021271)
-0.003946
(0.018233)
-0.199823
(0.128328)
0.22737
(0.155468)
0.168295
(0.120414)
-0.355895***
(0.108659)
1.887472
(1.409424)
-0.158849
(0.137284)
-0.123473
(0.176342)
0.04235
(0.213974)
0.262064
(0.227526)
-0.07906
(0.244503)
0.042149
(0.127306)

-287.5581***
(96.81153)
-1.878914
(1.903344)
3.736004
(3.34146)
-1.696375
(2.81412)
1.517246
(3.589551)
10.07252**
(4.537549)
0.060594
(0.269926)
-0.134569
(0.29823)
0.038116
(0.144451)
0.492929
(0.542128)
-0.130761
(0.558315)
0.977063**
(0.478574)
12.95368***
(3.368319)
-2.526553
(4.08066)
3.904929
(3.160588)
2.071026
(2.852037)
99.29768***
(36.99407)
-10.1126***
(3.603393)
-1.408814
(4.628552)
8.206729
(5.6163)
4.44106
(5.972015)
-1.203179
(6.417625)
1.181881
(3.341489)

-2.825888
(11.54919)
1.155133***
(0.227061)
-1.305326***
(0.398622)
-0.046523
(0.335712)
-0.69682
(0.428218)
0.177617
(0.54131)
0.014372
(0.032201)
-0.004982
(0.035578)
0.017369
(0.017232)
-0.006721
(0.064674)
-0.098033
(0.066605)
0.126298**
(0.057092)
0.336913
(0.401826)
0.248869
(0.486805)
-0.425372
(0.377044)
-0.129887
(0.340236)
-1.43607
(4.413231)
0.22602
(0.429869)
-0.267469
(0.552166)
0.946313
(0.67)
-0.397002
(0.712435)
-0.777414
(0.765595)
0.285668
(0.398625)

10.58926
(11.03114)
-0.24902
(0.216876)
0.347102
(0.380741)
-0.048212
(0.320654)
0.028008
(0.40901)
0.824373
(0.517029)
-0.004282
(0.030757)
0.01579
(0.033982)
-0.010581
(0.016459)
0.065364
(0.061773)
0.145192**
(0.063617)
0.015983
(0.054531)
-0.078099
(0.383802)
-0.270767
(0.464969)
-0.273623
(0.360132)
-0.132226
(0.324974)
-4.331198
(4.215271)
0.552933
(0.410587)
1.087539**
(0.527398)
0.763997
(0.639947)
-0.03906
(0.680478)
-0.198965
(0.731253)
-0.103631
(0.380744)

165.4799***
(31.04871)
0.117735
(0.610427)
3.114141***
(1.071649)
0.403591
(0.902525)
0.806161
(1.151216)
-1.193408
(1.455251)
0.028956
(0.086569)
0.111898
(0.095646)
0.088899*
(0.046327)
-0.354475**
(0.173868)
0.135945**
(0.179059)
0.006199
(0.153485)
-1.287166
(1.080264)
-2.245668*
(1.308721)
-2.106907**
(1.013642)
0.059011
(0.914685)
-40.48845***
(11.86448)
3.200307***
(1.155655)
2.894941*
(1.484437)
3.198797*
(1.80122)
5.817903***
(1.915302)
4.369966**
(2.058215)
-1.470411
(1.071659)

-31.99983
(26.23873)
-0.678319
(0.515862)
-0.067498
(0.905633)
1.031379
(0.762708)
-1.087926
(0.972873)
0.388856
(1.229807)
-0.100403
(0.073158)
-0.122174
(0.080829)
-0.087179**
(0.03915)
-0.190344
(0.146933)
-0.036204
(0.15132)
-0.016798
(0.129708)
-0.464349
(0.912912)
0.738592
(1.105977)
1.021816
(0.856611)
-0.334487
(0.772985)
23.97226**
(10.02647)
-2.363847**
(0.976624)
-3.48043***
(1.254472)
-5.427473***
(1.52218)
-4.849196***
(1.618589)
-4.358759**
(1.739362)
-0.860916
(0.90564)

-20.24162
(17.29697)
-0.107294
(0.340064)
-0.466171
(0.597007)
-0.201752
(0.502789)
-0.928379
(0.641332)
-0.177711
(0.810708)
-0.120739**
(0.048227)
0.083991
(0.053284)
-0.016905
(0.025809)
-0.11378
(0.09686)
-0.182322*
(0.099752)
-0.100158
(0.085505)
-0.836176
(0.601806)
0.923198
(0.729077)
-0.554749
(0.564691)
1.570238***
(0.509563)
9.980562
(6.609598)
-0.736439
(0.643805)
1.889284**
(0.826967)
1.958591*
(1.003444)
2.063846*
(1.066998)
0.214936
(1.146614)
0.196181
(0.597012)

0.0519
443

0.0804
443

0.1381
443

0.0459
443

0.1152
443

0.2088
443

0.1784
443

0.1544
443

0.4124
443

0.1643
443

0.1302
443

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Third member's age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Third member's education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (third member's wages)
Majorsex
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) square
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Majorsex equals zero if HH has 2 female decision makers; Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Mean of X

4.4424
0.3476
0.4515
0.6930
0.8804
38.8623
36.6569
31.4582
9.4199
9.2641
9.8668
4.3579
4.1602
4.1012
0.5756
5.0462
25.7241
0.5282
0.1422
0.1106
0.0835
0.2867

Table 12. QUAIDS Engel curve for households with three decision makers (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

24.46465
(73.03721)
-1.143744*
(0.685763)
1.046486
(1.028932)
0.058768
(0.854968)
1.383509
(1.107285)
-1.015732
(1.366062)
0.109607
(0.083171)
-0.060527
(0.090446)
-0.022467
(0.043765)
0.184458
(0.166624)
-0.046772
(0.176241)
-0.211819
(0.161928)
0.279515
(1.048504)
-1.86566
(1.481926)
1.460101
(1.030135)
0.357338
(0.891566)
-4.788647
(28.15074)
0.779657
(2.638681)
-0.834184
(1.586198)
-1.509964
(1.98983)
-1.317691
(2.224964)
0.651387
(2.128017)
1.043096
(1.026453)

67.7485*
(40.94513)
0.694353*
(0.384443)
-0.579179
(0.576826)
-0.32473
(0.479301)
0.694469
(0.620751)
-0.070183
(0.765823)
0.043951
(0.046626)
-0.028627
(0.050705)
0.003013
(0.024535)
0.071589
(0.093411)
0.145825
(0.098802)
-0.121485
(0.090778)
0.969276*
(0.587798)
-0.307408
(0.830777)
0.365404
(0.5775)
-0.204006
(0.499818)
-24.47855
(15.78149)
2.147812
(1.479262)
0.248545
(0.889233)
-0.634799
(1.115512)
0.581819
(1.247329)
2.463837**
(1.19298)
-0.486622
(0.575436)

-6.441724
(33.23029)
-0.271353
(0.312007)
-0.292508
(0.468141)
-0.26591
(0.388991)
-1.250318**
(0.50379)
-0.167987
(0.621527)
0.006897
(0.037841)
0.020217
(0.041151)
0.004202
(0.019912)
0.103123
(0.07581)
-0.028263
(0.080186)
-0.075652
(0.073674)
-0.500727
(0.477046)
-0.569818
(0.674243)
0.576299
(0.468688)
-0.684348*
(0.405643)
0.662183
(12.80795)
0.307466
(1.200541)
2.327942***
(0.721684)
4.070011***
(0.905328)
3.69421***
(1.012309)
2.813652***
(0.9682)
0.380848
(0.467013)

-10.31175
(13.55906)
0.190553
(0.127309)
-0.306296
(0.191017)
-0.21861
(0.158721)
0.134773
(0.205563)
-0.125408
(0.253604)
0.003881
(0.01544)
0.002216
(0.016791)
-0.000147
(0.008125)
0.00007
(0.030933)
0.04913
(0.032718)
0.01296
(0.030061)
-0.002587
(0.19465)
-0.027971
(0.275113)
-0.012343
(0.19124)
-0.031934
(0.165516)
5.907702
(5.226069)
-0.66516
(0.48986)
-0.418747
(0.294471)
-0.486788
(0.369404)
-0.555856
(0.413056)
-0.941498**
(0.395058)
-0.004986
(0.190557)

7.236299
(9.420459)
0.049508
(0.088451)
-0.221566*
(0.132713)
-0.072813
(0.110275)
0.207705
(0.142819)
-0.084088
(0.176197)
0.012722
(0.010728)
-0.022384*
(0.011666)
-0.002497
(0.005645)
-0.024107
(0.021492)
0.031281
(0.022732)
0.007957
(0.020886)
-0.180671
(0.135238)
0.289214
(0.191141)
0.168122
(0.132869)
-0.39685***
(0.114996)
-2.764929
(3.630929)
0.259658
(0.340341)
-0.137083
(0.20459)
-0.054723
(0.256652)
0.149703
(0.28698)
-0.108555
(0.274475)
0.007405
(0.132394)

-429.9641
(265.9891)
-5.765154**
(2.497433)
6.013984
(3.747195)
-0.364028
(3.11365)
-1.117826
(4.032545)
11.02385**
(4.974965)
-0.124083
(0.302894)
-0.068125
(0.32939)
0.002905
(0.159385)
0.13718
(0.606817)
-0.621107
(0.64184)
0.391349
(0.589714)
10.08253***
(3.818473)
-11.1828**
(5.396923)
-0.004359
(3.751577)
3.889298
(3.246934)
152.348
(102.5202)
-11.42531
(9.609629)
6.292008
(5.776663)
19.02742***
(7.246625)
18.02577**
(8.102944)
8.053331
(7.749879)
2.854497
(3.738167)

25.23095
(29.82181)
1.379494***
(0.280004)
-1.444409***
(0.420123)
-0.110205
(0.349092)
-0.557993
(0.452115)
0.137202
(0.557776)
0.025834
(0.03396)
-0.011886
(0.03693)
0.020693
(0.01787)
0.00896
(0.068034)
-0.06382
(0.071961)
0.172409***
(0.066117)
0.490942
(0.428114)
0.72079
(0.605085)
-0.263868
(0.420614)
-0.280387
(0.364035)
-12.17825
(11.49422)
1.049132
(1.077399)
-0.611237
(0.64766)
0.320082
(0.812467)
-1.165729
(0.908475)
-1.214759
(0.868891)
0.152609
(0.419111)

22.68928
(27.95234)
-0.36747
(0.262451)
0.410258
(0.393786)
0.00337
(0.327208)
-0.063333
(0.423773)
0.865393*
(0.52281)
-0.009248
(0.031831)
0.015273
(0.034615)
-0.010584
(0.01675)
0.050496
(0.063769)
0.13514**
(0.06745)
0.008322
(0.061972)
-0.17533
(0.401277)
-0.557664
(0.567153)
-0.445978
(0.394247)
-0.11454
(0.341215)
-9.079334
(10.77367)
1.132339
(1.009859)
1.405817**
(0.60706)
1.092538
(0.761535)
0.387882
(0.851524)
0.16361
(0.814421)
-0.082899
(0.392837)

323.8149***
(84.08979)
1.058989
(0.789538)
2.515144**
(1.184638)
0.163546
(0.984349)
1.361329
(1.274848)
-1.333248
(1.572785)
0.078679
(0.095757)
0.07665
(0.104133)
0.10549**
(0.050388)
-0.298634
(0.191839)
0.291572
(0.202911)
0.224829
(0.186432)
-0.664995
(1.207172)
-0.322825
(1.706183)
-1.560833
(1.186023)
-0.665625
(1.026485)
-101.2847***
(32.41074)
8.184243***
(3.037987)
1.659251
(1.826234)
0.568466
(2.290948)
2.624745
(2.561664)
2.733987
(2.450046)
-2.103377*
(1.181784)

-90.03241
(66.31179)
-0.756266
(0.622617)
-0.000749
(0.934186)
1.021278
(0.776241)
-1.103777
(1.005324)
0.367583
(1.240272)
-0.106333
(0.075512)
-0.112307
(0.082118)
-0.091478**
(0.039735)
-0.18397
(0.151281)
-0.062463
(0.160012)
-0.062749
(0.147017)
-0.489312
(0.951955)
0.642367
(1.345467)
1.121958
(0.935278)
-0.171376
(0.809469)
46.39831*
(25.55856)
-4.46902*
(2.395706)
-3.606417**
(1.440137)
-5.206189***
(1.806603)
-4.619977**
(2.020085)
-4.443074**
(1.932065)
-0.725852
(0.931935)

-24.11504
(43.48707)
-0.168315
(0.40831)
-0.429777
(0.612636)
-0.181924
(0.509057)
-0.968657
(0.659288)
-0.163971
(0.813366)
-0.123704**
(0.049521)
0.085287
(0.053853)
-0.017565
(0.026058)
-0.118965
(0.09921)
-0.190509*
(0.104936)
-0.11037
(0.096414)
-0.88029
(0.624289)
0.789576
(0.882353)
-0.610834
(0.613352)
1.602546***
(0.530847)
11.44747
(16.76123)
-0.818742
(1.571096)
2.001879**
(0.944438)
2.128622*
(1.184764)
2.275868*
(1.324766)
0.352269
(1.267042)
0.225456
(0.61116)

0.0478
443

0.0593
443

0.0971
443

0.0357
443

0.0854
443

0.0536
443

0.1320
443

0.1397
443

0.3170
443

0.1542
443

0.1289
443

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Third member's age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Third member's education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (third member's wages)
Majorsex
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) square
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural
R-squared
Number of households
1
2

3
4

Standard error in parentheses
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
Dummy variables - Majorsex equals zero if the household has two female decision makers; Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 13. Test of Pareto efficiency using different base categories
Category

1. Housing
2. Household operations
3. Clothing & Footwear
4. Personal & Services
5. Cosmetic
6. Transportation & Communication
7. Education
8. Recreation & Religion
9. Food eaten at home
10. Food eaten outside
11. Alcohol & Tobacco

1

Engel curve (2.22) Engel curve (2.22)
3SLS
4.51
3.83
6.67
4.13
2.80
3.25
4.51
4.28
6.08
5.89
1.66

** Critical chi-square (18) at 5% is 28.8693

94

5.14
4.88
4.70
0.90
1.91
0.00
2.77
6.00
5.30
7.14
1.61

Table 14. Descriptive statistics for all subsamples
Variable

Single female
Mean
Std. Dev.

Single male
Mean
Std. Dev.

Married couple
Mean
Std. Dev.

Log household total expenditure
Female age (less 35)

9.013
2.289
3.181

8.913

0.532

0.339
1.709

11.267
4.633

9.317
-0.918
1.118
0.010
1.323
1.151

0.486
10.580
4.517
0.095
11.011
4.461

0.202
0.057
0.040
0.029
0.003
0.161
0.017
0.236
0.154
0.093
0.008

0.086
0.036
0.053
0.020
0.010
0.102
0.024
0.136
0.121
0.107
0.034

0.163
0.066
0.038
0.035
0.008
0.191
0.019
0.275
0.139
0.052
0.014

0.076
0.035
0.046
0.021
0.015
0.096
0.025
0.109
0.096
0.066
0.035

Female years of education (less 9)
Female's income share (less 0.45)
Male age (less 35)
Male years of education (less 9)
Budget shares on:
Housing
Household operations
Clothing & Footwear
Personal & Services
Cosmetic
Transportation & Communication
Recreation & Religion
Food eaten at home
Food eaten outside
Alcohol & Tobacco
Health
Number of observations

0.529
11.753
5.031

0.215
0.067
0.064
0.045
0.018
0.162
0.024
0.257
0.122
0.009
0.016

0.095
0.047
0.070
0.032
0.032
0.094
0.032
0.125
0.098
0.041
0.051
810

825

95
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Table 15. Estimation results
Variable

d 0, f
d 0 ,m
d age, f
d age, m
d educ, f
d educ, m
r0
r f, inc share
r age, f
r age, m
r educ, f
r educ, m

Form of the sharing rule (η)
Instrument log expenditure (x )
Number of observations

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%

Model A

Model B

Model C

Model D

-0.133
(0.333)
0.618
(0.604)
-0.074***
(0.021)
-0.013
(0.019)
0.047
(0.036)
0.007
(0.034)
0.649***
(0.054)
0.012
(0.009)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.003**
(0.001)
0.003*
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.001)

-0.168
(0.344)
0.569
(0.599)
-0.071***
(0.02)
-0.011
(0.018)
0.044
(0.036)
0.01
(0.034)
0.591**
(0.259)
0.053
(0.042)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.004)
0.012*
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.004)

0.875
(0.932)
82.44
(240.241)
0.004
(0.019)
0.207
(0.306)
-0.022
(0.056)
-0.038
(0.69)
0.355***
(0.125)
0.006
(0.042)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.0003
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)

0.509
(0.705)
104.116
(383.430)
-0.009
(0.013)
0.162
(0.445)
0.019
(0.039)
0.237
(0.919)
0.263
(0.575)
0.592
(1.076)
-0.01
(0.021)
0.004
(0.013)
0.011
(0.043)
0.006
(0.039)

Linear
No
2743

Logistic
No
2743

Linear
Yes
2743

Logistic
Yes
2743

** Significant at 5%
*

Significant at 10%
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATES OF THE QUASI-QUADRATIC ENGEL
CURVE
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Appendix A 1. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for households with spouses only
Variable

Housing

Constant

4.62882
(4.088519)
10.0788***
(1.808474)
0.230099
(1.697436)
-0.050962
(0.151079)
-0.046326
(0.157754)
0.220267
(0.262564)
0.019666
(0.275903)
-5.54442***
(1.21678)
-5.483625***
(1.218265)
5.627628***
(1.217237)
0.001994*
(0.001109)
0.00191*
(0.001126)
-0.002155*
(0.00111)
0.004394**
(0.002234)
-3.184762
(2.021973)
-2.964756
(2.813279)
-11.11628***
(2.894822)
-6.160014**
(2.880711)
0.660931
(1.616781)

Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

0.2859
1108

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

1.247133
-2.537561
(0.913843)
(1.487438)
2.142745***
0.967383
(0.40422)
(0.657938)
0.614632
0.293274
(0.379401)
(0.617542)
0.005415
-0.005317
(0.033768)
(0.054964)
0.044293
-0.052078
(0.03526)
(0.057392)
-0.013079
0.108879
(0.058687)
(0.095523)
0.262652***
0.048434
(0.061668)
(0.100376)
1.034597***
0.192031
(0.271968)
(0.442675)
1.015906***
0.253939
(0.2723)
(0.443215)
-1.012345***
-0.179889
(0.27207)
(0.442841)
-0.001517*** -0.000942**
(0.000248)
(0.000403)
-0.001536*** -0.001164***
(0.000252)
(0.00041)
0.001499***
0.000902**
(0.000248)
(0.000404)
-0.002976*** -0.001602**
(0.000499)
(0.000813)
-0.207101
1.80237**
(0.45194)
(0.735611)
-1.981679*** 2.520144**
(0.628809)
(1.023495)
-1.976974***
0.479287
(0.647035)
(1.053161)
-1.927251***
0.206349
(0.643881)
(1.048027)
-0.378032
0.553346
(0.361374)
(0.588199)
0.3237
1108

0.3116
1108

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

2.160066***
(0.699381)
0.481539
(0.309357)
-0.033724
(0.290363)
-0.015459
(0.025844)
-0.034487
(0.026985)
0.03837
(0.044914)
0.055358
(0.047196)
0.72442***
(0.208142)
0.744399***
(0.208396)
-0.71272***
(0.20822)
-0.000863***
(0.00019)
-0.000932***
(0.000193)
0.000854***
(0.00019)
-0.001688***
(0.000382)
0.034839
(0.345878)
-0.081597
(0.481239)
-0.718239
(0.495188)
-0.2706
(0.492774)
-0.133006
(0.276566)

0.078832
(0.450759)
0.592589***
(0.199384)
-0.000328
(0.187142)
-0.017024
(0.016657)
-0.013123
(0.017392)
0.032824
(0.028948)
0.027181
(0.030418)
0.005832
(0.13415)
0.014047
(0.134314)
0.000173
(0.134201)
0.000039
(0.000122)
0.000011
(0.000124)
-0.000052
(0.000122)
0.000128
(0.000246)
-0.002288
(0.222923)
0.077772
(0.310164)
-0.218553
(0.319154)
-0.010133
(0.317599)
-0.006646
(0.17825)

-2.763209**
(1.379431)
0.250951
(0.610163)
0.011667
(0.5727)
0.043476
(0.050973)
0.0113
(0.053225)
-0.060724
(0.088587)
0.104756
(0.093087)
-1.172225***
(0.410531)
-1.091012***
(0.411032)
1.153366***
(0.410685)
0.000198
(0.000374)
-0.000011
(0.00038)
-0.000136
(0.000375)
0.000271
(0.000754)
-0.186018
(0.682196)
0.119965
(0.949176)
-2.134999**
(0.976687)
-0.942858
(0.971927)
-0.677087
(0.545488)

-3.037111
(3.043871)
4.532964***
(1.346395)
3.508602***
(1.263728)
-0.031043
(0.112477)
-0.156963
(0.117447)
0.468239**
(0.195477)
0.208639
(0.205408)
0.847019
(0.905884)
0.902168
(0.906989)
-0.700299
(0.906224)
-0.001206
(0.000825)
-0.001433*
(0.000838)
0.001085
(0.000826)
-0.002162
(0.001663)
-0.119464
(1.505344)
-4.368114**
(2.094465)
-2.885923
(2.155173)
-5.803028***
(2.144667)
0.393143
(1.203681)

0.135442
(0.501868)
0.206104
(0.221991)
-0.032107
(0.208361)
0.006206
(0.018545)
-0.011943
(0.019364)
0.010033
(0.03223)
-0.008886
(0.033867)
-0.203449
(0.149361)
-0.206046
(0.149543)
0.204182
(0.149417)
0.000191
(0.000136)
0.000194
(0.000138)
-0.000202
(0.000136)
0.000436
(0.000274)
0.056899
(0.248199)
0.010833
(0.345332)
0.425987
(0.355341)
-0.040809
(0.353609)
-0.1454
(0.198461)

-0.574997
(0.906372)
0.562016
(0.400915)
0.395226
(0.3763)
0.002006
(0.033492)
-0.030662
(0.034972)
0.025678
(0.058207)
0.07038
(0.061164)
0.720248***
(0.269745)
0.718153***
(0.270074)
-0.70312***
(0.269846)
-0.000892***
(0.000246)
-0.000909***
(0.00025)
0.000882***
(0.000246)
-0.001749***
(0.000495)
0.525967
(0.448246)
0.625273
(0.623668)
-0.658347
(0.641745)
-0.299242
(0.638617)
-0.58247
(0.35842)

15.93033***
(2.485461)
1.932907*
(1.099394)
-0.155497
(1.031892)
0.082051
(0.091843)
-0.032188
(0.095901)
0.150667
(0.159616)
0.182743
(0.167725)
-0.523367
(0.739696)
-0.571215
(0.740598)
0.603602
(0.739974)
-0.000271
(0.000674)
-0.000288
(0.000685)
0.000122
(0.000675)
-0.000093
(0.001358)
1.851735
(1.229183)
-1.849128
(1.710227)
-1.425639
(1.759798)
1.503657
(1.75122)
-0.736201
(0.982861)

19.18081***
(2.474664)
1.269151
(1.094618)
-0.367166
(1.027409)
-0.122008
(0.091444)
-0.16764*
(0.095484)
-0.096899
(0.158923)
0.20743
(0.166996)
0.455812
(0.736482)
0.526612
(0.737381)
-0.427403
(0.736759)
-0.0003
(0.000671)
-0.00043
(0.000682)
0.000377
(0.000672)
-0.000972
(0.001352)
-0.974362
(1.223843)
-6.783083***
(1.702798)
-10.39079***
(1.752153)
-1.449722
(1.743612)
-2.295132**
(0.978591)

4.486884**
(1.873181)
-2.257723***
(0.828564)
1.409723*
(0.777691)
-0.03146
(0.069218)
0.014049
(0.072276)
-0.235446**
(0.120295)
0.075192
(0.126407)
0.056368
(0.557476)
0.053456
(0.558156)
-0.034349
(0.557685)
-0.000451
(0.000508)
-0.000469
(0.000516)
0.000566
(0.000509)
-0.001414
(0.001023)
0.510734
(0.92638)
0.055843
(1.288922)
0.746323
(1.326281)
-0.099398
(1.319816)
0.408466
(0.740738)

0.2356
1108

0.1554
1108

0.1391
1108

0.5569
1108

0.0162
1108

0.2212
1108

0.1889
1108

0.1631
1108

0.0559
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Mean of X

0.3096
0.7238
36.3231
34.0821
10.1507
10.1182
106.4901
91.2456
198.0402
19347.2200
14730.5500
65380.3400
15541.3800
0.5135
0.1119
0.1092
0.0930
0.2527
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Appendix A 2. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with kids, no others
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

7.691888**
(3.586904)
0.080032
(0.645139)
7.499744***
(0.848888)
-0.400681
(1.419808)
0.000151
(0.092334)
0.034356
(0.096544)
0.484108***
(0.153259)
0.456027***
(0.152833)
-0.475442
(0.766374)
-0.497451
(0.764718)
0.515666
(0.767021)
-0.000347
(0.001267)
-0.000364
(0.001265)
0.000374
(0.001267)
-0.000782
(0.002533)
-6.183872***
(1.467896)
-11.54594***
(1.600255)
-11.95611***
(1.642136)
-7.172112***
(1.675848)
-2.450314**
(1.006615)

-4.626713*
(2.748746)
1.484869***
(0.494388)
0.617768
(0.650527)
0.477627
(1.088039)
0.045246
(0.070758)
0.042611
(0.073985)
0.289727**
(0.117446)
0.079908
(0.11712)
-0.023415
(0.587294)
-0.008496
(0.586025)
0.032184
(0.58779)
-0.000098
(0.000971)
-0.000172
(0.000969)
0.000144
(0.000971)
-0.000315
(0.001941)
-0.502631
(1.12489)
-1.426455
(1.22632)
-3.037681**
(1.258415)
-2.075567
(1.28425)
-0.583092
(0.771398)

-8.703235***
(2.520889)
0.984512**
(0.453406)
0.482058
(0.596602)
0.455171
(0.997846)
-0.017793
(0.064892)
0.026722
(0.067852)
0.296528***
(0.107711)
0.147061
(0.107412)
-0.303279
(0.538611)
-0.304678
(0.537446)
0.327365
(0.539065)
0.000376
(0.000891)
0.00032
(0.000889)
-0.000323
(0.00089)
0.000549
(0.00178)
3.156497***
(1.031642)
3.795213***
(1.124665)
0.323659
(1.154099)
3.281955***
(1.177792)
-1.555412**
(0.707453)

7.32846***
(2.594281)
0.016145
(0.466606)
-0.703994
(0.613971)
-0.072206
(1.026897)
0.001992
(0.066782)
-0.143858**
(0.069827)
0.179473
(0.110847)
0.210725*
(0.110539)
-0.26659
(0.554291)
-0.212811
(0.553093)
0.250126
(0.554759)
0.000721
(0.000916)
0.000616
(0.000915)
-0.000588
(0.000916)
0.001042
(0.001832)
-1.436743
(1.061677)
-2.851792**
(1.157408)
-1.601839
(1.187699)
-2.14349*
(1.212082)
0.300532
(0.728049)

-2.143228**
(0.98068)
0.310981*
(0.176385)
0.035961
(0.232091)
0.269659
(0.388183)
-0.01497
(0.025245)
0.042794
(0.026396)
0.070764*
(0.041902)
0.116475***
(0.041785)
0.688972***
(0.209531)
0.718934***
(0.209078)
-0.709467***
(0.209708)
-0.00179***
(0.000346)
-0.001844***
(0.000346)
0.001838***
(0.000346)
-0.003684***
(0.000693)
-0.109652
(0.401331)
0.119571
(0.437519)
-0.417711
(0.448969)
-0.328647
(0.458186)
-0.199507
(0.275214)

1.187164
(1.76549)
0.393227
(0.317541)
-0.038494
(0.417827)
-0.758246
(0.698836)
-0.006949
(0.045447)
-0.041842
(0.04752)
-0.022573
(0.075435)
0.06344
(0.075225)
-0.128178
(0.377213)
-0.109096
(0.376398)
0.133655
(0.377531)
0.000147
(0.000624)
0.000133
(0.000622)
-0.000151
(0.000624)
0.000304
(0.001247)
-0.47322
(0.722505)
-0.76614
(0.787653)
-0.902461
(0.808267)
-0.719748
(0.82486)
-0.044887
(0.495461)

-7.39408
(4.922307)
0.320696
(0.885324)
2.074347*
(1.164929)
5.515184***
(1.948401)
-0.097746
(0.126709)
0.239767*
(0.132488)
0.786652***
(0.210317)
0.611136***
(0.209733)
2.644928**
(1.051695)
2.801446***
(1.049422)
-2.624931**
(1.052582)
-0.006115***
(0.001739)
-0.006457***
(0.001735)
0.006365***
(0.001738)
-0.012975***
(0.003476)
-5.864779***
(2.014392)
-13.13101***
(2.196029)
-13.34559***
(2.253503)
-9.184138***
(2.299765)
1.394296
(1.381378)

-7.307036***
(1.809558)
1.60073***
(0.325467)
0.829848*
(0.428256)
1.326755*
(0.716279)
-0.047299
(0.046581)
0.121881**
(0.048706)
0.056432
(0.077318)
0.065437
(0.077103)
0.328308
(0.386628)
0.376691
(0.385793)
-0.327535
(0.386955)
-0.000852
(0.000639)
-0.000965
(0.000638)
0.000935
(0.000639)
-0.001996
(0.001278)
-2.794723***
(0.740539)
-3.163742***
(0.807313)
-5.756561***
(0.828442)
-3.641218***
(0.845449)
-0.681064
(0.507828)

-2.39929
(1.467492)
-0.396108
(0.263943)
0.299218
(0.347302)
0.652318
(0.580879)
0.012501
(0.037776)
0.035243
(0.039499)
0.109331*
(0.062702)
-0.065122
(0.062528)
-0.444734
(0.313543)
-0.442125
(0.312865)
0.463103
(0.313807)
0.0005
(0.000518)
0.000477
(0.000517)
-0.000495
(0.000518)
0.000985
(0.001036)
1.023269*
(0.600553)
-0.288008
(0.654704)
-0.350994
(0.671839)
-0.55694
(0.685631)
-0.226868
(0.411832)

8.815167*
(4.841619)
4.363924***
(0.870812)
-0.579721
(1.145833)
1.28244
(1.916462)
-0.08981
(0.124632)
0.127429
(0.130316)
0.366467*
(0.206869)
0.366049*
(0.206295)
-0.184228
(1.034455)
-0.114889
(1.032219)
0.215058
(1.035328)
-0.000425
(0.00171)
-0.000553
(0.001707)
0.000458
(0.00171)
-0.000982
(0.003419)
-0.86342
(1.981372)
-5.205621**
(2.160031)
-1.916061
(2.216563)
-0.713927
(2.262067)
-0.499155
(1.358734)

7.301019**
(3.406892)
0.822891
(0.612762)
1.112403
(0.806286)
-0.321366
(1.348553)
-0.028042
(0.0877)
0.037567
(0.091699)
-0.007541
(0.145567)
0.347446**
(0.145163)
-0.09051
(0.727913)
-0.110296
(0.72634)
0.131345
(0.728527)
0.000313
(0.001204)
0.000311
(0.001201)
-0.000357
(0.001203)
0.000814
(0.002406)
-3.2225**
(1.394228)
-7.201807***
(1.519945)
-7.547603***
(1.559724)
-5.052498***
(1.591744)
-0.791305
(0.956097)

2.654427
(3.071063)
-0.01304
(0.55236)
-1.111496
(0.726808)
1.110315
(1.215622)
-0.074583
(0.079055)
0.064413
(0.08266)
0.049295
(0.131218)
-0.160789
(0.130854)
0.796149
(0.65616)
0.762359
(0.654742)
-0.764777
(0.656714)
-0.001985*
(0.001085)
-0.001914*
(0.001083)
0.001957*
(0.001085)
-0.003906*
(0.002169)
2.048446
(1.256794)
1.011391
(1.370118)
1.138169
(1.405977)
0.402985
(1.43484)
0.568796
(0.861851)

0.4573
1112

0.3096
1112

0.2944
1112

0.5491
1112

0.6105
1112

0.0705
1112

0.7334
1112

0.4019
1112

0.3016
1112

0.2842
1112

0.2526
1112

0.0626
1112

Household size
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

99

Mean of X

3.4874
0.5549
0.8948
38.2932
35.7113
10.6124
10.6484
120.7648
94.0006
215.1794
27315.6700
15772.2400
80401.1900
18561.0400
0.3786
0.1871
0.1691
0.1538
0.2590

1112

Appendix A 3. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with others, no kids
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

33.36615*
(19.00924)
6.059839**
(2.768981)
10.61327**
(4.911224)
13.18326*
(7.022037)
-0.360524
(0.420478)
0.098073
(0.45895)
0.864348
(0.782817)
-0.369397
(0.777567)
0.575624
(2.260407)
0.64198
(2.260559)
-0.543983
(2.268872)
-0.001368
(0.002557)
-0.001343
(0.002562)
0.001462
(0.002563)
-0.003274
(0.005116)
-49.31369***
(7.05226)
-58.57742***
(7.704572)
-62.81195***
(7.595056)
-52.05416***
(9.211614)
-1.977252
(4.632842)

1.715238
(6.371599)
2.502931***
(0.928119)
0.49266
(1.646165)
2.694344
(2.353676)
0.043045
(0.140938)
0.00408
(0.153833)
0.075319
(0.262388)
0.46823*
(0.260628)
0.676005
(0.757653)
0.651544
(0.757704)
-0.660312
(0.76049)
-0.0009
(0.000857)
-0.000879
(0.000859)
0.000876
(0.000859)
-0.001654
(0.001715)
-8.406606***
(2.363806)
-9.835184***
(2.582451)
-14.33616***
(2.545743)
-10.824***
(3.087588)
-2.248043
(1.552856)

-6.277159
(6.722842)
0.688474
(0.979283)
-0.348317
(1.736912)
-1.423792
(2.483426)
-0.010746
(0.148707)
0.025864
(0.162313)
-0.008755
(0.276853)
0.25621
(0.274996)
-0.014904
(0.79942)
-0.027093
(0.799473)
0.029476
(0.802413)
-0.00018
(0.000904)
-0.000163
(0.000906)
0.000132
(0.000907)
-0.000099
(0.001809)
5.939495**
(2.494114)
3.961612
(2.724812)
5.204489*
(2.686081)
8.838409***
(3.257796)
0.064967
(1.638459)

-8.968699
(8.236811)
3.407483***
(1.199815)
0.963357
(2.128061)
1.695636
(3.042688)
0.047172
(0.182196)
0.009058
(0.198866)
0.171701
(0.339199)
0.376496
(0.336924)
0.438789
(0.979447)
0.388424
(0.979513)
-0.428294
(0.983115)
-0.000885
(0.001108)
-0.000852
(0.00111)
0.000834
(0.001111)
-0.001493
(0.002217)
-4.608381
(3.055783)
-7.147047**
(3.338434)
-8.571843***
(3.29098)
-6.699421*
(3.991444)
-0.470691
(2.007436)

1.854225
(2.109771)
-0.317755
(0.30732)
0.906732*
(0.54508)
-1.546157**
(0.779352)
-0.032255
(0.046667)
0.034147
(0.050937)
-0.110083
(0.086882)
0.211575**
(0.0863)
0.241276
(0.250875)
0.228709
(0.250892)
-0.235837
(0.251814)
-0.000243
(0.000284)
-0.000232
(0.000284)
0.00023
(0.000285)
-0.000424
(0.000568)
-0.046428
(0.782706)
-0.275825
(0.855104)
0.502297
(0.842949)
0.415143
(1.022366)
0.008338
(0.514183)

-0.39126
(13.50095)
0.208508
(1.966615)
-0.454034
(3.488102)
-8.360764*
(4.987266)
-0.214487
(0.298636)
0.363357
(0.32596)
-0.267755
(0.555981)
0.570724
(0.552252)
1.683641
(1.60541)
1.635491
(1.605518)
-1.638658
(1.611422)
-0.001754
(0.001816)
-0.001736
(0.00182)
0.001758
(0.001821)
-0.003571
(0.003634)
-1.9271
(5.008731)
0.86922
(5.472023)
-5.61215
(5.394241)
1.337717
(6.542371)
-0.974896
(3.290387)

1.36197
(16.14645)
4.453686*
(2.351972)
1.676493
(4.171593)
16.10571***
(5.964517)
0.173711
(0.357154)
-0.55448
(0.389832)
1.337227**
(0.664925)
-0.442647
(0.660465)
-1.933038
(1.919989)
-1.852569
(1.920119)
2.009745
(1.927179)
0.001822
(0.002172)
0.001746
(0.002177)
-0.001703
(0.002177)
0.003188
(0.004346)
-7.049457
(5.990188)
-21.3503***
(6.544262)
-22.86777***
(6.451239)
-16.60449**
(7.824344)
-5.413884
(3.935135)

2.197409
(11.02351)
2.78513*
(1.605739)
1.994892
(2.848031)
0.629188
(4.072097)
-0.191448
(0.243836)
0.120803
(0.266146)
0.48258
(0.453958)
-1.007999**
(0.450913)
-1.3482
(1.310816)
-1.328079
(1.310904)
1.383006
(1.315724)
0.002214
(0.001483)
0.002171
(0.001486)
-0.002103
(0.001486)
0.003975
(0.002967)
-8.246009**
(4.089623)
-6.878152
(4.4679)
-13.30127***
(4.404392)
-3.206557
(5.341838)
0.939791
(2.686597)

-3.904654
(5.568071)
1.087083
(0.811073)
0.022927
(1.438566)
2.862677
(2.056852)
-0.043204
(0.123164)
0.111073
(0.134433)
0.112312
(0.229298)
-0.037196
(0.22776)
0.710242
(0.662105)
0.765342
(0.662149)
-0.716977
(0.664584)
-0.001162
(0.000749)
-0.001209
(0.000751)
0.001177
(0.000751)
-0.002369
(0.001499)
-4.469431**
(2.065705)
-6.382251***
(2.256776)
-7.852556***
(2.224697)
-5.766239**
(2.69821)
-0.106269
(1.357024)

3.633912
(11.41343)
5.69608***
(1.662537)
2.886268
(2.948772)
-0.596022
(4.216137)
-0.157686
(0.252461)
0.35043
(0.27556)
-0.001353
(0.470015)
0.691844
(0.466863)
-0.46249
(1.357182)
-0.540946
(1.357274)
0.536874
(1.362265)
0.000496
(0.001535)
0.000569
(0.001539)
-0.000576
(0.001539)
0.001215
(0.003072)
-5.298473
(4.234282)
-5.281836
(4.625941)
-9.973121**
(4.560185)
-5.157351
(5.530791)
-2.130401
(2.781628)

5.941415
(10.29174)
3.662724**
(1.499146)
3.5134
(2.658972)
-3.071252
(3.801781)
0.063293
(0.22765)
0.095527
(0.248479)
0.306063
(0.423823)
0.785382*
(0.42098)
1.840081
(1.223801)
1.826565
(1.223883)
-1.858671
(1.228384)
-0.002509*
(0.001384)
-0.002535*
(0.001387)
0.00254*
(0.001388)
-0.004996*
(0.00277)
-7.103836***
(3.818144)
-14.07595***
(4.171311)
-20.80429***
(4.112018)
-11.95407**
(4.987234)
-5.150929**
(2.508254)

5.196893
(6.3392)
0.816366
(0.923399)
2.141459
(1.637794)
-2.482115
(2.341708)
-0.21111
(0.140221)
0.128293
(0.153051)
-0.567663**
(0.261054)
0.135337
(0.259303)
-0.644816
(0.7538)
-0.713706
(0.753851)
0.702034
(0.756623)
0.000501
(0.000853)
0.000554
(0.000855)
-0.000528
(0.000855)
0.000988
(0.001706)
2.519388
(2.351787)
0.302582
(2.56932)
2.835588
(2.532798)
4.708121
(3.071888)
-0.351514
(1.54496)

0.3900
314

0.4326
314

0.3184
314

0.1751
314

0.1910
314

0.0914
314

0.6055
314

0.2794
314

0.2301
314

0.2926
314

0.2637
314

0.0772
314

Household size
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

100

Mean of X

3.4076
0.7994
0.9204
47.3567
45.2580
11.9841
11.9172
191.8114
163.1361
355.5988
55216.0200
44616.7100
187229.3000
43458.9400
0.3854
0.2038
0.2420
0.0828
0.2293

314

Appendix A 4. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with kids and others
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

8.048147
(12.38509)
0.757195
(2.311547)
3.37613
(3.559932)
-2.762861
(3.045576)
5.097523*
(2.661121)
4.20332
(4.255732)
0.221082
(0.272977)
-0.032494
(0.275119)
0.58257
(0.407488)
0.68194
(0.415474)
0.445058
(1.331165)
0.283716
(1.334331)
-0.349166
(1.329196)
-0.000227
(0.001035)
0.000188
(0.001037)
0.000089
(0.001033)
-0.000072
(0.002093)
-22.29841***
(4.383741)
-24.71957***
(4.681985)
-26.67108***
(4.601581)
-23.8679***
(5.173085)
1.759068
(2.772831)

-0.95667
(6.59724)
3.328155***
(1.231305)
-1.942357
(1.89629)
-2.548151
(1.622305)
0.764297
(1.417515)
-0.975975
(2.266926)
-0.21439
(0.145408)
0.12955
(0.14655)
-0.016799
(0.217059)
0.081605
(0.221313)
-0.214153
(0.709079)
-0.255091
(0.710766)
0.264144
(0.708031)
0.000156
(0.000551)
0.000185
(0.000553)
-0.000194
(0.00055)
0.000465
(0.001115)
-2.087883
(2.335113)
-0.669343
(2.49398)
-3.081789
(2.451151)
-4.16841
(2.755578)
-0.567531
(1.47702)

2.458862
(7.382409)
-1.245442
(1.377849)
0.898784
(2.121976)
3.072073*
(1.815383)
0.131241
(1.58622)
0.322009
(2.536723)
-0.050035
(0.162714)
-0.028055
(0.163991)
-0.05805
(0.242892)
0.233532
(0.247652)
-0.01742
(0.79347)
-0.060157
(0.795358)
0.065699
(0.792297)
-0.000027
(0.000617)
0.000095
(0.000618)
-0.000078
(0.000616)
0.000282
(0.001248)
1.668737
(2.613026)
1.891174
(2.790801)
2.366071
(2.742874)
3.920834
(3.083532)
-0.612946
(1.652807)

4.751777
(3.767399)
0.029404
(0.703145)
0.831362
(1.082889)
-0.560838
(0.926428)
0.547
(0.809482)
0.757426
(1.294543)
-0.097698
(0.083036)
0.073116
(0.083688)
-0.05551
(0.123953)
0.123279
(0.126382)
0.228937
(0.404925)
0.18673
(0.405888)
-0.196765
(0.404326)
-0.00117***
(0.000315)
-0.001027***
(0.000316)
0.001136***
(0.000314)
-0.002338***
(0.000637)
-2.346411*
(1.333482)
-1.509163
(1.424205)
-2.766031**
(1.399747)
-1.418435
(1.573592)
-1.122123
(0.843463)

-0.157569
(1.498428)
0.092017
(0.279666)
-0.392649
(0.430703)
-0.394971
(0.368473)
0.226032
(0.321959)
0.178889
(0.514886)
0.002829
(0.033027)
-0.00589
(0.033286)
0.018881
(0.049301)
0.048611
(0.050267)
-0.059037
(0.161053)
-0.08414
(0.161436)
0.074823
(0.160815)
0.000047
(0.000125)
0.00011
(0.000126)
-0.000066
(0.000125)
0.000115
(0.000253)
-0.656475
(0.530373)
-0.376887
(0.566457)
-0.604137
(0.556729)
-0.896342
(0.625873)
-0.087907
(0.335475)

12.75868
(10.74838)
-0.257538
(2.006072)
2.302906
(3.08948)
2.128335
(2.643097)
1.090195
(2.309449)
4.361693
(3.693329)
-0.210549
(0.236902)
-0.011623
(0.238762)
0.178672
(0.353638)
0.126234
(0.360568)
-0.723858
(1.155249)
-0.691298
(1.157997)
0.73095
(1.15354)
0.000301
(0.000898)
0.000344
(0.0009)
-0.000303
(0.000897)
0.00046
(0.001817)
-11.83513***
(3.804421)
-14.55538***
(4.063252)
-14.79651***
(3.993474)
-11.41522**
(4.489453)
-2.420183
(2.406397)

3.407915
(12.13728)
2.109321
(2.265296)
-2.64439
(3.488702)
-1.125871
(2.984637)
4.097644
(2.607875)
11.95592***
(4.17058)
-0.338199
(0.267515)
0.058548
(0.269615)
0.156794
(0.399335)
-0.057424
(0.40716)
-3.686507***
(1.30453)
-3.765175***
(1.307633)
3.859327***
(1.3026)
0.001792*
(0.001014)
0.001734*
(0.001016)
-0.001872*
(0.001012)
0.003929*
(0.002052)
-9.724456**
(4.296027)
-16.13729***
(4.588304)
-16.11599***
(4.509509)
-14.55423***
(5.069578)
-0.446346
(2.71735)

-6.378675
(5.462524)
0.792769
(1.019523)
-1.238937
(1.570131)
1.352081
(1.343271)
-0.570151
(1.173704)
2.701529
(1.877018)
-0.008679
(0.120398)
0.171518
(0.121343)
0.087285
(0.179725)
0.173628
(0.183247)
0.36813
(0.587119)
0.347529
(0.588515)
-0.350758
(0.58625)
-0.000453
(0.000457)
-0.000395
(0.000457)
0.000464
(0.000456)
-0.000928
(0.000923)
-5.398981***
(1.933477)
-5.737996***
(2.065019)
-6.710648***
(2.029557)
-7.383451***
(2.281622)
0.197236
(1.222975)

1.552706
(3.02792)
-0.302243
(0.565129)
0.282609
(0.870336)
0.407608
(0.744585)
0.221677
(0.650594)
1.336814
(1.040446)
0.027576
(0.066738)
-0.03667
(0.067262)
0.017274
(0.099623)
-0.069326
(0.101575)
-0.745525**
(0.325445)
-0.744521**
(0.326219)
0.753095**
(0.324963)
0.000455*
(0.000253)
0.000458*
(0.000254)
-0.000468*
(0.000253)
0.001012**
(0.000512)
0.228805
(1.071741)
-1.224165
(1.144656)
-1.471883
(1.124999)
-1.809201
(1.264721)
-1.254808*
(0.677905)

15.00858
(10.56571)
1.167153
(1.971979)
6.599321**
(3.036976)
1.065931
(2.598179)
-2.058077
(2.2702)
-1.736565
(3.630562)
-0.191183
(0.232876)
0.372883
(0.234704)
0.195401
(0.347628)
0.531409
(0.35444)
-0.699431
(1.135616)
-0.763958
(1.138317)
0.78608
(1.133936)
0.000121
(0.000883)
0.000226
(0.000885)
-0.0002
(0.000881)
0.000391
(0.001786)
0.943944
(3.739766)
0.419934
(3.994198)
-3.818348
(3.925606)
6.628814
(4.413156)
-2.635728
(2.365501)

13.21995
(8.65971)
-1.473088
(1.616244)
1.659504
(2.48912)
4.009764**
(2.12948)
2.180688
(1.860667)
1.24858
(2.975626)
-0.054246
(0.190867)
0.107752
(0.192365)
0.077881
(0.284917)
0.286661
(0.290501)
1.182678
(0.930756)
1.106492
(0.93297)
-1.103856
(0.929379)
-0.000723
(0.000724)
-0.0006
(0.000725)
0.00064
(0.000722)
-0.001257
(0.001464)
-6.715775**
(3.06513)
-12.50724***
(3.273664)
-11.55479***
(3.217445)
-8.136769**
(3.617044)
-0.878603
(1.938776)

4.468619
(5.182062)
0.09652
(0.967177)
0.068178
(1.489515)
-0.274582
(1.274303)
-1.361095
(1.113443)
0.652797
(1.780646)
-0.135452
(0.114217)
0.147406
(0.115113)
-0.151997
(0.170498)
0.054476
(0.173839)
-0.075655
(0.556974)
-0.103676
(0.558299)
0.095154
(0.55615)
0.000073
(0.000433)
0.00002
(0.000434)
-0.000054
(0.000432)
0.0001
(0.000876)
-0.018903
(1.834206)
0.181933
(1.958995)
1.735082
(1.925353)
1.651182
(2.164477)
-0.9622
(1.160184)

0.4051
399

0.2984
399

0.2128
399

0.4778
399

0.1740
399

0.0858
399

0.6420
399

0.3633
399

0.3286
399

0.3037
399

0.2884
399

0.0816
399

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

101

Mean of X

4.5639
0.3333
1.0251
0.7820
0.9223
42.3008
39.3158
11.1404
11.2682
150.4377
112.6142
263.8561
35073.6800
20749.1300
103858.2000
23679.7800
0.3784
0.1779
0.2506
0.1078
0.2431

399

Appendix A 5. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with one dependent
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

12.79448***
(4.332992)
-0.851288
(1.752927)
-2.316924*
(1.400101)
8.013226***
(1.158808)
-0.010067
(1.821296)
-0.06519
(0.1185)
0.098891
(0.123943)
0.593547***
(0.197332)
0.435222**
(0.199867)
-0.551644
(0.750791)
-0.575648
(0.749851)
0.592926
(0.752121)
0.001149
(0.00108)
0.001148
(0.00108)
-0.001117
(0.001081)
0.002164
(0.002163)
-10.19712***
(1.899545)
-15.72496***
(2.058372)
-19.13615***
(2.152244)
-11.27008***
(2.26239)
-2.425054*
(1.304719)

5.476991***
(1.895925)
-1.152348
(0.767003)
-2.016196***
(0.612622)
0.868914*
(0.507043)
0.075167
(0.796918)
-0.006395
(0.05185)
0.01585
(0.054232)
0.075063
(0.086344)
0.07498
(0.087453)
0.059427
(0.328513)
0.041686
(0.328102)
-0.02107
(0.329095)
-0.000181
(0.000473)
-0.000199
(0.000472)
0.000176
(0.000473)
-0.000374
(0.000946)
-1.097586
(0.831157)
-2.744142***
(0.900652)
-3.904535***
(0.941727)
-2.765308***
(0.989921)
-0.550168
(0.570887)

-4.612895*
(2.671023)
0.207451
(1.080572)
0.377677
(0.863076)
0.469393
(0.714334)
0.66263
(1.122717)
-0.035935
(0.073048)
0.006449
(0.076403)
0.163388
(0.121643)
0.080594
(0.123206)
-0.497515
(0.462816)
-0.514236
(0.462237)
0.541448
(0.463636)
0.00074
(0.000666)
0.000763
(0.000666)
-0.000785
(0.000667)
0.001571
(0.001333)
2.906194**
(1.170953)
2.952715**
(1.26886)
1.3714
(1.326726)
4.260886***
(1.394624)
-1.427075*
(0.804279)

0.180664
(2.670517)
6.420221***
(1.080367)
0.988459
(0.862913)
0.455175
(0.714199)
0.573281
(1.122505)
0.065446
(0.073034)
-0.018967
(0.076389)
0.255041**
(0.12162)
0.269689**
(0.123182)
0.380871
(0.462729)
0.444859
(0.46215)
-0.432231
(0.463548)
-0.000553
(0.000666)
-0.000684
(0.000665)
0.000706
(0.000666)
-0.001448
(0.001333)
-2.023302*
(1.170731)
-3.660848***
(1.26862)
-3.466197***
(1.326475)
-4.056797***
(1.39436)
0.229882
(0.804127)

-0.595774
(0.800929)
-0.029564
(0.324019)
0.027894
(0.258801)
0.310397
(0.214199)
0.022354
(0.336656)
-0.010473
(0.021904)
0.006189
(0.02291)
-0.036193
(0.036476)
0.086663**
(0.036944)
0.129054
(0.13878)
0.128818
(0.138606)
-0.120185
(0.139025)
-0.000175
(0.0002)
-0.000178
(0.0002)
0.000169
(0.0002)
-0.000343
(0.0004)
-0.083334
(0.35112)
-0.145347
(0.380479)
-0.410413
(0.39783)
-0.170738
(0.41819)
-0.269514
(0.24117)

-2.70354
(3.252394)
-0.711388
(1.315768)
-2.255134**
(1.050932)
-0.077843
(0.869815)
-0.035291
(1.367086)
0.020196
(0.088947)
0.140121
(0.093033)
-0.020526
(0.148119)
0.340974**
(0.150022)
0.803305
(0.563552)
0.789134
(0.562847)
-0.798383
(0.564551)
-0.001245
(0.000811)
-0.001216
(0.00081)
0.001209
(0.000812)
-0.00232
(0.001624)
-2.685098*
(1.425821)
-2.363084
(1.545038)
-5.11378***
(1.6155)
-2.059059
(1.698176)
-0.52934
(0.979338)

6.3203
(5.636794)
-6.055188***
(2.280385)
-1.934853
(1.821393)
1.528403
(1.507495)
7.243138***
(2.369327)
-0.004779
(0.154156)
-0.175779
(0.161237)
0.506525**
(0.256709)
0.143702
(0.260007)
-1.241789
(0.976705)
-1.205399
(0.975482)
1.379719
(0.978435)
0.002189
(0.001405)
0.002108
(0.001404)
-0.002165
(0.001407)
0.004137
(0.002814)
-5.545112**
(2.47112)
-14.23893***
(2.677739)
-17.54489***
(2.799857)
-9.238881***
(2.943146)
-0.253972
(1.697311)

6.760887**
(3.04188)
-5.043804***
(1.230603)
-1.796851*
(0.98291)
0.668418
(0.813516)
0.879619
(1.2786)
-0.111084
(0.08319)
0.040034
(0.087011)
0.036229
(0.138532)
-0.053185
(0.140312)
-0.534991
(0.527076)
-0.609739
(0.526416)
0.593148
(0.52801)
0.001184
(0.000758)
0.001321*
(0.000758)
-0.001271*
(0.000759)
0.002606*
(0.001518)
-3.15031**
(1.333533)
-3.025281**
(1.445034)
-7.520353***
(1.510935)
-2.212189
(1.58826)
0.332371
(0.915949)

-3.62796**
(1.756414)
-0.126989
(0.710564)
0.450343
(0.567542)
-0.011623
(0.469733)
0.977761
(0.738278)
0.012182
(0.048035)
0.028264
(0.050241)
0.191756**
(0.07999)
-0.09426
(0.081018)
-0.633581**
(0.304339)
-0.588867*
(0.303958)
0.63471**
(0.304878)
0.000996**
(0.000438)
0.000919**
(0.000438)
-0.00095**
(0.000438)
0.001838**
(0.000877)
0.298651
(0.769996)
-1.422878*
(0.834378)
-1.306094
(0.87243)
-0.797563
(0.917078)
0.030025
(0.528879)

14.61518***
(4.923672)
9.724024***
(1.991889)
2.191912
(1.590965)
1.664642
(1.316779)
1.135247
(2.069578)
-0.152688
(0.134654)
0.391026***
(0.140839)
-0.003573
(0.224232)
0.363304
(0.227113)
-0.332678
(0.85314)
-0.276517
(0.852072)
0.374672
(0.854651)
0.000771
(0.001227)
0.000671
(0.001227)
-0.000758
(0.001229)
0.001417
(0.002458)
-2.584781
(2.158494)
-6.092405***
(2.338973)
-7.732446***
(2.445641)
-1.72065
(2.570802)
-2.351198
(1.482581)

10.0828***
(3.807634)
-2.797857*
(1.540392)
-0.741229
(1.230344)
0.976525
(1.018307)
0.649136
(1.600471)
0.011538
(0.104132)
0.063746
(0.108915)
0.161746
(0.173406)
0.591672***
(0.175634)
0.044365
(0.65976)
0.003351
(0.658935)
-0.01575
(0.660929)
0.000043
(0.000949)
0.000075
(0.000949)
-0.00007
(0.00095)
0.000196
(0.001901)
-5.437917***
(1.669233)
-9.791634***
(1.808803)
-14.02867***
(1.891293)
-7.331278***
(1.988084)
0.407481
(1.146528)

2.771065
(2.968186)
0.378251
(1.20079)
1.797746*
(0.959097)
-1.170772
(0.793807)
1.683064
(1.247624)
-0.104053
(0.081175)
0.096924
(0.084903)
0.058793
(0.135176)
-0.052489
(0.136913)
0.381616
(0.514307)
0.382079
(0.513663)
-0.375688
(0.515218)
-0.001583**
(0.00074)
-0.001594**
(0.00074)
0.001661**
(0.000741)
-0.003494**
(0.001482)
1.12183
(1.301226)
-1.651092
(1.410026)
0.343628
(1.47433)
-0.111605
(1.549782)
0.868508
(0.893759)

0.4049
846

0.3869
846

0.2409
846

0.3478
846

0.1787
846

0.1052
846

0.6201
846

0.1995
846

0.2727
846

0.2669
846

0.2191
846

0.0705
846

Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

102

Mean of X

0.3191
0.4350
0.5875
0.8913
40.2884
37.8712
10.7742
10.8416
130.1483
106.9741
237.5311
28431.7100
20141.5100
91898.2000
21556.7100
0.3865
0.2092
0.1631
0.1312
0.2541

846

Appendix A 6. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with two dependents
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

26.57127***
(9.241426)
-4.316347**
(2.12391)
-5.762177***
(1.462999)
8.959116***
(2.032995)
7.199706**
(3.534078)
-0.183863
(0.221552)
0.022098
(0.241157)
0.377213
(0.362185)
-0.106001
(0.351893)
-0.537879
(1.136455)
-0.571666
(1.137003)
0.65008
(1.137597)
0.000315
(0.000938)
0.00046
(0.000938)
-0.00036
(0.000939)
0.0005
(0.00188)
-20.28266***
(3.512949)
-26.86319***
(3.870522)
-26.86223***
(3.791379)
-22.71168***
(4.078576)
-1.255351
(2.320089)

0.422331
(4.706405)
0.026191
(1.081649)
-0.250938
(0.745065)
0.908507
(1.035348)
0.992653
(1.799809)
0.038478
(0.11283)
0.062306
(0.122815)
0.273932
(0.184451)
0.100877
(0.179209)
0.170747
(0.578766)
0.154227
(0.579045)
-0.144902
(0.579347)
-0.000185
(0.000478)
-0.000148
(0.000478)
0.000153
(0.000478)
-0.000243
(0.000958)
-0.687787
(1.789049)
-1.292619
(1.971151)
-4.358642**
(1.930845)
-3.528906*
(2.077107)
-1.166706
(1.181558)

-4.147706
(4.352953)
0.712987
(1.000417)
1.380295**
(0.689111)
0.631952
(0.957594)
0.173631
(1.664643)
-0.057404
(0.104357)
-0.001829
(0.113591)
0.103442
(0.170599)
0.173102
(0.165751)
-0.273897
(0.5353)
-0.339795
(0.535558)
0.331296
(0.535838)
0.000108
(0.000442)
0.000188
(0.000442)
-0.000199
(0.000442)
0.000528
(0.000886)
3.797908**
(1.654691)
3.662071**
(1.823117)
1.608866**
(1.785838)
3.193109*
(1.921116)
-1.497731
(1.092823)

-1.933589
(2.91438)
3.664838***
(0.669797)
0.098409
(0.461372)
-0.014738
(0.641126)
0.623676
(1.114508)
-0.007812
(0.069869)
0.070091
(0.076051)
-0.021146
(0.114219)
0.225154**
(0.110973)
1.27587***
(0.358393)
1.28442***
(0.358566)
-1.277474***
(0.358753)
-0.00198***
(0.000296)
-0.001993***
(0.000296)
0.001984***
(0.000296)
-0.003903***
(0.000593)
0.514333
(1.107845)
-0.269008
(1.220609)
1.364279
(1.195651)
1.175814
(1.286221)
-0.739067
(0.731664)

0.10764
(1.065795)
-0.029105
(0.244946)
0.180738
(0.168725)
-0.004347
(0.234461)
0.056327
(0.407578)
-0.008369
(0.025551)
-0.00888
(0.027812)
0.025407
(0.04177)
0.036444
(0.040583)
0.103746
(0.131065)
0.091446
(0.131128)
-0.092622
(0.131197)
-0.000064
(0.000108)
-0.000048
(0.000108)
0.000046
(0.000108)
-0.000061
(0.000217)
-0.226804
(0.405141)
-0.292961
(0.446379)
-0.294077
(0.437252)
-0.585758
(0.470374)
-0.17851
(0.267571)

20.60135***
(6.009491)
-1.254356
(1.381131)
-2.040776**
(0.951355)
0.249625
(1.322011)
-3.845061*
(2.298132)
-0.216112
(0.14407)
-0.148327
(0.156819)
-0.033492
(0.235521)
-0.140429
(0.228828)
0.29322
(0.739011)
0.34892
(0.739368)
-0.283581
(0.739754)
-0.000431
(0.00061)
-0.000471
(0.00061)
0.000482
(0.00061)
-0.001112
(0.001223)
-1.666941
(2.284392)
-2.309609
(2.516913)
-1.891628
(2.465449)
-2.150421
(2.652206)
0.256392
(1.508702)

-1.206732
(7.423138)
-2.693841
(1.706022)
-0.288459
(1.175148)
3.154413*
(1.632995)
7.137393**
(2.838734)
-0.26613
(0.17796)
0.199006
(0.193708)
0.811286***
(0.290924)
0.642523**
(0.282657)
0.380426
(0.912853)
0.310824
(0.913293)
-0.246294
(0.91377)
-0.001642**
(0.000753)
-0.001588**
(0.000754)
0.001659**
(0.000754)
-0.003432**
(0.00151)
-4.402607
(2.821762)
-14.3821***
(3.108981)
-12.66395***
(3.04541)
-10.86817***
(3.2761)
0.30967
(1.863602)

-0.566583
(3.652088)
-2.217451***
(0.839341)
-1.560161***
(0.578158)
0.265819
(0.803412)
1.819573
(1.39662)
-0.08935
(0.087554)
0.279782***
(0.095302)
0.191074
(0.143131)
0.015631
(0.139063)
0.080291
(0.449112)
0.108725
(0.449329)
-0.084403
(0.449563)
-0.000007
(0.000371)
-0.00009
(0.000371)
0.000137
(0.000371)
-0.000425
(0.000743)
-3.028019**
(1.38827)
-4.991682***
(1.529578)
-7.036793***
(1.498302)
-5.951149***
(1.611799)
-1.444751
(0.916868)

-2.334763
(2.405733)
-0.137657
(0.552898)
-0.257989
(0.380849)
0.418736
(0.52923)
1.408481
(0.919993)
0.004078
(0.057674)
0.028581
(0.062778)
0.029546
(0.094284)
-0.004041
(0.091605)
-0.050005
(0.295843)
-0.042167
(0.295985)
0.065334
(0.29614)
-0.000196
(0.000244)
-0.000202
(0.000244)
0.000178
(0.000244)
-0.000325
(0.00049)
0.197695
(0.914493)
-0.884474
(1.007576)
-1.975325**
(0.986974)
-1.816837*
(1.061737)
-0.71541
(0.603967)

21.42694***
(6.773559)
3.532913**
(1.556733)
0.900365
(1.072314)
-2.226798
(1.490096)
2.293726
(2.590324)
-0.037324
(0.162388)
0.044839
(0.176757)
0.029085
(0.265466)
0.172539
(0.257922)
0.397966
(0.832972)
0.293732
(0.833374)
-0.254102
(0.833809)
-0.000681
(0.000687)
-0.000548
(0.000688)
0.000524
(0.000688)
-0.001028
(0.001378)
1.896207
(2.574838)
-1.99019
(2.836923)
0.699259
(2.778914)
1.91614
(2.989417)
-1.295683
(1.700523)

16.51493***
(5.482202)
-3.347035***
(1.259947)
-1.946465**
(0.867881)
2.18026*
(1.206014)
-1.346735
(2.096487)
-0.05117
(0.131429)
0.018552
(0.143059)
-0.248967
(0.214856)
0.437796**
(0.20875)
0.267274
(0.674169)
0.219799
(0.674494)
-0.191373
(0.674846)
-0.000004
(0.000556)
0.000043
(0.000557)
-0.000052
(0.000557)
0.000095
(0.001116)
-3.27331
(2.083953)
-8.785373***
(2.296072)
-8.656334***
(2.249123)
-5.830346**
(2.419494)
-3.315538**
(1.376324)

-0.663045
(4.462277)
1.156379
(1.025543)
1.454237**
(0.706418)
-0.751238
(0.981644)
-0.162378
(1.706451)
0.007255
(0.106978)
0.043566
(0.116444)
-0.014238
(0.174883)
-0.15841
(0.169914)
0.050983
(0.548744)
0.036736
(0.549009)
-0.030884
(0.549296)
0.000039
(0.000453)
0.000019
(0.000453)
-0.000052
(0.000453)
0.000162
(0.000908)
1.897815
(1.696248)
2.56529
(1.868905)
2.845479
(1.83069)
1.520172
(1.969365)
-0.271386
(1.120269)

0.3607
728

0.2260
728

0.2388
728

0.3794
728

0.2153
728

0.0679
728

0.6660
728

0.4248
728

0.2500
728

0.3129
728

0.2904
728

0.0545
728

Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

103

Mean of X

0.3709
1.0742
0.6731
0.9203
40.9560
38.2967
11.0783
11.1635
145.2872
110.7878
256.6934
34634.3300
22356.4000
104740.5000
23657.0200
0.3819
0.1676
0.2294
0.1277
0.2473

728

Appendix A 7. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with three or more dependents
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Health

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

8.547077
(12.09144)
2.798074
(2.109196)
-1.450992
(1.485844)
2.462563
(3.101323)
4.186755
(4.574312)
0.314517
(0.292656)
0.085908
(0.305946)
0.639956
(0.502172)
0.79324
(0.493762)
-1.100844
(1.432171)
-1.394158
(1.439326)
1.208933
(1.436973)
0.002441*
(0.001263)
0.003185**
(0.00128)
-0.002579**
(0.001279)
0.005187**
(0.002604)
-20.67589***
(4.712235)
-24.18938***
(5.007096)
-26.2663***
(4.910194)
-23.16509***
(5.371892)
1.091531
(3.038941)

16.46707*
(8.78621)
-0.254189
(1.532641)
-1.395916
(1.079684)
0.013665
(2.253567)
-0.249462
(3.32391)
-0.107451
(0.212658)
0.016402
(0.222314)
0.007552
(0.364902)
-0.17571
(0.358791)
-0.885352
(1.040682)
-0.935014
(1.045882)
0.972206
(1.044172)
0.001116
(0.000918)
0.000992
(0.00093)
-0.001095
(0.00093)
0.002179
(0.001892)
-8.856211***
(3.424131)
-4.95902
(3.638391)
-9.631693***
(3.567978)
-7.522788*
(3.903469)
-1.585689
(2.208237)

-2.333299
(7.286625)
-1.072673
(1.271058)
1.033549
(0.895409)
-1.541948
(1.86894)
-1.970591
(2.756602)
0.041086
(0.176362)
-0.057137
(0.184371)
-0.108642
(0.302622)
0.289989
(0.297554)
0.353733
(0.863064)
0.362778
(0.867376)
-0.321435
(0.865958)
0.000612
(0.000761)
0.000563
(0.000771)
-0.000635
(0.000771)
0.001356
(0.001569)
2.911524
(2.839718)
3.768054
(3.017409)
2.984265
(2.959013)
5.269604
(3.237245)
1.006908
(1.831347)

3.389664
(9.608259)
2.133234
(1.676037)
-0.711589
(1.180701)
-1.021355
(2.464414)
2.31472
(3.634899)
-0.063284
(0.232554)
0.243163
(0.243114)
0.399614
(0.399043)
0.031897
(0.39236)
-1.410041
(1.13805)
-1.360113
(1.143736)
1.399244
(1.141866)
0.001905*
(0.001004)
0.001781*
(0.001017)
-0.00177*
(0.001016)
0.00339
(0.002069)
-14.04081***
(3.744497)
-13.17022***
(3.978803)
-15.78655***
(3.901802)
-14.18999***
(4.268683)
1.132775
(2.414843)

-0.193932
(3.465135)
-0.37233
(0.604448)
0.181134
(0.425809)
0.52568
(0.888769)
-0.831367
(1.310895)
-0.065259
(0.083869)
0.055351
(0.087677)
-0.035823
(0.143911)
0.140581
(0.141501)
-1.637057***
(0.410428)
-1.595861***
(0.412479)
1.618042***
(0.411804)
0.00099***
(0.000362)
0.00091**
(0.000367)
-0.000907**
(0.000367)
0.001727**
(0.000746)
0.067781
(1.35042)
1.230315
(1.434921)
0.045373
(1.407151)
-0.08498
(1.539463)
-0.057194
(0.870892)

2.421535
(9.254264)
-0.232608
(1.614287)
0.554589
(1.1372)
0.741642
(2.373618)
2.281807
(3.500979)
-0.104293
(0.223986)
0.100997
(0.234157)
0.011047
(0.384341)
0.328564
(0.377904)
-1.55066
(1.096121)
-1.510812
(1.101598)
1.542579
(1.099797)
0.001064
(0.000967)
0.000999
(0.00098)
-0.001051
(0.000979)
0.002087
(0.001993)
-4.534201
(3.606539)
-6.272654
(3.832213)
-8.765829**
(3.758049)
-5.223202
(4.111412)
-3.529524
(2.325873)

28.20125**
(14.36026)
-3.150529
(2.504963)
-3.367946*
(1.764646)
2.73049
(3.683251)
7.365098
(5.432629)
-0.468164
(0.34757)
0.089245
(0.363353)
-0.062146
(0.596399)
-0.852366
(0.586411)
-8.177338***
(1.700901)
-8.121706***
(1.7094)
8.346662***
(1.706605)
0.00845***
(0.0015)
0.008083***
(0.00152)
-0.008342***
(0.001519)
0.016678***
(0.003093)
-13.63497**
(5.596432)
-17.10762***
(5.94662)
-18.08777***
(5.831536)
-14.34795**
(6.379867)
-0.507353
(3.609164)

-2.975294
(6.19526)
-1.377744
(1.080683)
0.930408
(0.761298)
0.161404
(1.589016)
2.155396
(2.343728)
-0.011425
(0.149947)
0.153366
(0.156756)
0.159601
(0.257297)
0.220052
(0.252988)
0.062293
(0.733797)
0.062203
(0.737464)
-0.05513
(0.736258)
-0.001545**
(0.000647)
-0.001389**
(0.000656)
0.001645**
(0.000655)
-0.003577***
(0.001334)
-6.331628***
(2.414395)
-3.334177
(2.565472)
-6.651532***
(2.515823)
-4.940149*
(2.752382)
0.326494
(1.557054)

0.194233
(3.938471)
0.021748
(0.687015)
-0.073975
(0.483975)
0.83654
(1.010175)
0.890417
(1.489962)
0.024011
(0.095325)
0.009129
(0.099654)
0.062001
(0.163569)
-0.347528**
(0.16083)
-1.028987**
(0.466492)
-1.070528**
(0.468823)
1.069425**
(0.468056)
0.001591***
(0.000411)
0.001654***
(0.000417)
-0.001663***
(0.000417)
0.003463***
(0.000848)
-2.09632
(1.534887)
-2.330186
(1.63093)
-2.901391*
(1.599367)
-3.561882**
(1.749753)
0.075942
(0.989855)

13.762
(13.3214)
4.974664**
(2.323746)
1.985453
(1.636986)
1.657095
(3.416793)
-4.761421
(5.039616)
-0.217645
(0.322425)
0.52711
(0.337067)
0.770316
(0.553254)
0.762081
(0.543988)
-3.25263**
(1.577853)
-3.208319**
(1.585736)
3.272624**
(1.583144)
0.002308*
(0.001391)
0.002288
(0.00141)
-0.002278
(0.001409)
0.004476
(0.002869)
-5.301891
(5.191568)
-3.013276
(5.516423)
-9.476299*
(5.409664)
-3.468333
(5.918327)
2.156722
(3.348065)

32.27221***
(9.462197)
-3.707135**
(1.650558)
-0.244731
(1.162752)
0.751924
(2.42695)
-2.10659
(3.579642)
-0.230743
(0.229019)
-0.052263
(0.239419)
0.244706
(0.392976)
-0.514792
(0.386395)
0.651087
(1.12075)
0.647094
(1.126349)
-0.601342
(1.124508)
-0.000922
(0.000988)
-0.00092
(0.001002)
0.00086
(0.001001)
-0.001589
(0.002038)
-1.881363
(3.687574)
-7.816831**
(3.918319)
-5.307282
(3.842488)
-6.215716
(4.203791)
-1.934741
(2.378133)

14.78565**
(5.975101)
-1.463399
(1.042279)
-1.196805
(0.734244)
-0.581556
(1.532548)
-2.719771
(2.26044)
-0.280232*
(0.144619)
0.109627
(0.151186)
-0.378768
(0.248153)
0.152814
(0.243997)
-0.255841
(0.707721)
-0.307668
(0.711257)
0.2969
(0.710094)
-0.000308
(0.000624)
-0.000302
(0.000632)
0.000355
(0.000632)
-0.000863
(0.001287)
1.339905
(2.328596)
2.119136
(2.474304)
3.594312
(2.426419)
4.447199*
(2.654571)
-1.045555
(1.501721)

0.5786
251

0.5390
251

0.4158
251

0.6408
251

0.7703
251

0.0767
251

0.8555
251

0.5750

0.4873

0.3275

0.4003

0.0998

251

251

251

251

251

Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Husband wage&salary
Wife wage&salary
HH total income
Husband w&s square
Wife w&s square
HH total income square
Husws * Wifews
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

104

Mean of X

0.5657
1.4502
0.7689
0.9084
41.5538
38.6056
11.2709
11.0757
154.0608
117.6607
272.4781
49562.6700
25944.6500
141986.4000
32967.8400
0.3506
0.1753
0.2351
0.1434
0.2470

251

APPENDIX B: ESTIMATES OF QUADRATIC ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND
SYSTEM
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Appendix B 1. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with spouses only (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

84.28641**
(37.15709)
0.999859
(0.932178)
-0.637037
(0.728019)
0.112346*
(0.062017)
0.045003
(0.065196)
0.02076
(0.111978)
-0.185137
(0.122958)
-6.773888***
(1.325887)
-3.459142***
(1.208454)
-27.03742*
(15.44469)
4.533978***
(1.717505)
-2.551083***
(0.834451)
-1.335696
(1.288967)
-0.737175
(1.390963)
0.054324
(1.227817)
0.311812
(0.687242)

-0.051388
(13.83926)
0.830132**
(0.347192)
-0.051404
(0.271153)
0.000068
(0.023098)
0.062225***
(0.024282)
-0.059387
(0.041707)
0.118296***
(0.045796)
0.108887
(0.49383)
-1.117143**
(0.450092)
4.244475
(5.752418)
-0.532813
(0.639689)
-0.011322
(0.310794)
-0.251736
(0.480079)
-0.112064
(0.518068)
-0.676493
(0.457304)
0.090743
(0.255965)

27.63119
(18.0156)
-0.602949
(0.451966)
-0.05946
(0.35298)
0.019026
(0.030069)
-0.01033
(0.03161)
0.065013
(0.054293)
0.017977
(0.059616)
-0.338193
(0.642856)
0.010165
(0.585918)
-13.34883*
(7.488351)
1.699091**
(0.832731)
1.291381***
(0.404583)
2.227773***
(0.624955)
2.216806***
(0.674408)
1.493832**
(0.595307)
0.412402
(0.333209)

8.00849
(8.635747)
-0.037944
(0.216649)
-0.221524
(0.1692)
-0.019195
(0.014413)
-0.006292
(0.015152)
0.028078
(0.026025)
0.039078
(0.028577)
0.0641
(0.308152)
0.154933
(0.280859)
-1.520138
(3.589529)
0.104234
(0.399169)
-0.199486
(0.193936)
-0.084207
(0.299571)
-0.228905
(0.323276)
-0.198181
(0.285359)
-0.107876
(0.159723)

-8.05075
(5.826972)
0.235059
(0.146184)
0.023597
(0.114168)
-0.006409
(0.009726)
-0.010899
(0.010224)
0.022271
(0.01756)
0.018295
(0.019282)
0.083146
(0.207926)
0.215617
(0.18951)
3.232377
(2.422035)
-0.33643
(0.269339)
-0.050964
(0.130859)
0.08386
(0.202136)
0.150778
(0.218131)
-0.065304
(0.192546)
0.015846
(0.107773)

-110.6886***
(33.84887)
0.192939
(0.849183)
2.257201***
(0.663201)
-0.018127
(0.056495)
-0.00302
(0.059391)
0.234179**
(0.102009)
0.068508
(0.11201)
3.730491***
(1.207839)
2.414731**
(1.100861)
42.25734***
(14.0696)
-4.45035***
(1.56459)
-0.401731
(0.760157)
-0.742662
(1.174206)
0.419006
(1.267121)
-2.697185**
(1.1185)
1.029419*
(0.626054)

6.193183
(5.342912)
0.247614*
(0.13404)
0.036735
(0.104684)
0.00434
(0.008918)
-0.011699
(0.009375)
0.01027
(0.016102)
0.015515
(0.01768)
0.230589
(0.190653)
0.178787
(0.173767)
-2.575538
(2.220831)
0.18289
(0.246964)
0.052617
(0.119988)
0.013589
(0.185344)
0.07906
(0.20001)
-0.05553
(0.176551)
-0.129629
(0.09882)

9.625024
(10.03086)
0.027153
(0.251649)
0.340923*
(0.196535)
0.004478
(0.016742)
-0.00668
(0.0176)
0.076882**
(0.03023)
0.00204
(0.033193)
0.324616
(0.357934)
0.311803
(0.326232)
-4.792563
(4.169422)
0.490124
(0.463655)
0.278501
(0.225267)
0.200673
(0.347967)
-0.276344
(0.375502)
-0.021174
(0.331459)
-0.247541
(0.185527)

133.5254***
(37.21412)
-0.219574
(0.933609)
-0.730146
(0.729137)
0.103379*
(0.062112)
0.007924
(0.065296)
-0.022137
(0.11215)
-0.063183
(0.123146)
-0.118251
(1.327922)
-2.06128*
(1.210308)
-32.02371**
(15.4684)
2.226291
(1.720141)
1.723953**
(0.835732)
1.320719
(1.290945)
2.180358
(1.393098)
2.72264**
(1.229702)
0.446782
(0.688297)

-15.03815
(36.97279)
-0.710806
(0.927554)
-1.33044*
(0.724408)
-0.171905***
(0.061709)
-0.125764*
(0.064873)
-0.065965
(0.111423)
-0.075485
(0.122348)
1.421979
(1.319311)
4.322217***
(1.20246)
14.88081
(15.36809)
-2.263978
(1.708986)
-0.673497
(0.830313)
-2.961997**
(1.282573)
-5.185967***
(1.384064)
-1.696956
(1.221727)
-1.783921***
(0.683833)

-51.47541*
(26.41305)
-1.394423**
(0.662637)
0.098934
(0.517511)
-0.059456
(0.044085)
0.068283
(0.046345)
-0.283465***
(0.0796)
-0.031111
(0.087404)
0.849948
(0.942505)
-1.424448*
(0.859027)
23.86739**
(10.97883)
-2.274028*
(1.220885)
0.607026
(0.593168)
1.475402
(0.91626)
1.954531**
(0.988764)
1.099031
(0.872792)
0.409761
(0.488525)

-0.3671
1108

0.0687
1108

0.1171
1108

0.0272
1108

0.0700
1108

0.2850
1108

-0.0326
1108

0.0809
1108

0.3272
1108

0.1459
1108

0.0652
1108

Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) squared
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

106

Mean of X

0.3096
0.7238
36.3231
34.0821
10.1507
10.1182
4.4212
4.2504
4.7121
22.4408
0.5135
0.1119
0.1092
0.0930
0.2527

1108

Appendix B 2. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with kids, no others (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

-27.07517
(18.7014)
-0.730986*
(0.383406)
3.272844***
(0.462644)
-1.811373**
(0.790274)
0.05554
(0.048068)
-0.036293
(0.049871)
0.070495
(0.089215)
0.011183
(0.090371)
-0.844596
(1.135116)
-1.80264**
(0.711058)
19.79739***
(7.586763)
-1.736469**
(0.691695)
-1.190084
(0.812016)
-1.219607
(1.199282)
-1.499981
(1.204216)
-0.362646
(1.012324)
-1.397994***
(0.523303)

46.70066***
(9.851053)
0.82168***
(0.201961)
0.200861
(0.2437)
0.477367
(0.416281)
-0.010764
(0.02532)
0.024325
(0.02627)
0.121219***
(0.046994)
0.042395
(0.047603)
1.878057***
(0.597928)
0.456231
(0.374553)
-16.01339***
(3.996363)
0.986341***
(0.364354)
-0.628228
(0.427733)
-1.501333**
(0.631727)
-1.872099***
(0.634326)
-1.344831**
(0.533247)
-0.282359
(0.275652)

-13.06479
(12.20895)
0.385655
(0.250301)
0.08528
(0.302031)
0.217669
(0.515919)
-0.021783
(0.031381)
0.002598
(0.032558)
0.084918
(0.058243)
0.051959
(0.058997)
0.879979
(0.741045)
-0.489545
(0.464204)
3.87378
(4.952912)
-0.324995
(0.451564)
1.896695***
(0.530113)
3.088974***
(0.782934)
1.376052*
(0.786155)
2.350018***
(0.660882)
-0.571926*
(0.341631)

38.16406***
(11.6437)
-0.3629
(0.238713)
-0.725894**
(0.288047)
-0.209921
(0.492033)
-0.020235
(0.029928)
-0.088932***
(0.03105)
0.021044
(0.055546)
0.0526
(0.056266)
-1.064711
(0.706736)
-0.039548
(0.442712)
-11.75277**
(4.723601)
1.41303***
(0.430657)
-0.817846
(0.50557)
-0.602981
(0.746686)
0.147616
(0.749758)
-0.878168
(0.630284)
0.317683
(0.325814)

3.825765
(3.183122)
-0.020674
(0.065259)
-0.073228
(0.078746)
0.093963
(0.134511)
0.000901
(0.008182)
-0.005311
(0.008488)
-0.009573
(0.015185)
0.022837
(0.015382)
0.005645
(0.193205)
-0.006513
(0.121028)
-2.080678
(1.291325)
0.285225**
(0.117732)
0.074493
(0.138211)
0.347936*
(0.204127)
0.189557
(0.204967)
0.046207
(0.172305)
-0.06309
(0.08907)

-48.72525*
(25.18992)
-2.381946***
(0.51643)
-0.849914
(0.62316)
1.72237
(1.064462)
0.081714
(0.064745)
-0.053111
(0.067174)
-0.057506
(0.120168)
-0.082679
(0.121725)
-3.002602**
(1.528948)
-0.866147
(0.957762)
19.12037*
(10.21901)
-0.158811
(0.931681)
-0.078204
(1.093747)
2.175121*
(1.615376)
2.293262
(1.622022)
0.801865
(1.363553)
2.156006***
(0.704865)

-6.110155
(7.898942)
0.745909***
(0.16194)
0.172063
(0.195408)
0.692103**
(0.333789)
-0.003931
(0.020303)
0.065179***
(0.021064)
0.010461
(0.037682)
0.038484
(0.03817)
0.787537*
(0.479441)
0.31788
(0.300331)
0.163246
(3.204433)
-0.080013
(0.292152)
-1.004509***
(0.342973)
-1.005702**
(0.506543)
-2.236365***
(0.508627)
-1.158697***
(0.427577)
-0.47253**
(0.221028)

8.864514
(6.026867)
-0.164009
(0.12356)
0.00497
(0.149096)
0.726058***
(0.25468)
0.024291
(0.015491)
0.022501
(0.016072)
0.071084**
(0.028751)
0.013522
(0.029124)
0.609969*
(0.365812)
0.154003
(0.229151)
-4.563137*
(2.444972)
0.376655*
(0.222911)
0.300872
(0.261687)
-0.23559
(0.38649)
-0.204434
(0.38808)
-0.475059
(0.32624)
-0.084468
(0.168644)

192.1982***
(29.78319)
2.489822***
(0.610599)
-0.460428
(0.736791)
1.694695
(1.258562)
-0.094235
(0.076551)
0.089348
(0.079423)
0.035768
(0.14208)
0.140702
(0.143921)
4.509908**
(1.807745)
2.595327**
(1.132405)
-55.30267***
(12.08241)
2.846081***
(1.101569)
-0.960786
(1.293188)
-4.286141**
(1.909933)
-1.772685
(1.917791)
-0.803184
(1.612191)
-0.282372
(0.833394)

-80.93303***
(20.36396)
-0.430252
(0.417491)
-0.371751
(0.503773)
-2.963834***
(0.86053)
0.003674
(0.052341)
-0.006282
(0.054305)
-0.259386***
(0.097146)
-0.126655
(0.098405)
-2.439566**
(1.236028)
-0.186072
(0.774271)
38.49522***
(8.261229)
-3.168636***
(0.753187)
0.108061
(0.884204)
0.385756
(1.305898)
0.772038
(1.311271)
0.093213
(1.10232)
0.001287
(0.569825)

-7.243901
(14.65968)
-0.386112
(0.300545)
-1.017421***
(0.362658)
0.043822
(0.619481)
-0.008215
(0.03768)
0.012933
(0.039093)
-0.010415
(0.069934)
-0.187247***
(0.07084)
-0.480919
(0.889796)
0.175832
(0.557385)
4.925731
(5.947123)
-0.389921
(0.542207)
2.216059***
(0.636524)
2.06145**
(0.940095)
2.266103**
(0.943962)
1.297021
(0.793542)
0.500987
(0.410208)

0.0433
1112

-0.0026
1112

0.1126
1112

0.0593
1112

0.1375
1112

0.0449
1112

0.1366
1112

0.0658
1112

0.2258
1112

0.0502
1112

0.0606
1112

Household size
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) squared
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

107

Mean of X

3.4874
0.5549
0.8948
38.2932
35.7113
10.6124
10.6484
4.5320
4.2619
4.9004
24.3101
0.3786
0.1871
0.1691
0.1538
0.2590

1112

Appendix B 3. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with others, no kids (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

-25.61885
(56.82421)
-0.879125
(0.898599)
3.554106***
(1.377573)
-0.031124
(1.959949)
-0.009907
(0.112614)
-0.099643
(0.123587)
0.231971
(0.216644)
-0.295399
(0.222477)
-4.738013***
(1.751813)
-0.415576
(1.430123)
21.58927
(21.57862)
-1.278054
(1.917996)
-5.144769**
(2.386291)
-6.279053**
(2.919854)
-4.827132
(3.39181)
-5.636813*
(2.906495)
-0.435998
(1.315775)

27.31265
(21.66995)
0.055263
(0.342681)
-0.13795
(0.525339)
-0.352592
(0.747428)
0.04264
(0.042945)
-0.059018
(0.04713)
-0.046622
(0.082617)
0.079593
(0.084842)
0.206653
(0.668055)
0.836533
(0.545378)
-6.894372
(8.229019)
0.460972
(0.731429)
-0.803852
(0.910014)
-0.635105
(1.113488)
-1.275695
(1.293469)
-1.426474
(1.108394)
-0.780954
(0.501772)

1.854806
(28.1551)
-0.158361
(0.445235)
-0.620215
(0.682556)
0.018355
(0.97111)
-0.040605
(0.055797)
0.020686
(0.061234)
-0.154873
(0.107342)
0.108263
(0.110232)
1.591681*
(0.867984)
1.211682*
(0.708593)
-2.777329
(10.69171)
0.127334
(0.950324)
1.601529
(1.182353)
1.591262
(1.446721)
2.765194*
(1.680565)
2.534088*
(1.440102)
0.461764
(0.651937)

26.06031*
(14.6156)
0.376621
(0.231126)
0.182236
(0.354322)
0.142497
(0.504113)
0.022828
(0.028965)
-0.058775*
(0.031787)
0.054145
(0.055723)
0.039726
(0.057223)
-0.120773
(0.450579)
0.214957
(0.367838)
-8.376433
(5.550177)
0.714234
(0.493323)
0.104703
(0.613772)
-0.412086
(0.751008)
-0.365332
(0.872398)
-0.765105
(0.747572)
-0.103289
(0.338427)

0.337827
(9.015585)
-0.176773
(0.142569)
0.410301*
(0.218562)
-0.573504*
(0.310961)
-0.022877
(0.017867)
0.009895
(0.019608)
-0.057776*
(0.034372)
0.058939*
(0.035298)
0.187742
(0.277938)
0.220527
(0.2269)
0.138361
(3.423608)
-0.030262
(0.304304)
-0.085461
(0.378603)
-0.002109
(0.463257)
0.411625
(0.538136)
0.078881
(0.461137)
-0.070692
(0.208758)

-102.6561*
(52.61389)
-1.268152
(0.832018)
-1.895847
(1.275504)
4.881945***
(1.814729)
0.126396
(0.10427)
-0.225877**
(0.11443)
0.199243
(0.200592)
-0.167527
(0.205993)
1.197689
(1.622015)
2.415432*
(1.32416)
36.72306*
(19.97977)
-3.017101*
(1.775885)
3.561109
(2.209482)
2.632052
(2.703511)
4.40822
(3.140498)
2.282409
(2.691142)
1.125143
(1.218285)

2.80779
(34.25972)
0.564737
(0.541772)
-0.191142
(0.830549)
-2.031213*
(1.181668)
0.000089
(0.067896)
0.045189
(0.074511)
0.102694
(0.130616)
-0.351513***
(0.134133)
1.007742
(1.056181)
-0.894615
(0.862231)
-3.22489
(13.0099)
0.657454
(1.156374)
-0.479043
(1.438712)
1.6958
(1.760401)
-0.400069
(2.044947)
1.429972
(1.752347)
0.437793
(0.793291)

-28.20247
(17.70175)
-0.226353
(0.279929)
-0.394512
(0.429139)
0.744151
(0.610559)
0.001947
(0.035081)
0.023392
(0.038499)
-0.040897
(0.067489)
0.000085
(0.069306)
-0.514328
(0.545721)
0.837718*
(0.445509)
9.905021
(6.72212)
-0.826341
(0.59749)
0.149204
(0.743372)
0.064322
(0.909586)
-0.265728
(1.056609)
-0.534617
(0.905425)
0.459218
(0.409887)

234.9178***
(58.21718)
1.983536**
(0.920626)
0.155219
(1.411343)
0.644433
(2.007995)
-0.01089
(0.115374)
0.179737
(0.126616)
0.025793
(0.221955)
0.210372
(0.227931)
2.09115
(1.794757)
-0.35681
(1.465181)
-71.77256***
(22.10759)
5.048543***
(1.965013)
-1.773634
(2.444788)
0.003903
(2.99143)
-1.706248
(3.474956)
0.005731
(2.977744)
-0.954762
(1.34803)

-34.78545
(47.18976)
0.7106
(0.746243)
-0.410918
(1.144008)
-1.98897
(1.627643)
0.019513
(0.09352)
-0.02761
(0.102633)
0.008118
(0.179913)
0.100814
(0.184756)
-1.149982
(1.454796)
-1.590978
(1.187648)
21.61752
(17.92)
-1.979624
(1.592803)
0.980238
(1.981699)
-0.759049
(2.424797)
-2.419498
(2.816734)
-0.656034
(2.413703)
-0.744665
(1.092688)

-23.81864
(35.84237)
-1.004357*
(0.566799)
0.366698
(0.868917)
-0.221118
(1.236255)
-0.102483
(0.071032)
0.062514
(0.077953)
-0.315493**
(0.13665)
-0.046089
(0.140329)
-0.554111
(1.104972)
-2.001522**
(0.902063)
12.73711
(13.6109)
-0.72757
(1.209793)
2.161044
(1.505174)
1.380445
(1.841723)
4.57288**
(2.139414)
2.328051
(1.833297)
0.562215
(0.829937)

-0.0051
314

0.0757
314

0.0953
314

0.0721
314

0.0904
314

0.3138
314

0.1446
314

0.0993
314

0.3112
314

0.1049
314

0.0627
314

Household size
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) squared
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

108

Mean of X

3.4076
0.7994
0.9204
47.3567
45.2580
11.9841
11.9172
4.9861
4.7709
5.3622
29.1275
0.3854
0.2038
0.2420
0.0828
0.2293

314

Appendix B 4. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with kids and others (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

6.154422
(45.0715)
-0.302238
(0.847523)
0.096747
(1.289449)
-1.542526
(1.098359)
2.119038**
(0.985143)
-0.585685
(1.633865)
0.22776**
(0.102027)
-0.196358*
(0.103133)
0.260119*
(0.149186)
-0.085892
(0.157097)
-3.178818*
(1.751434)
-0.879336
(1.231024)
4.435848
(17.68147)
0.187568
(1.666983)
-2.00979
(1.892014)
-2.339502
(2.254637)
-2.1175
(2.31045)
-2.839759
(2.158616)
0.262274
(1.054227)

52.37576**
(22.608)
1.173707***
(0.42512)
-0.686081
(0.646792)
-1.118562**
(0.55094)
-0.361523
(0.494151)
-2.517305***
(0.819552)
-0.033635
(0.051177)
-0.015125
(0.051732)
-0.004203
(0.074832)
0.004557
(0.0788)
0.366119
(0.878525)
0.344246
(0.617485)
-17.79263**
(8.869077)
1.615196*
(0.836164)
1.00081
(0.94904)
1.558448
(1.130933)
1.062708
(1.158928)
0.099553
(1.082769)
-0.278426
(0.528804)

42.58459
(29.01921)
-0.628418
(0.545676)
0.193675
(0.83021)
1.419133**
(0.707176)
-0.083377
(0.634283)
-0.289907
(1.051961)
0.04533
(0.06569)
-0.041338
(0.066402)
0.005595
(0.096053)
0.182914*
(0.101147)
-0.556715
(1.127658)
-0.244973
(0.792593)
-15.85204
(11.38418)
1.646126
(1.073284)
1.330134
(1.21817)
2.329148
(1.451644)
2.897623*
(1.487579)
2.985717**
(1.389821)
0.176892
(0.678762)

8.230505
(13.97275)
-0.168187
(0.262743)
0.091406
(0.399746)
-0.22354
(0.340506)
0.006043
(0.305407)
-0.145054
(0.50652)
0.025057
(0.03163)
-0.009825
(0.031973)
-0.019722
(0.04625)
0.053392
(0.048702)
-0.68275
(0.542968)
0.038585
(0.381634)
-0.926077
(5.481486)
0.123951
(0.516786)
-0.329577
(0.586549)
0.154644
(0.698967)
-0.050167
(0.71627)
-0.01329
(0.669199)
-0.303672
(0.326824)

-1.679992
(5.321528)
0.019659
(0.100066)
-0.207596
(0.152244)
-0.189808
(0.129682)
-0.013365
(0.116314)
0.027266
(0.192908)
0.013872
(0.012046)
-0.017337
(0.012177)
0.013822
(0.017614)
0.011812
(0.018548)
-0.053828
(0.206789)
-0.005282
(0.145345)
0.600567
(2.087625)
-0.024055
(0.196818)
0.013426
(0.223387)
0.11663
(0.266202)
0.226563
(0.272792)
-0.095353
(0.254865)
0.000143
(0.124471)

-117.9231***
(39.73806)
0.561311
(0.747233)
-2.121443*
(1.136865)
-1.529427
(0.968387)
1.55324*
(0.868568)
5.32202***
(1.440525)
-0.095664
(0.089954)
0.032956
(0.090929)
0.006629
(0.131533)
-0.062077
(0.138507)
4.963152***
(1.544182)
2.071111*
(1.085353)
40.49643***
(15.58917)
-3.968796***
(1.469724)
-1.254699
(1.668126)
-2.094627
(1.987839)
-2.482786
(2.037047)
-2.72452
(1.903181)
1.677691*
(0.929478)

17.79944
(22.03483)
-0.048437
(0.414342)
-0.739852
(0.630394)
0.762584
(0.536972)
-0.746568
(0.481623)
0.307071
(0.798774)
-0.011706
(0.049879)
0.09491*
(0.05042)
-0.029764
(0.072935)
0.029294
(0.076803)
-0.485016
(0.856252)
-0.385821
(0.601831)
-7.934113
(8.644225)
1.044202
(0.814965)
-0.344413
(0.92498)
0.433544
(1.102261)
-0.244444
(1.129547)
-0.90589
(1.055318)
0.254999
(0.515397)

-12.07322
(10.14506)
-0.23134
(0.190767)
-0.003654
(0.29024)
0.138498
(0.247228)
0.071009
(0.221744)
0.005513
(0.367764)
0.017866
(0.022965)
-0.02557
(0.023214)
-0.03423
(0.03358)
-0.041624
(0.035361)
0.220262
(0.394227)
0.382875
(0.277089)
3.883188
(3.979889)
-0.279865
(0.375218)
0.833894**
(0.42587)
0.706575
(0.507492)
0.540927
(0.520055)
0.153266
(0.485879)
-0.368004
(0.237294)

155.8969***
(47.49944)
0.581497
(0.893178)
3.126523**
(1.35891)
0.597157
(1.157526)
-1.968085*
(1.038211)
-2.59831
(1.721879)
-0.036805
(0.107523)
0.069082
(0.108689)
-0.050316
(0.157223)
-0.096115
(0.16556)
1.058018
(1.845782)
1.224267
(1.297338)
-39.38447**
(18.63394)
2.317923
(1.756781)
2.620172
(1.993934)
3.848144
(2.376091)
2.606285
(2.43491)
5.862242***
(2.274898)
-1.504496
(1.111017)

-15.44152
(39.8893)
-0.901002
(0.750077)
-0.064005
(1.141192)
1.369963
(0.972073)
0.52613
(0.871874)
-0.537942
(1.446008)
-0.053534
(0.090296)
0.031501
(0.091275)
-0.082893
(0.132033)
0.009652
(0.139035)
-0.424701
(1.550059)
-0.864015
(1.089484)
13.74927
(15.6485)
-1.176304
(1.475318)
-1.247703
(1.674475)
-3.416103*
(1.995405)
-2.165421
(2.0448)
-2.217059
(1.910425)
0.587879
(0.933015)

29.24307
(28.1744)
-0.238985
(0.52979)
0.223617
(0.806041)
0.13622
(0.686589)
-0.767593
(0.615817)
0.044418
(1.021337)
-0.125662**
(0.063777)
0.110437*
(0.064469)
-0.105425
(0.093257)
-0.030831
(0.098202)
1.370773
(1.09483)
-1.182051
(0.769519)
-8.142981
(11.05277)
0.670519
(1.042039)
0.580655
(1.182707)
0.154179
(1.409384)
1.172265
(1.444273)
1.067441
(1.349361)
-0.575139
(0.659002)

-0.0222
399

0.1008
399

0.1071
399

0.0444
399

0.1001
399

0.3970
399

0.1127
399

0.1384
399

0.4394
399

0.0705
399

0.0714
399

Household size
Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) squared
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

109

Mean of X

4.5639
0.3333
1.0251
0.7820
0.9223
42.3008
39.3158
11.1404
11.2682
4.7618
4.4401
5.1068
26.3557
0.3784
0.1779
0.2506
0.1078
0.2431

399

Appendix B 5. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with one dependent (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

9.607692
(26.65131)
-0.650086
(0.913061)
-0.275904
(0.74374)
2.686896***
(0.63678)
-2.983845***
(1.010479)
0.05366
(0.061877)
-0.073779
(0.064889)
0.070368
(0.108222)
0.003556
(0.113857)
-3.090336***
(1.090599)
-3.038903***
(0.844523)
5.199436
(10.65526)
0.351113
(1.085655)
-0.582077
(1.078839)
0.19376
(1.436459)
0.394799
(1.620599)
0.08295
(1.31566)
-1.313874*
(0.684084)

42.48559***
(11.31006)
-0.668379*
(0.387477)
-1.116219***
(0.315622)
0.093966
(0.270231)
-0.17903
(0.428819)
0.012515
(0.026259)
-0.013807
(0.027537)
0.037633
(0.045927)
0.002206
(0.048318)
1.416274***
(0.46282)
0.147012
(0.358392)
-13.30208***
(4.521792)
0.967795**
(0.460721)
-0.092479
(0.457829)
-0.515386
(0.609593)
-0.690179
(0.687736)
-0.866827
(0.558329)
-0.173014
(0.290306)

-24.63638
(15.39001)
-0.031233
(0.527255)
0.07506
(0.429479)
0.309029
(0.367714)
0.516733
(0.583509)
-0.032657
(0.035732)
0.02437
(0.037471)
0.10798*
(0.062494)
0.091314
(0.065748)
1.502389***
(0.629775)
0.352069
(0.487676)
9.052442
(6.152967)
-1.152427*
(0.62692)
1.43887**
(0.622984)
1.93606**
(0.829495)
1.44015
(0.935828)
2.071783***
(0.759739)
-0.7284*
(0.39503)

26.89102**
(13.60178)
2.905046***
(0.465991)
-0.035088
(0.379576)
-0.196694
(0.324987)
0.233245
(0.515709)
0.013883
(0.03158)
-0.049091
(0.033117)
0.029022
(0.055233)
0.066063
(0.058108)
-0.356497
(0.556599)
0.160246
(0.431011)
-8.885799
(5.438027)
0.905914
(0.554076)
-0.791977
(0.550597)
-1.04116
(0.733112)
-0.664091
(0.82709)
-2.147145***
(0.671461)
0.20093
(0.34913)

-4.215899
(4.059494)
-0.098003
(0.139076)
-0.087111
(0.113286)
0.116882
(0.096994)
0.031362
(0.153915)
-0.002088
(0.009425)
-0.002155
(0.009884)
-0.01487
(0.016484)
0.046268***
(0.017343)
0.240997
(0.166119)
0.164039
(0.128637)
1.327467
(1.622996)
-0.151051
(0.165366)
0.050652
(0.164327)
0.198178
(0.2188)
0.060925
(0.246848)
-0.00415
(0.2004)
-0.112757
(0.104199)

-27.42558
(26.77895)
-3.275267***
(0.917434)
-0.424395
(0.747302)
-0.760717
(0.639829)
4.097538***
(1.015319)
0.088324
(0.062174)
-0.143486**
(0.0652)
0.14611
(0.108741)
-0.007107
(0.114402)
3.06232***
(1.095823)
2.23176***
(0.848567)
7.16444
(10.70629)
-0.547099
(1.090855)
-1.1552
(1.084006)
-1.657388
(1.443338)
-1.115607
(1.62836)
-1.444293
(1.321961)
1.409834**
(0.68736)

-5.041132
(11.80278)
-2.126959***
(0.404358)
-0.210814
(0.329372)
-0.077993
(0.282004)
0.156601
(0.4475)
-0.013996
(0.027403)
0.005945
(0.028737)
0.016457
(0.047927)
-0.092477*
(0.050423)
0.493707
(0.482982)
0.232867
(0.374005)
1.43849
(4.718783)
-0.021741
(0.480793)
-0.744492
(0.477774)
0.081922
(0.636149)
-1.624949**
(0.717698)
-0.055527
(0.582653)
0.04108
(0.302953)

6.376922
(7.700325)
-0.342395
(0.26381)
0.056562
(0.214888)
-0.316441*
(0.183984)
0.57099**
(0.291956)
0.014854
(0.017878)
0.015746
(0.018748)
0.056547*
(0.031269)
-0.005442
(0.032897)
-0.345091
(0.315105)
0.011217
(0.244007)
-3.561425
(3.07861)
0.506044
(0.313677)
0.418911
(0.311708)
0.103423
(0.415034)
0.562846
(0.468237)
-0.160096
(0.380132)
0.072367
(0.197651)

194.4819***
(33.41395)
5.996606***
(1.144746)
1.198084
(0.932461)
0.324629
(0.798359)
0.902666
(1.266883)
-0.10058
(0.077578)
0.222764***
(0.081354)
-0.198238
(0.135683)
0.065373
(0.142747)
1.12858
(1.367334)
1.761983*
(1.058816)
-55.05468***
(13.35898)
3.602141***
(1.361135)
-0.969
(1.352589)
-2.108153
(1.800953)
-1.721088
(2.031818)
0.646891
(1.649502)
-0.954475
(0.857667)

-93.11088***
(25.62627)
-1.782388**
(0.877944)
0.768925
(0.715135)
-0.659689
(0.612288)
-2.613578***
(0.971615)
0.014975
(0.059497)
-0.042313
(0.062393)
-0.129934
(0.10406)
-0.053659
(0.109478)
-2.412884**
(1.048654)
-0.808774
(0.812041)
44.33611***
(10.24545)
-3.838641***
(1.0439)
-0.101907
(1.037346)
0.026372
(1.381211)
-0.345787
(1.558269)
0.234282
(1.265058)
1.010658
(0.657773)

-26.61102
(18.76658)
0.149236
(0.642934)
0.662742
(0.523706)
-1.208039***
(0.44839)
-0.444755
(0.711531)
-0.063126
(0.043571)
0.032864
(0.045692)
-0.095191
(0.076205)
-0.227754***
(0.080173)
-1.349154*
(0.767948)
-0.921466
(0.594673)
12.98756*
(7.502928)
-0.827672
(0.764467)
3.053339***
(0.759667)
2.671003***
(1.011486)
4.243144***
(1.141149)
1.83598**
(0.926425)
0.626047
(0.481699)

-0.0973
846

0.0723
846

0.0443
846

0.1556
846

0.0951
846

0.3401
846

0.1659
846

0.1589
846

0.3977
846

0.0870
846

0.0716

Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) squared
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

110

846

Mean of X

0.3191
0.4350
0.5875
0.8913
40.2884
37.8712
10.7742
10.8416
4.5944
4.3593
4.9202
24.5081
0.3865
0.2092
0.1631
0.1312
0.2541

846

Appendix B 6. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with two dependents (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

-25.94597
(31.14947)
-0.213211
(0.706221)
-0.794166
(0.504697)
3.348566***
(0.706059)
0.031207
(1.246085)
0.064447
(0.072918)
-0.085666
(0.079126)
0.108976
(0.122796)
-0.229022*
(0.128698)
-3.683913**
(1.71899)
-1.205059
(1.04392)
17.54364
(12.15356)
-0.889276
(1.15417)
-2.524624**
(1.260757)
-2.198517
(1.855929)
-1.904761
(1.777856)
-1.346234
(1.614045)
-0.113413
(0.787828)

49.71399***
(14.29068)
-0.062337
(0.323998)
-0.30794
(0.231544)
0.025581
(0.323924)
-0.377858
(0.571676)
-0.022606
(0.033453)
0.034745
(0.036301)
0.048025
(0.056336)
0.074249
(0.059044)
0.172662
(0.788634)
0.528851
(0.478927)
-14.95976***
(5.575778)
1.146844**
(0.529507)
-0.341107
(0.578407)
-0.583303
(0.851458)
-1.18679
(0.81564)
-1.017177
(0.740488)
-0.254093
(0.361438)

15.2075
(18.82204)
0.439968
(0.426734)
0.720806**
(0.304963)
-0.228717
(0.426636)
-0.226687
(0.752946)
0.008764
(0.044061)
-0.029967
(0.047812)
0.014582
(0.074199)
0.081762
(0.077766)
-0.254161
(1.038698)
-0.678645
(0.630788)
-6.457366
(7.343777)
0.883368
(0.697406)
1.810907**
(0.761812)
2.972044***
(1.121443)
2.159979**
(1.074268)
2.491754**
(0.975286)
0.131249
(0.476044)

5.842335
(13.0403)
1.550279***
(0.29565)
0.179793
(0.211285)
-0.41986
(0.295582)
-0.49439
(0.521657)
0.009031
(0.030526)
-0.007361
(0.033125)
-0.10668**
(0.051407)
0.017556
(0.053878)
-1.459282**
(0.719632)
-0.244235
(0.437023)
-1.320407
(5.087921)
0.492247
(0.483177)
0.268513
(0.527799)
1.007097
(0.776959)
1.665501**
(0.744275)
1.275628*
(0.675698)
0.02186
(0.329813)

0.148954
(4.172485)
-0.080883
(0.094599)
0.036415
(0.067604)
-0.082249
(0.094577)
-0.011207
(0.166914)
0.001189
(0.009767)
-0.012654
(0.010599)
0.015411
(0.016449)
0.005584
(0.017239)
0.049629
(0.230259)
0.090925
(0.139834)
-0.241456
(1.627974)
0.051401
(0.154602)
-0.02521
(0.168879)
0.026419
(0.248602)
0.202605
(0.238145)
-0.045127
(0.216202)
-0.065041
(0.10553)

-135.043***
(33.16421)
-0.38795
(0.7519)
0.750998
(0.537341)
0.258031
(0.751727)
1.089079
(1.326682)
-0.015922
(0.077634)
-0.016783
(0.084244)
0.12397
(0.130738)
0.051034
(0.137022)
-1.540365
(1.830174)
-1.037598
(1.111441)
51.16108***
(12.93965)
-3.751024***
(1.228821)
0.370177
(1.342303)
1.502531
(1.97597)
1.303717
(1.892848)
0.437815
(1.718442)
2.481049***
(0.838784)

11.21353
(14.17913)
-1.114623***
(0.32147)
-0.486703**
(0.229737)
-0.379648
(0.321396)
-0.35629
(0.567214)
-0.025621
(0.033192)
0.12452***
(0.036018)
0.011195
(0.055896)
0.004308
(0.058583)
-0.04397
(0.782478)
-0.862611*
(0.475189)
-4.540637
(5.532258)
0.697244
(0.525374)
-0.980737*
(0.573892)
-0.664532
(0.844813)
-1.642774**
(0.809274)
-1.319636*
(0.734708)
-0.343108
(0.358617)

-0.034415
(8.504395)
0.056878
(0.192812)
-0.010308
(0.137792)
0.086162
(0.192768)
0.666445**
(0.340205)
0.029907
(0.019908)
-0.001184
(0.021603)
-0.007249
(0.033526)
0.027523
(0.035137)
0.640743
(0.469317)
0.321761
(0.28501)
-1.305593
(3.318151)
0.070604
(0.31511)
0.446319
(0.344211)
0.393025
(0.506704)
-0.328103
(0.485388)
-0.127008
(0.440665)
-0.179432
(0.215092)

213.2955***
(41.75173)
1.669201*
(0.946596)
0.283052
(0.67648)
-1.711844*
(0.946378)
2.847611*
(1.670212)
-0.005541
(0.097737)
0.051942
(0.106058)
0.021591
(0.164592)
0.042435
(0.172503)
6.97923***
(2.304077)
2.933841**
(1.399236)
-63.26694***
(16.29023)
3.343394**
(1.547011)
-0.003882
(1.689878)
-2.605829
(2.487626)
-0.991387
(2.38298)
-0.493286
(2.163413)
-1.059636
(1.055979)

-62.0318**
(26.87952)
-2.317174***
(0.609413)
-0.747008*
(0.435514)
0.257495
(0.609273)
-2.476033**
(1.075273)
-0.022428
(0.062922)
-0.037143
(0.06828)
-0.140033
(0.105963)
0.091117
(0.111056)
0.080463
(1.483352)
0.333003
(0.90082)
32.09322***
(10.48755)
-3.213066***
(0.995957)
-0.310451
(1.087933)
-2.095037
(1.601519)
-2.044136
(1.534149)
-1.58082
(1.392793)
-1.456804**
(0.679833)

19.11897
(20.35923)
0.255049
(0.461585)
0.567646*
(0.329869)
-0.585396
(0.461479)
0.466059
(0.814439)
0.004433
(0.047659)
0.014681
(0.051717)
-0.024609
(0.080259)
-0.149014*
(0.084117)
0.56298
(1.123528)
-0.104787
(0.682304)
-6.294794
(7.943538)
0.529381
(0.754363)
0.762328
(0.824028)
0.963203
(1.213031)
1.481256
(1.162003)
0.688144
(1.054937)
0.076254
(0.514923)

-0.0765
728

0.0908
728

0.0857
728

0.0051
728

0.1033
728

0.1879
728

0.1484
728

0.0680
728

0.1792
728

0.0817
728

0.0322

Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) squared
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero

111

728

Mean of X

0.3709
1.0742
0.6731
0.9203
40.9560
38.2967
11.0783
11.1635
4.7127
4.4034
5.0507
25.8142
0.3819
0.1676
0.2294
0.1277
0.2473

728

Appendix B 7. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with three or more dependents (3SLS)
Variable

Housing

Household
operations

Clothing&
Footwear

Personal&
Services

Cosmetic

Transportation&
Communication

Education

Recreation&
Religion

Food in

Food out

Alcohol&
Tobacco

Constant

15.77136
(38.30264)
0.400745
(0.764659)
-0.81359
(0.50029)
1.424702
(1.064019)
0.78019
(1.562153)
0.186726*
(0.106681)
-0.116002
(0.106153)
0.279775
(0.183628)
0.008724
(0.174754)
1.515908
(1.883489)
-0.87907
(1.336922)
1.352251
(14.12661)
-0.517995
(1.106385)
-3.904303**
(1.925625)
-6.576808***
(2.054854)
-6.073314***
(2.291469)
-5.140622**
(2.138454)
-0.969292
(1.085604)

81.18375***
(25.21963)
-0.244075
(0.503475)
-0.43458
(0.329406)
-0.099615
(0.700583)
-0.36346
(1.028569)
0.025066
(0.070242)
-0.028767
(0.069894)
0.200276*
(0.120906)
0.072251
(0.115063)
2.678484**
(1.240147)
0.396308
(0.88027)
-26.6478***
(9.301389)
1.846468**
(0.728478)
-1.595942
(1.26789)
-0.554597
(1.352978)
-2.208436
(1.508773)
-1.379728
(1.408024)
-1.839902***
(0.714795)

8.541248
(28.22445)
-0.432096
(0.563462)
0.559276
(0.368654)
-0.641984
(0.784055)
-0.001734
(1.151119)
-0.001481
(0.078611)
0.012862
(0.078222)
-0.108136
(0.135312)
0.211039
(0.128773)
0.63914
(1.387906)
0.613029
(0.985151)
-4.802379
(10.40962)
0.405958
(0.815273)
1.351703
(1.418954)
2.524154*
(1.51418)
1.958462
(1.688538)
3.416182**
(1.575784)
0.599857
(0.79996)

27.17966*
(15.38049)
1.095245***
(0.30705)
0.167172
(0.200892)
-0.322673
(0.427259)
-0.025579
(0.627285)
0.027991
(0.042838)
-0.001871
(0.042626)
0.198217***
(0.073736)
-0.071231
(0.070173)
-0.802076
(0.756318)
-0.559713
(0.536843)
-9.249888
(5.672563)
1.054898**
(0.444271)
-1.169132
(0.773238)
-0.897474
(0.82513)
-1.438814
(0.920143)
-1.65932*
(0.8587)
0.217152
(0.435926)

13.23764
(8.116318)
-0.122134
(0.162031)
0.103497
(0.106011)
0.039175
(0.225465)
-0.015086
(0.33102)
-0.002121
(0.022606)
-0.001064
(0.022494)
-0.018589
(0.038911)
0.053748
(0.03703)
0.061384
(0.399111)
-0.072017
(0.283293)
-5.507976*
(2.993424)
0.569407**
(0.234443)
0.027269
(0.408039)
0.289907
(0.435423)
0.241443
(0.485562)
-0.051889
(0.453138)
0.038627
(0.230039)

-138.5017***
(48.1543)
-0.524346
(0.961334)
-1.387835**
(0.628968)
-0.517948
(1.337691)
5.077748***
(1.963948)
0.118289
(0.13412)
-0.087166
(0.133456)
-0.230572
(0.230858)
-0.169032
(0.219702)
-2.84259
(2.367934)
-0.413933
(1.680786)
47.2751***
(17.76005)
-2.784879**
(1.390954)
3.696976
(2.420907)
3.652183
(2.583374)
4.790483*
(2.880848)
3.105499
(2.688477)
2.242472*
(1.364828)

-6.047831
(21.84644)
-0.647989
(0.436134)
0.539723*
(0.285348)
-0.392559
(0.606878)
0.885314
(0.890996)
0.055489
(0.060847)
0.006489
(0.060546)
-0.015136
(0.104735)
0.081032
(0.099673)
-0.577179
(1.074274)
0.544776
(0.762532)
1.017305
(8.057307)
0.034127
(0.631042)
-0.66748
(1.098307)
0.81471
(1.172014)
-0.253686
(1.306971)
-0.296188
(1.219697)
0.064928
(0.61919)

-5.162412
(11.00513)
-0.167854
(0.219702)
-0.023013
(0.143744)
0.244262
(0.305715)
-0.011693
(0.448839)
0.016806
(0.030652)
0.017053
(0.0305)
0.002345
(0.05276)
-0.067921
(0.05021)
-0.122318
(0.541165)
0.234969
(0.384125)
0.906227
(4.058864)
0.023992
(0.317887)
0.376145
(0.553272)
0.450233
(0.590402)
0.372811
(0.658386)
-0.410637
(0.614422)
0.102582
(0.311916)

133.8621***
(49.81215)
2.66877***
(0.994431)
1.290989**
(0.650622)
1.117606
(1.383745)
-4.539312**
(2.031563)
-0.054954
(0.138737)
0.1245
(0.13805)
0.160709
(0.238806)
0.05682
(0.227266)
-1.308198
(2.449456)
1.19069
(1.738652)
-28.50187
(18.37149)
1.371464
(1.438842)
0.565551
(2.504253)
2.089998
(2.672314)
1.173693
(2.980029)
2.896793
(2.781036)
0.226156
(1.411816)

-12.03124
(41.55579)
-1.691292**
(0.829604)
-0.085951
(0.542781)
-0.247919
(1.154389)
-1.831275
(1.694831)
-0.240907**
(0.115742)
0.002865
(0.115169)
-0.198827
(0.199224)
-0.401596**
(0.189596)
0.686964
(2.043459)
1.171174
(1.45047)
12.58707
(15.32642)
-1.135999
(1.200354)
0.943597
(2.089173)
-1.572364
(2.229378)
1.249037
(2.486089)
-1.748459
(2.320079)
0.659704
(1.177808)

25.07067
(29.31194)
-0.534337
(0.585172)
-0.239318
(0.382858)
-0.555687
(0.814264)
-0.77943
(1.195472)
-0.130097
(0.08164)
0.065872
(0.081236)
-0.216991
(0.140525)
0.129607
(0.133734)
1.788219
(1.441381)
-1.456643
(1.023109)
-5.980221
(10.8107)
0.439075
(0.846686)
0.596051
(1.473627)
0.296778
(1.572522)
1.316281
(1.753597)
1.65897
(1.636499)
-0.575612
(0.830783)

0.1121
251

-0.0914
251

0.0906
251

0.2152
251

0.1437
251

0.1795
251

0.1713
251

0.1801
251

0.4743
251

0.1284
251

0.0565
251

Young children
Older children
Home owner
Vehicle owner
Husband age
Wife age
Husband education (year)
Wife education (year)
Log (husband wages)
Log (wife wages)
Log (household total consumption)
Log (hh total consumption) squared
Central
North
Northeast
South
Rural

R-squared
Number of households

1

Standard error in parentheses

2

*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%

3

Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht

4

Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Mean of X

0.5657
1.4502
0.7689
0.9084
41.5538
38.6056
11.2709
11.0757
4.7307
4.4432
5.1458
26.8081
0.3506
0.1753
0.2351
0.1434
0.2470

251
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